


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CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE HARMONIZED

AND

ITS RATIONALITY VINDICATED

BY

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PREFACE.

It was suggested to the author by a friend that he should entitle this treatise "The Logic of Christianity." He himself thought of naming it "Christian Doctrine Viewed from the Speculative Stand-Point." In either case the meaning would have been this : Christian Doctrine, or Dogmatics, as an element in a rational system, *i. e.*, a system of doctrine in harmony with all other known truth, therefore founded upon the absolute philosophy of the First Principle, and its outcome in the universe, and having no necessary conflict with any certain science. In such case the Dogmatic system and the Rational system must coincide, measurably coalesce, and may throw light upon and evidence each other.

But on account of possible popular misunderstanding of the meaning of the words, there was selected the (somewhat clumsier) present title. The word "speculation" is popularly used to mean—mere guesses at truth,—the suggestion of possible solutions,—theory put forth at a venture and to be tried. This is not the sense of the word and its adjective when used by philosophic writers ; and as these occur frequently in the following treatise, it is thought wise to state beforehand their meaning.

This alone might seem to show the intent of the work, which thus becomes both Dogmatic and Apolo-

getic. The Catholic Faith, though in its main elements largely or generally agreed upon by Christian thinkers, still is variously interpreted in different Christian organizations. These differences ought to be susceptible of unification, and all thoughtful Christian literature is an effort after the same. Moreover, there are questions in Christian Doctrine yet unpronounced upon by any generally admitted authority, and not yet settled by general conviction and agreement,—which are still the matter for anxious discussion. If light can be thrown upon these, and solution attained, or progress made towards it, it will serve to harmonize and produce clearer apprehension of the whole. So far this work has Dogmatic intent, and if the Dogmatic system thus presented will bear the scrutiny of the speculative processes, and can be shown to be truly rational, *i. e.*, to have meaning not only reconcilable with all other truth, but likewise needful to supplement and unify such truth, such presentation and self-consistency must have Apologetic worth,—must exhibit the inferiority and insufficiency of any other philosophy proposed instead of the Christian philosophy, and render null any criticism of the latter.

It will be seen to be contended in this work that the Absolute Truth cannot, in its entirety, be brought within the sphere of *knowledge* ; that there is still an insoluble element, and therefore that, as a whole, it is still to be held in the region of *faith*. But it is also contended that this very fact is one evidence of the rationality, and the key-stone of the whole arch of Christian truth,—that only because it is still a matter of faith can Christianity be a remedial method at all.

What the present author has endeavored to do is to bound sharply this mystery, this one insoluble problem. Because this *does* constitute an hiatus in the entire presentation, the whole must still be held as matter of faith. Thus Christian Doctrine has its *one* mystery, and can give a reason why it is mystery ; while other philosophies have many mysteries, and can give no reason why they are such, and why they are needful.

At the present time, when all the departments of investigation are so specialized, it becomes more necessary for an exhaustive and satisfactory treatment of any one that such treatment should be confined with some rigidity within its proper limits. Had the present author in his undertaking entered upon all the criticism and the exegetical enquiries suggested by the topics of his treatise, it would have been expanded unduly, and probably have found fewer readers than now it is hoped it will find. Therefore there are only such critical allusions made and exegetical confirmation adduced as seems necessary for the proper understanding of the positions maintained. The only exception is the Exegesis, intended to be exhaustive, found in Appendix E., Volume II., which it has been thought wise to superadd, to strengthen the conclusion reached upon other grounds.

If this present work be indeed a *system*, all its parts are articulated with each other and constitute a coherent whole. It cannot then be rightly judged but as a totality ; and any criticism suggested by any part will find its answer in some other part.

That it may serve to harmonize the thought and the feeling of the followers of Jesus Christ, and bring

other souls, who now withhold themselves, to his allegiance, is the aim and the prayer of the author.

October, 1888.

While the author was reading the proofs of the first volume of this treatise he received and read the book lately published—"The Faith of the Gospel: a Manual of Christian Doctrine," by Arthur James Mason, B.D.,—and noted with gratification the frequent similarity of treatment, and the many points of coalescence with the processes and conclusions of his own work.

It will be seen, however, that he has endeavored to grasp these in a profounder and fundamental unity, and thus to afford philosophic vindication of the whole.

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CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY,—DESIGN AND METHOD,—POSTULATES.

CHRISTIAN Dogmatics, or Systematic Christian Doctrine, may be rightly called a *science*, since purporting to be founded upon facts. In admitting these it cannot escape the scrutiny of criticism, or evade the laws of testimony. But, in addition to the external evidence of their authenticity, it may have, on *a priori* grounds, sufficient reason for admitting them as possible and probable. It may be said thus to rest upon two foundations, each one of which supports the structure and strengthens the other. Thus it claims to be a coherent whole, every part of which illustrates and confirms each other part. The explication of these three grounds for holding true constitutes a distinct branch of theologic enquiry, now generally called Apologetics. With the first two divisions of this enquiry Dogmatics proper has nothing to do, but it supplies an important contribution to the third, and here identifies itself with it. It takes for granted that the intimations needful for a system of truth have been imparted to man externally, and by special means. It takes for granted that a true Philosophy furnishes no contradic-

tion, but rather vindication of the postulates on which itself depends. But Dogmatics, in unifying its own content, must relate it so to all other truth, and so unify the whole, that no philosophic objection is possible. This self-coherence is the highest form of proof. Thus Dogmatics takes its place in a complete constructive Philosophy, and becomes a part of the same. But in drawing its conclusions directly from the particular facts, and special intimations (which together is ordinarily called Divine Revelation), it is liable to constant scrutiny to see whether these coalesce and harmonize with the entire revelation of the First Principle of the universe in nature and in man. It cannot escape this test. All truth is one, and is seen to be true by virtue of its inner harmony and self-coherence. If there be any facts which Philosophy can never succeed in incorporating into its system, so as to furnish a complete whole for human knowledge, these must be sought out, defined, and sharply bounded.

The present author proposes so to treat Dogmatic results as to show their harmony with all other known truth. Thus if the so-called Divine Revelation be admitted on valid grounds, it must confirm truth otherwise reached ; and this, in turn, may throw light upon its own dark spots which still need illumination. Not only in its relation to all other truth, but in itself, Dogmatics or Christian Theology is therefore a progressive science. Treatises on Christian Doctrine will appear till the world's end, because of these reasons. And in one respect each age will have the advantage over all the preceding ones. We now have the entire past thought of the Christian world to aid us, and to render needless or brief many an investi-

gation of proposed pathways of thought : and we possess also an immense number of new facts about man and the universe, which help to the understanding of the others, and which must be unified, and take their place in the whole of knowledge. But it is also true that in the enquiry into the correctness of the object matter of the Christian Revelation as externally presented, the remote past and the early Christian generations had the advantage of us, since receiving these facts and intimations with simpler apprehension, and without being swayed by the numerous tentatives of human thought which have had their day since. Their testimony therefore must not be disregarded, if we would discern whether the primitive Christian consciousness, from which all doctrine is elaborated, has undergone no change, but has preserved its identity and continuity till the present time.

Dogmatics proper, however, starts with certain postulates, into the grounds for holding which as true it does not, or only incidentally, enter. These, therefore must rest upon rational or speculative grounds ; yet in the development of its doctrine it may strengthen these grounds. These postulates are : (1) God, the sustaining and ruling principle of the universe ; (2) man, as a spiritual, moral, and responsible being ; and (3) sin, or the deranged and abnormal relation existing between them. On these postulates, the need, the probability, and the possibility of Divine interference, or further revelation, are founded. The establishment of these postulates Dogmatics relegates to Philosophy, which in its various branches endeavors to explicate them fully. And it also pre-supposes,

that a certain point or *stadium* in the explication of these, or in the naïve admission of them, had been reached at a certain period of the world's history, wherefrom the Divine Revelation at that time had intrinsic fitness. It so implied these three postulates in its facts and intimations that they were intelligible as coalescing with the foregone rational groundwork of those to whom they were presented. This is only saying that what the Christian Revelation declares about God and man and sin, had meaning for human apprehension, and could enter into human thought without violating it. These postulates, further elaborated, are as follows :

(1) God, or the First Principle of the universe under the form of Personality, the source and sustentation of its existence and its movement ; in whom is intelligence, energy, and benevolence, taking the form both of beneficence and severity ; revealing himself in the universe as the determination by his thought and energy of something called the Divine glory susceptible of change ; revealing himself thus externally *to* man, and also *in* man, by imprinting upon or comprising within the structure of his spiritual soul an ideal outline of the end of his being, which end, when illumined, is discovered to be an image or reflection of the mode of subsistence of the First Principle itself.

(2) Man, thus existing, in whom, however, this outline or ideal end is obscured, since his impulses run counter to its realization, and in whom, therefore, this ideal end takes the form of the moral law, his relation to which is expressed by the judgment and feeling of obligation ; whence comes responsibility, which implies moral freedom.

(3) As a corollary from these, and also discoverable from observation, the fact of human sin, and the inference of its universality.

The utterances of the early Christian consciousness, from which Dogmatics derives its material to be worked up, do not undertake elaborately to prove these postulates, but only state them ; yet incidentally furnish evidence and confirmation for the same. It is by assuming these as irrefutable that Dogmatics finds a further revelation from the Divine source to be possible, and claims, therefore, that no objection to it *a priori* is valid. It is implied that these postulates need not be proven, that they are a common human possession ; that the claim of any human one that he is not morally responsible, or that he is sinless, may be disregarded, since exceptional and extravagant ; that man's moral freedom is a *dictum* of the universal human consciousness, and a primitive fact ; and that in this consciousness, when scrutinized, there is not discernible a spontaneous and constant movement towards the ideal end of his being, but native contradiction and voluntary deflection from the same, whence it takes the form of *law* ; and there is thus revealed the absolute distinction of good and evil. And if a *law*, then there is implied a personal author of the same, and an upholder of its sanctions.

It would seem then that in the regard of Dogmatics the existence of God need not be proven ; that what remains for it to do is to explicate the essential idea ; that in some form this is involved in the very structure of the human soul, and is an element in all its thought ; that it is implicit in every mental movement or conscious action ; and thus that its surety is

more impregnable than in any proof from propositions, for these pre-suppose and imply it ; in short, and to use other language, that the so-called cosmological, teleological, and ethical arguments all imply and precipitate the ontological argument ; and that this last need not be argued for, but is the indestructible *residuum* when all else is abstracted from human consciousness ; and that God is the one only existent which it is impossible to doubt as eternal.

Should, however, the speculative explication proceed further, and reach, on *a priori* grounds, the idea that Love is the essential and unifying element of the First Principle, then *a posteriori* facts may interpose objections apparently valid. It is because of the real or seeming irreconcilability of these *a priori* and *a posteriori* conclusions that what is called *faith* is a necessary resort : *i. e.*, that the human mind must still here vibrate. The Christian Revelation does not attempt to reconcile this difference, but rather emphasizes the fact and the need of this vibration. But Dogmatics, nevertheless, proceeds from the *a priori* ground, assuming that the *a posteriori* objection is susceptible of ultimate explanation and removal, and on this claims not only the possibility but the probability of a still further Divine Revelation hereafter, as a super-addition to the already progressive series of Divine interferences, or as a new phase of the development of the universe (if this form of expression be preferred, though the two are not contradictory), and proceeds to explicate the same, and incorporate it into its system of truth.

Dogmatics and Speculative Theology are each under obligations to the other. The aid which the lat-

ter has derived from the former, as a contribution to human thought, is immense, and has been indispensable. This, of course, does not consist in supplying new truth to the human mind in the sense of something beyond its grasp, for it could not be truth except as apprehended, and the mind could not incorporate any meaningless proposition into its subjective comprehension, and would be as impotent and unmoved before it as he, understanding one only language, would be before sounds uttered in another. It consists rather in supplying new facts, affording new *stimuli*, and thus enabling wider and more piercing apprehension. It thus anticipates the possible results of speculation itself, and clarifies and renders precise the tentatives and the results of human thinking. Painfully, indeed, has the human mind endeavored after a doctrine of the Godhead which should have the needed conditions of unity and plurality, or a satisfactory doctrine of the union of the Divine and human, or a doctrine of sacrifice that need not run into superstition. Of each of these it had a naïve or instinctive sense or suspicion. Its vagaries have been ended by the Christian doctrines of the Unity in Trinity, of the Incarnation, and the Atoning Sacrifice; yet for all these it finds also the evidence within itself in the absolute rationality of the same. This absolute rationality it is the aim of the present treatise to exhibit.

And the whole history of the formation of the Christian creeds shows the obligation that Dogmatics has been under to the speculative processes, to clear thinking. A profound mental movement was needed to detect, in any statement put forth, any divergence from the content of the primitive Christian conscious-

ness, to which the entire Christian world was called upon to bear testimony, and by no means to allow of any departure from or defect in the same. The suggestion of solutions of theological problems yet awaiting settlement, the attempted formulation of what still needed clear expression, the utterance of premature or incautiously worded propositions, has stimulated the thoughtful Christian mind to sink deeply into itself, and to discover the mistake or the insufficiency of many of these, and has helped to the formation of others entirely or comparatively satisfactory. Hence the unanimity with which Christian thought has accepted the result of these endeavors of the great ecumenical councils, as exhibited in the Chalcedon formula, has been something so marked, that this may be regarded as a secure standpoint for Christian theology, wherefrom to make a new departure, from which to attempt enquiry into problems left unsolved, and thus, without deranging its outline so far ascertained, to fill up the body of our Theology, and bring to light new ramifications and harmonies.

There are two methods which might be used in a treatise like the present one, either to follow the naïve procedure of the human mind when occupied with these questions, and when in such course, reaching points of coincidence with Dogmatic statements, stopping to compare and elaborate ; or to follow the course of Dogmatic Theology itself, taking up its doctrines in such order as best to show the inner coherence of the same. The latter will be, in the main, the method of the present author, though the former method must be availed of in the more deliberate establishment of the postulates.

The author's predecessors in such an undertaking have been numerous, and his successors will continue to be numerous. But each age has its own illumination which it can shed upon these problems, and if we did not think we could throw some needed light upon them, here and there, and say some things which have not been said, or have been obscurely or imperfectly said, we should not write at all. We will therefore go over the whole field of Systematic Theology in what we regard as essential to its systematic completeness, stopping to elaborate the argument more fully upon the questions about which the thought of our age has not yet reached a satisfactory statement. What these are will appear in the course of the work itself. But we do not think that the argumentative strength of this treatise will be fully apparent in any isolated portion, but in the articulation, coherence, and self-consistency of the entire doctrinal presentation.

CHAPTER II.

MORAL FREEDOM,—MOTIVES,—MOTIVE-SPRINGS.

MAN'S freedom is strictly and solely a moral one, *i. e.*, limited to a power of choice between the ideal norm, the universal idea, dimly or more clearly described in every human mind, and individualistic ideals, the material for which is supplied by the universe. The question, whether his freedom is any other than moral, is a purely philosophical one, constituting the purport of numerous treatises, and can only in this be considered in a condensed manner, and in order to show the relation between human moral freedom and physical liberty, or, as otherwise phrased, between formal and real freedom.

Man's moral freedom is not pure indifferentism. He can only move in the sphere and under the limitations in which he finds himself, and cannot yet transcend them. He can only select from the material furnished him by the universe, which moves according to ascertainable laws ; though these laws be not absolutely fixed, but constitute a hierarchy, in which the lower yields to the higher, which may yet yield to higher still,—the unity of all which is still an inference, and a matter for discovery and argument. This movement, thus progressive, continues to furnish mankind with new and enlarging material, in which to find matter for the creation of ideals, and for choice.

Moreover, the human being always chooses from a previous bias, and is born already with an inchoate character which will affect his choice. This character is derived through the principle of heredity from his ancestry, and receives modification from his environment and his education. It is a legitimate object for science to show how human choices are thus pre-determined, and how they are afterwards determined. But this alone is not as yet certain science, since certain human choices and actions are unexplainable from such known sources ; and the hiatus here can only be provisionally filled, if not indispensably filled, by assuming relations to the universe not yet discovered, if at all discoverable, by intelligence (which assumption, or fact, as we shall see hereafter, connects itself with, and is a philosophic vindication for the Christian doctrine of grace, or the mystical influence of the Holy Spirit). If these relations are forever to elude intelligence, the conclusion becomes obvious, that the known universe is not the true universe, but only one, or a provisional aspect of it.

How far these considerations of determination from the known universe, or inborn character, and from the unseen universe implying unknown influences, affect the question of man's moral freedom, will appear further on. The former may be included under the denomination of Providence ; the latter we venture to comprise under the notion of Grace. The one can be followed by the intellect ; the other is mystical, and eludes the consciousness. The extension of the known into the region of the unknown may progress (and here is the field for science, using the word in its stricter sense, as physical and psychological only),

but if there be a limit, it is desirable accurately to mark it, which also we shall endeavor.

Determination everywhere opposes itself, and victoriously, to its favorite adversary, pure Indifferentism. This latter scheme represents the human will as always *in equilibrio* ; that the intelligence looks at, sifts, and accepts or rejects all motives, the will being indifferent to them all, and able, according to its caprice, at any time to make a new beginning. According to the Psychology implied in this scheme, the human will is thought as an indifferent force-centre, and as something apart from, superadded to, or enclosed within human *nature*, or the congeries of tendencies, physical and spiritual,—is regarded as an abstract entity, or as pure Ego, and therefore as indifferent, or possibly indifferent, or once indifferent. But Determinists may and do always urge in opposition to this, that we know nothing of any such will ; that we have no evidence of the existence of any such will ; that we only know the Ego as concrete, and therefore as determined ; that, indeed, the will is the nature itself, the entire nature, with all its past behind it, focussed, and *quoad* any possible activity. A profound Determinism, however, does not deny that, as movement or change, *will* is *prius*, and that pure activity, *i. e.*, energy developing the idea, must first be thought, and is the first element of any concrete, and the token of its creaturely existence ; and here it reaches its strongest ground.

Determinism points likewise to the fact that we do not and cannot dissociate will from character ; that there is no mere arbitrariness in human choices ; that “the titillation of arbitrariness is itself a motive for

choice"¹; that the motives or ends which the mind constructs out of the material supplied by its environment, the essential conditions of its existence, are always ruled by the prevailing bent of the character.

We may say, here, that the old attempt to represent the human will as an indifferent force-centre, in the concrete ruled inevitably by forces *ab extra*, coming in the shape of motives, the stale maxim of which is, or was, that the will is governed by the strongest motive, seems to have been abandoned by writers of late days, it being clearly at length perceived that motives are not *ab extra*, but creations of the will's own; that motives are only the self-mediation, and not the producing cause of free volition.

Determinists may still urge, however, that admitting the fact of mystical relations and influences, these, as well as known influences, are still *ab extra*, and bring about necessary determinations. This is its last stronghold, and one apparently difficult to storm. And we may either decline the task, and fall back upon our consciousness of moral freedom, which no theory of determinism can explain, regarding it as a *primum* in our thinking, and the evidence that we are self-determining beings, and belong to a realm above all necessity, except the self-necessitation of love, or perfect being; or we may contend that this fortress of determinism is no stronger than any previous one, by showing, as we hope to do hereafter that these same mystical influences must be thought not as acting upon our unconscious nature, thus compelling the choice, but upon it only through the mediation of our intelligence and feeling, clarifying

¹ Julius Müller

the ends suggested, and, through intensification of emotion, enhancing or diminishing their attractiveness, thus leaving unimpaired our consciousness and conviction of moral freedom. Thus we retire upon our own impregnable stronghold, the idea of self-determination, as the highest of all ideas, and the ultimate of human thought, refusing to think of ourselves under any lower idea, and declaring that no scheme of necessity can account for the genesis of any such idea; that the idea could not be disclosed did it not originate in, and belong to, a higher realm than any such scheme or closed circle of necessity.

The aggregate of influences which determines the selection of any one motive or end, or class of motives or ends, from any other, may or may not include those which are mystical, and come from other than known or knowable relations. In the early stages of human development, the motive-spring is always the craving for pleasure or the imagination of interest, immediate or remote, but never ultimate; *i. e.*, ultimate well-being is not sought to be secured by the attempt to realize any mere individualistic ideal. The benevolent sympathies at once swarm about this, and modify it. The possibilities of the human soul, and any anticipated well-being, or ultimate perfection, compel it for a time to assume relations with other souls, and to look for its own well-being as not without reference to theirs, or only in conjunction with theirs. Thus the naïve ethic of the unreflecting soul, is an egoistic scheme lapsing by its own self-movement into an altruistic one, though the voluntary reversal of the movement is also possible. And if any altruistic scheme, or one intermediate between it and

pure egoism, becomes the rule of living, it must either respect the idea of perfection developed to the utmost of its possibilities, or stop short with an undeveloped one. It must either dwell in imagination upon some condition of things thought to be possible upon this planet, and for one's own narrow circle of family and friends, or for the existing generation, or for the ultimate generations, or it must reach forward in imagination to the utmost conceivable perfection, and assume its own immortality and some change in the environment.

Thus the motive-spring for any such scheme of living is mediated by some ideal state more or less satisfactory to human desire and aspiration, as well as to human reason, either an intermediate and transitory state of things, or the ultimate and ideal commonwealth, in short, where all the longings of the human heart may have full gratification, and all the possibilities of its being be realized through the sum of relations between the members of such commonwealth, and with their environment. To seek one's own well-being and blessedness only as included in that of the whole, cannot be liable to the charge which Kant brings against it as a motive of self-interest, and less pure than simple reverence for the moral law, since one's own absolute worth is equal to that of any other, and determines and is determined by that of the entire moral organism.

But since in the majority of cases imagination is incompetent and fails so to dwell upon this ideal state as to find attraction in it, and that sort of satisfaction which may be called æsthetic, there is required for such, a motive-spring more immediate and

apprehensible; and here is place for the Kantian motive-spring, reverence for the moral law,—which means that human reason finds contradiction in its violation, and for its own satisfaction judges that the requirement of the law should be satisfied. Hence we have the pure motive-spring of obligation.

With the mass of mankind there is found, however, another and a negative motive-spring, the dread of the results of violation of the moral law, the fear that the consequences of inadequate satisfaction of it may be disastrous, the fear of pain, the shrinking from ill-being, which too can be imagined.

Thus we have a series of motive-springs: (1) The native impulse towards individual pleasure, interest, or well-being; (2) the same impulse towards the welfare of a limited and narrow circle, to be had immediately or remotely; (3) the attractiveness for the æsthetic sense of the well-being of humanity, of the total organism, to be ultimately attained and including that of the individual member; (4) fear, or shrinking from the imagined consequences of moral short-coming; (5) reverence for the law in its abstract character, as alone satisfying the reason, and hence self-imposed (which Kant calls the autonomy of the will); and (6) the Christian motive-spring, love, or the personal attraction between God and his creatures, which coalesces in its end and aim with the third one named.

CHAPTER III.

MORAL EVIL,—IMMORTALITY,—CONDITIONAL OR ESSENTIAL,—SIN.

THE first form which the notion of moral evil (provisionally called "sin") takes in the human mind is that of violation of law, but of the moral law not in its abstract form, or in its unifying idea, but as concrete rules or maxims, the result of the application of the pure norm to human experience. These are the crystallized decisions of such general experience and reflection. For many of such maxims there is agreement nearly universal, while many others are perpetually undergoing re-statement. These maxims are imparted, however, *ab extra*, and the human subject accuses himself of violation of these before his intelligence is awakened enough to perceive that it has itself supplied the law from whence these maxims have their validity. Hence moral evil takes the form of violation of parental precepts, and even of alleged Divine commands, before it is clearly understood as violation of the absolute law for the human being. Also, there is wrapped up in the early consciousness of such violation the discovery that it is selfish and a preference of the individual desire irrespective of the desires of others.

The actual order of appearance of these notions is not then identical with the logical order, or the notion

as apprehended by reflection. In this process moral evil is first thought as transgression of the law in its autonomic form. Thereafter, on further analysis, it comes to be thought as violation of the Divine will ; and, still further, as a declension of the personal relation of love between God and his creature ; and thus emerges the full notion of *Sin*. Still later reflection concludes its principle to be selfishness, or unbelief, and finds itself stopped and puzzled by the enquiry how such selfishness or unbelief were possible or became actual. Still other reflection, discovering that the moral maxims upon which men have agreed, and even any alleged Divine commands externally given, are only applications of the ideal moral principle to concrete human experience, and may change as physical and social conditions change, and require re-statement, finds its hope awakened at the prospect of future knowledge, and comes to look upon all sin as negative, as a falling short of entire correspondence to the ideal end and aim ; as failure indeed, but failure growing less and less likely.

To state properly this ideal end is the main object of all ethical theories, all of which, except pure egoistic Hedonism, judge of human conduct by its more or less conformity to some ideal, to be realized in the immediate future and within a limited range, or in some remote future, or in some ultimate condition, possibly more or less clearly to be thought and imagined, of perfection, which only can content the reason and the æsthetic sense.

The moral requirement demands, then, not only that in this development entire conformity to the law shall be exhibited, but that such moral strength,

too, shall be attained as shall secure it from any deflection or retrogression, and ultimately convert such moral obedience into pure spontaneity or moral necessity. In this ultimate state, when imagined, the moral requirement no longer appears as law, but as nature, or harmonized being; and the moral sense has become the æsthetic sense, which is no more violated, or unsatisfied, but becomes the enjoyment of the perfection and the beauty of the ideal existence; in which case any onward progress is only and simply further growth and enrichment.

It is conceivable that man's moral development might have proceeded without the appearance of actual moral evil, and therefore that as such there could not have been actual knowledge of it as in contrast with its opposite. This does not exclude the possibility of temptation, which implies not only the abstract possibility of moral evil, but of solicitations to conduct not fully understood as to its consequences, and which, therefore, to be temptation, must, before experience, have *ab extra* some light thrown upon the nature of such consequences. Had human development been normal, resistance to such temptation and subsequent ones recurring, must have dimmed by degrees the attractiveness of such solicitations, have exhausted the possibilities of temptation, in the end annihilating it, and meanwhile converting it often into its own opposite, producing recoil, and hence becoming stimulus to further moral growth. In this case moral strength will still have been exerted and spiritual fibre increased; in its increase losing its consciousness as strength, and the development of the human being, thus requiring diminishing resist-

ance, might still be regarded as sublime, but as sublimity gradually lapsing into beauty. What further possibilities for the creature would remain after such development should have reached its acme, or highest stage under the existing environment, is legitimate matter for speculation. And we may notice by the way that Christian thought has indulged in speculation here, and furnished the notion that the Incarnation of the Divine Logos was an end involved in the idea of mankind, only taking the actual historic form it did from the existence of the contradiction and the need of redemption. But of this hereafter.

Since man's development has not been normal, but he has yielded to temptation, the enquiry emerges how such shortcoming of the moral requirement has become possible. Thus early are we met by the problem of the origin and the nature of moral evil. To this question no satisfactory answer vindicating itself against all impugnors, has ever been given. To derive moral evil from physical evil, or necessary want and suffering, destroys its definition as such, and leaves the form which it takes in human consciousness unaccounted for. No such notion as guilt could ever be derived from such a source. Transgression, then, could simply be thought as misfortune or imprudence, and the human being as involved in the chain of necessity. But even the strongest conviction of the actuality of the physical *nexus* does not destroy the judgment and the feeling of freedom and of guilt, and the contradiction, undoubtedly existing, is thus lodged in human intelligence itself, which if it be irreducible, must vitiate all the mental processes, and carry it over, in despair, into mere Pyrrhonism.

Or, admitting moral freedom to be an ineradicable element in human consciousness, the scheme which makes physical evil, and hence moral evil, a benevolent provision, and needful for development and the acquisition of moral strength, converts it into a form of good, and thus again destroys the conception of it as violation of an immutable law to which there is obligation. The absolute character of the distinction disappears.

Or, the mind may take convenient refuge in a Dualism, which likewise is a refuge of despair. The attempt to unify all knowledge becomes then without hope, a philosophy is impossible, and the growth of human intelligence ceases. If there be an insoluble contradiction, the enquiry can be pushed farther than this, and this easy solution, if it be such, declined. The manifest unity in the physical universe, which science more and more establishes, keeps alive the instinctive belief or hope that it is correlated with moral phenomena, and that this, the only true unity, may at length be grasped.

The existence of such unity is axiomatic in every philosophic mind, and we have the rival systems:—that (1) which derives moral evil from physical, and makes it necessary in the sense that all physical processes are necessary; and that (2) which reverses the relation and makes physical evil the consequence (as the universe is constituted) of free moral transgression. In the former scheme the highest human conception,—of freedom or self-determination, is abandoned, and unaccounted for; and the First Principle is thought under a lower form, of physical or metaphysical necessity. In the latter scheme physical evil

is thought as consequence of moral evil, and, although it has its difficulties, it unlocks more wards of the mystery than the other. Regarded *a posteriori*, much of human experience testifies to it favorably, and that physical evil can be diminished by moral rectitude, not only objectively, by diminishing or weakening its sources, but subjectively, by weakening or even annihilating it; and also that moral evil cannot be diminished by any amount of physical good; rather that excess of physical good intensifies it, and causes it to assume its intensest form. Man is not to be made holy by diminishing his bodily suffering, but his bodily suffering can be diminished by his holiness.

The notion that physical evil is derived from moral evil has been so confidently held by many thinkers, that, as in the case of Plato, of Kant, of Schopenhauer, and Julius Müller, they have given to moral evil a purely spiritual genesis, and carried its origination in man back to some foregone lapse, or pre-existent state, or (whatever that may mean), some extra-temporal decision. But these tentatives have not removed the difficulty, have rather complicated it by locating the problem for examination in a realm of shadows and unimaginable possibilities, instead of bringing it into the twilight of our actual knowledge. The conditions for such lapse are still unsupplied. The question how, for man as an innocent and undeveloped creature, with corresponding environment, any motive to sin, other than the sway of the physical *nexus*, is possible, still remains unanswered.

The Biblical narrative also gives it a purely spiritual origin by referring it to an alien influence, thus diminishing the apparent guiltiness of man, and mak-

ing the possibility of his moral recovery more thinkable. So far as this purports to be history we may not here avail ourselves of it, and if we did, it would not solve the problem, but only carry the question of the origin of moral evil farther back ; and locate it, as in the other scheme, in a region of unimaginable possibilities. In default of such aid from imagination, we can only see whither speculation *a priori* will lead us.

If moral evil originated in physical evil, then it must have appeared first in its weakest and most dilute form ; and been simply the weakness of a being with imperfect knowledge of the consequences of his own acts ; in whom moral strength had not received any, or but the slightest increment ; have been simply a shrinking from pain, or a contest with opposition, or a running into peril from physical attractiveness. The simple yielding to any impulse running counter to the moral idea (altruistic from its very definition), begins at once to form a habit, and moral resistance meets difficulty. Habit rapidly strengthens the egoistic tendency, and when the fact is disclosed, or the suspicion aroused, that immediate, or future, or ultimate well-being is imperilled, the habit has become too strong for continued resistance, the seductiveness of the tempting world increases, new ideal aims spring up, excuses for transgression are supplied, sophistries are invented, inchoate philosophies to dull the conscience grow out of the mist, moral evil becomes more and more attractive, and hence more and more deliberate, more subtle, recondite, and spiritual.

That something like this has been the story of the human race is undeniable, and man appears thus the

victim of his circumstances, as driven into moral evil by his environment, and therefore as not chargeable with blame. But the implications of this scheme are terrific. We have, in the First Principle then, an unethical Divinity, one of power and not of love. Either, then, he is necessitated to produce evil, and it is only a disguised form of the good; and if so its existence and the suffering which comes from it are forever possible, and it is remediless; or else he is purely arbitrary, and the whole process of human declension might be reversed, and converted into one of recovery and elevation, through irresistible influences, by a simple change in his environment, which solution would make of his present mode of existence so much needless waste; and besides could give no security that the whole process might not be again reversed. In all this the highest human ideas, of freedom, of absolute good, of love, of sacrifice, of beauty, are neglected and unaccounted for. The universe is either a soulless machine, or is ruled by an arbitrary will, in whom love or its opposite are equally possible alternatives. No wonder that these attempts to explain moral evil have been unsatisfactory for human thought and feeling.

But is the difficulty avoided by turning the other way, and regarding moral evil as the *prius*, and physical evil its correspondence or result? Let us see how far into the depths of the problem this will lead us, whether this, while it does not solve, will not simplify the question, and give us a sharper line between the known and the unknowable.

If, then, moral evil be *prius*, it must have existed first in its purely spiritual form, and not through any

influence from any physical *nexus*. If in such pure form, it must have appeared at the start in its intensest possible degree. The solicitation must have been purely spiritual, and the strongest possible, to effect such an absolute reversal. And here, the only such one conceivable in human thought, is the attractiveness of spiritual independence. Imagination has no play here, for it can deal only with the material of our environment. But the human, thinking soul, dwelling in thought upon its own freedom, and spiritual aloofness from any environment, can reach this idea of spiritual independence, and find in it attractiveness. Thus the central and essential idea of spiritual evil is such independence and isolation, the withdrawal of the spiritual entity into one's self, and making of one's self its total world, the refusal to depend upon any thing or any one beyond itself, the refusal even to allow any development or modification of itself from contact with others, to have its own potentialities elicited by any relation to the spiritual universe outside itself. It may or may not seek fellowship in its negative attitude of opposition to the good, but such fellowship is only provisional and not necessary, for if necessary, its spiritual independence is assaulted, it is recoverable, and no longer appears as pure spiritual evil.

This independence implies too, for such spiritual entity, its absolute assurance of its own continued existence, for if not, it must know its independence to be but seeming and delusive. It is a closed circle still, and therefore infinite; but moving towards the infinitely little. Its history, if thought under time conditions, is a perpetual shrinking and narrowness;

the purchase of its own independence by its own poverty, yet never reaching extinction of being. It is no more possible to think such extinction of a self-determining being, than it is to imagine the infinitely little in space. Movement either way defies imagination, yet both are equally a necessity of thought. In like manner in the opposite case, of the holy soul development, thought under time conditions, there is an endless expansion into the infinitely great, yet never reaching any limit.

Such a state of spiritual consciousness, we have seen, is thinkable, but unimaginable. The moment that imagination attempts to give a concrete image of moral evil, it is obliged to incorporate in it an element of good.

If for such spiritually evil entity any relation to an environment is possible or permitted, and of its own caprice, or to intensify itself, and not merely to try its power (for it scorns any exercise of power as needless for its own independence and supremacy), it enters into and becomes an influence in such environment, and this be thought to be the human race and its world, then we have superadded to any physical solicitations befalling such, a spiritual temptation superadded. Thus having effected entrance into the human sphere, spiritual evil may filtrate through the human generations, and if any members of that race are assimilated to it irrecoverably, they must share its own narrowing and dwarfing characteristics, and when the environment changes, its ultimate destiny.

This *a priori* scheme may or may not be at all points identical with that implied in the Biblical narrative, but is what speculation without its aid can

reach. It has its own difficulties and unsolved enigma still, which will be adverted to further on.

But we have still to consider how physical connects with moral evil thus posited. Before entering upon this, however, which is a large topic, let us note that this way of thinking of the origin of moral evil is purely speculative and is not evidenced by any facts. But it locates the problem in the region of thought and not of imagination; and its solution, therefore, can only come from ampler and purer thought. In the present state of human development its satisfactory solution, estopping any further inquiry, can be seen to be not only unlikely, but to be no boon, but rather a detriment; and hence the inference is made that clear insight here would not aid but rather hinder man's moral recovery. For *faith*, which is spiritual strength, and needed to increase spiritual strength, would no longer be needful. Man's obedience to the higher monitions of his being would no longer require sacrifice, and the highest ethical possibilities of the creature could no longer be elicited. The very despair into which the intellect falls when contemplating the alternatives of perpetual persistence in moral evil on the part of some, and the universal restoration of humanity somehow to be brought about, makes man's faith more needful, and makes possible his greatest ethical virtue.

In this connection we remark again that the notion of sin, when fully explicated, requires the postulate of man's essential immortality. For sin, if it be other than misfortune and inevitable weakness, if it be an act and a determination of the will, and if the will represent the entire being in its spiritual as well as

its physical relations, pre-supposes a moral law, or required adaptation of the concrete situation to the ideal end, which ideal end is an element of the normal constitution of the entire universe, of which God is the sustentation. Were no such realization of the absolute idea possible, there could be no *law*, and any alleged law must therefore respect it, and derive its obligation from it. It exhibits the requirement that the universe shall be rid of all contradiction, and its elements set in right relation. The law, so far as it acts upon the reason, never relaxes, and it has behind it, and to aid it, the original predispositions of our being. That man's entire nature, focussed in his character and the trend of his self-consciousness, has received a bias which affects its totality, including the spiritual relations of the same, is again the problem of moral evil. Sin is thus a wilful opposition to, or withdrawal from, the law of the universe. He that sins knows that he might not sin. He prefers to realize the ideal which he has framed from the material furnished by his environment, thinking to secure his immediate delight or well-being, rather than to realize the universal one in which consists his ultimate well-being as member of a totality, which membership alone can bring out all his potentialities, and secure his perfect development; not foreseeing that such a course must ultimately withdraw from him his environment so far as it has any possibilities for his gratification, and leave him solely to the resources within himself. His spiritual independency is thus secured by the sacrifice of every thing else; but still within himself is an imagined world, the memory of his past, a world of dreams and unrealities sufficient to sustain his self-

consciousness, and thus he must be ever preying upon himself, yet can never reach extinction, since his spiritual principle is still a reflection of the Divine Spirit, and therefore a permanent unity. Not that his existence as a concrete unity can ever become purely simple, for no concrete existence is simple—not God himself,—but a synthesis of relations; but in this case these relations are with a world of shadows, of compound things, made up of his past experiences, a complex of subjective impressions, which can never lapse. Imagination fails to reproduce in our present consciousness this existence in the world of shadows, yet cannot ignore the dim picture in which no outlines are discoverable.

Thus if man's essential immortality can be established for our thinking, on these metaphysical grounds, and it is implied in his very definition as a spiritual soul, the notion of sin thus derives validity, and meets the requirements of rational thinking.

But on moral grounds also the notion of sin requires the postulate of man's essential immortality. If he be merely an animal, with the possibility of becoming an immortal animal, he may prefer to remain as he is, and he cannot be convicted of sin, according to our definition of it, if he so decide. He may prefer to remain an animal, and derive what delight he can from his existence while it lasts, and decline the painful procedure of becoming more than an animal, or consent to the withdrawal of any spiritual relation which has made him more than such and made of his animal consciousness a spiritual soul-consciousness. It becomes then simply a question of expediency, and no eternal law is violated by his preference of the known

immediate rather than the remote and problematical. The notion of conditional immortality (which word we use to mean persistence of conscious existence) requires an ethic of expediency only, and from this the absolute and eternal distinction of right and wrong cannot be drawn, and the judgment and feeling of obligation are delusions. Besides, the motive set for a man under this scheme for seeking to elevate his being is still a purely selfish one. He prefers to leave behind him some number of his brethren as irrecoverably committed to the lower choice, and to join another band who are seeking with him the result of the same ambition. Love for mankind as a totality, the sense of the organic unity of the human race, the pure disinterested determination to reach the result of well-being only for and in the totality, disappear as motives for the will. The sense of brotherhood is weakened, and a portion of mankind in his estimation is degraded to the level of pure animality. Its lot is not so distressing after all. Thus there emerges a doctrine of arbitrary election, seeing that the influences which only furnish the most powerful motive-spring, and can elevate man to his highest, are not brought to bear upon the larger portion of the race. Thus would appear the sole exception within our knowledge of a Divine idea unrealized. The idea of the animal, a sensory filled during its vital period with adequate enjoyment, seems to be realized. Any seeming failure is one of degree only. To take the protoplasm of the plant, and add to its vitality, physical growth, beauty, and perfection, enjoyment in any degree whatever, which is the Divine idea for the animal, is what we can reconcile with the

Divine benevolence. But to frame the human being with far-reaching possibilities of development arising from his relation to spirit, to convert half his pleasures into pains, to allow him to turn his world into a Pandemonium, to withhold the strongest elevating force, to allow him therefore to sink into absolute extinction, is a scheme so assaulting our idea of Divine love as to weaken the foundation of our belief that any benevolent provision for man's elevation exists or is possible. Here the solution of the problem of moral evil is barred forever. No after knowledge can throw back any light upon this darkness. The difficulties are far fewer if we postulate man's essential immortality, and we may still hope, with faculties spiritualized either in good or evil, ultimately to reach the solution. But, as was said before, this must be found in the region of pure thought, into which imagination, dealing with the present material, cannot enter.

If man be essentially immortal, his moral nature and experience become explicable. Being a spiritual soul he is free, he can set himself in right relation with other spiritual souls, and with the Father of spirits; and, acquiring moral strength, can at length attain right relation to his environment. To accomplish this it is required that he shall set for himself the realization of the Divine idea, the commonwealth of love, the commonwealth of strong spirits, to whom the universe is fluent and subservient; and to reach this ultimate consummation, he needs to be moved by the highest, purest, and strongest motive-spring, of love, the personal relation, the spiritual attraction and bond which is symbolized in the material worlds by their mutual gravitation; the human heart must re-

spond to the Divine heart, revealing itself nowhere but in Jesus Christ. Man can aim no higher than he thinks God to be, and unless he knows of God's love in Christ, he cannot aim the highest, and with any lower aim cannot reach his perfection. From this it may seem to flow, as a corollary, that every child of man must ultimately know of God's love in Christ, in order to have the profoundest spring possible for his being set in motion, and to accomplish his perfection. But being a free spiritual soul, lord of himself, though determined from without, there is still for him the need that his moral position shall be his own act. No matter how strong the tendencies either way, from his heredity and his education thus far, he is still in his own thought spiritually aloof from all this. While he has the desire and may have the will to make the right moral choice, his recovery from the force of adverse tendencies is still thinkable, and therefore possible. Instances of such recovery, so far as we can accurately judge from observation, have been frequent and numerous; instances of making choice of moral good from out the deepest abyss and heaviest ruin of moral evil. Here again, to account for such choice, is suggested a doctrine of grace mystical, and that relations to the unseen world beyond or beneath present knowledge may involve influences, determining his motives, and enhancing his motive-springs;—a notion strictly philosophical, and indeed inevitable under any other than a purely materialistic philosophy. The difficulty, seeing that such influences exist, is ever to discover the last ground for the wrong moral choice. This is the mystery of our eternal election; and but another

way of stating the problem of the possibility of moral evil.

In such wrong moral choice the free spiritual soul does to all appearance resist all motive-springs which draw him from his spiritual isolation. Beneath his impure desires for present or future gratification, there is the pure spiritual ambition to make the world his prey, and be sovereign in his sphere, be it wide or narrow. Sacrifice, except as temporary expediency, disappears from his life. The sense of obligation, springing out of the profound predispositions of his being, exists, but this he shuns, or, if it haunts him, endeavors to think away by a philosophy. Our judgments, however, of human character are so untrustworthy that no one can presume to say of any human brother that he has gone so far into evil that his retreat is impossible. But his persistence in evil is thinkable, and therefore possible, though no token that it is irretrievable can be admitted. Did he regard himself as not essentially immortal, he could have no such feeling as remorse, only regret more or less for his mistakes, for his failure to secure his expected gratification, which regret causes him to fall back into his independency, from which he has been seduced, and helps to make his evil more purely spiritual. Remorse would be a sign of his possible recovery. As long as the beauty of a loving life and a loving commonwealth could be felt, and determine his imaginative activity, his recovery would still be thinkable and possible. But if, *ex hypothesi*, his imagination deals more and more with other images, his gratifications become more and more selfish, the loving ties still present through his heredity and

education become attenuated and ultimately extinct. If his love turn in upon himself, and collapse within himself, becoming negative to every thing external,—then we have as result a spiritual entity loosened from all voluntary relation to any thing beyond itself, and ultimately to be loosened from all known environment, and left to its own created world of shadows.

Thus, if man be essentially immortal, pure evil is thinkable, but not thinkable if his spirituality be only provisional ; and, as before said, unless he be essentially immortal, the idea of good also becomes diluted, and sacrifice loses its beauty and its charm.

CHAPTER IV.

THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE MORAL DERANGEMENT,— ORIGINAL SIN.

SPECULATIVE Theology has no antagonistic attitude towards science or historic investigation. It waits patiently the trustworthy discoveries of these ; ready, if needful, to modify itself accordingly. It longs for these as new facts and relations enriching its material ; and its very method is to incorporate these into itself, and thus reach a more manifest unity.

Therefore it is not indifferent to the accumulating evidence for the fact of evolution which science is furnishing. It looks favorably upon this, since it holds a doctrine of evolution upon *a priori* grounds. In its regard, creation is entirely and only thus to be conceived, and is thought simply as a movement, or culminating point in the process of evolution, and as the concrete presentation in the existing material of a new idea, hints and tokens of which are afterwards discovered to have existed in the antecedent Cosmos, yet which could not have been explicitly forecasted. For it, the phrase "creation out of nothing" is meaningless, not only as having no fact or analogy to authorize it, but as an impossible conception, therefore words without a thought ; and excluded by the very principle of causality which rules all human mental movement ; in which conclusion it is supported

by the Biblical narrative itself, as may hereafter appear.

It is also indifferent to the result of the enquiry whether the human race is or is not the offspring of a single pair. This question is not likely to be ever permanently settled either by historic investigation or by science. It appears, however, a little easier to hold the organic unity of the human race if the question be answered affirmatively ; but the truth is in no peril if the other reply be affirmed. Mankind, in every concrete, exhibits the same idea, the same elevation above other orders of existence, the same unlimited capacity for development. He exists under a unique set of relations both to spirit and to matter, everywhere deriving modifications from each ; and in this identity of the idea is the organic unity of the race. Moreover, on ethical grounds he holds all of that race as included under the obligation of social duties, and proposes no ultimate commonwealth less extensive than one including the whole. Thus mankind is considered a moral organism, which it could not be were it not likewise a physical organism, since true unity consists only in the mutual interdependence of the two.

Neither is Speculative Theology, when claiming for itself identity with Christian Dogmatic Theology, rightly understood and harmonized, troubled by the conjecture that rational beings may inhabit other planets beside our own. As a scientific utterance this has no foundation, and can be held as probable only on *a priori* grounds ; for, as has been or will be seen, the Divine idea is that the universe as known, or possible to be known, does not exhaust the Divine

capacities, which are infinite, and must for thought be so, since otherwise the idea of the infinite could have no place in the human mind, and there could not be for it any such symbol and evidence as the infinite space. Should, even, it be scientifically established that there are inhabitants of other planets than ours, Christian Theology could easily adjust itself to the requirement; and as now it must regard any Divine scheme for human redemption and regeneration as applicable to the universe as known, it could then, in various ways, avail itself of this extension of knowledge, and perhaps find in it illumination for its own dimly comprehended solutions of divers profound problems.

With this prelude we approach the topic of the universality of the moral derangement—"Original Sin"—a vague and perhaps unfortunate denomination for the same.

We have concluded that we cannot establish beyond contest any theory of the origin of moral evil. We acknowledge that it exists, and refuse, for the attainment of premature rest for our thought, to weaken its conception as moral evil and convert it into simple unwisdom by any such scheme as man's conditional immortality. *A priori*, as we have seen, that solution is most satisfactory and reduces the problem to narrower terms, which thinks it not necessary, but free, and to have existed at the first, in its purest form. But the knowledge we have of the history of the human race does not allow us to think that it existed for such, at the start, in its purest form. The Biblical notion that it entered our world from the

spiritual universe, if this be the right interpretation of the same, connects itself thus with *a priori* speculation. Nothing in the history of mankind authorizes us to think that moral evil existed in the earliest period of the race development in pure form, or in any intense degree. Rather the contrary is true, and the evidence stronger that it showed itself first in impure form, as carnality and impulsive selfishness; and that in consequence of human culture only has moral evil become spiritualized, become for the human soul more clearly known as such; that it has only sporadically and at later periods deserted all carnality and become capable of a refined prudence, shown itself able to avoid much suffering, and to banish the danger of it from life, to make the world its prey and the human race its slave.

And the Biblical narrative falls in with this view. It represents man as in the beginning morally innocent, as liable through his spiritual structure to meet temptation, yet intended to acquire spiritual strength and dignity by resistance to such. To make his environment become matter for temptation, the results of alternative actions must be disclosed to him, or the knowledge of them reached by him in some way; otherwise he must remain untried and morally indifferent. Without such alternatives he would be left to his spontaneity; and could not attain any dignity as a self-determining being, which we have subsequently found out he manifestly is. According to the Biblical account evil is shown to him *ab extra*, as a possibility, and the sanctions for obedience declared. The knowledge that he might have acquired, that he is not yet lord of the world, and can only use it under

certain conditions and limitations is thus anticipated, and appears in some form in his earliest experience. He is told, and is not merely allowed to find out, that neglect of this assurance would bring disaster, and a derangement in his relation to his physical environment, and that instead of becoming its master, he would become its slave, and thus that he would begin to die.

That such knowledge *ab extra* was imparted, it seems necessary to hold, if the early transgression be made referable to human freedom; otherwise the yielding to temptation was the result of ignorance, and moral evil and the consciousness of it appear only later, and when the flood of disordered proclivities has made any recovery from it difficult or impossible.

All other history, and science itself, furnish no support for this allegation of knowledge imparted *ab extra*. It is possible that philological investigations may hereafter throw some light upon the question, but at present Speculative Theology can only take it into its scheme, as needful to exclude the theory of the necessity of moral evil, and a denial of it as absolute contradiction. This, its position, remains as strong as before, and it awaits any history or science to show that it need modify itself in this particular. But this is one of the arenas of debate where no victory on either side seems likely. The present scientific prepossessions are indeed against it; yet on the other side may be adduced the fact that human history is full of evidence of human deterioration and gradual degradation as well as of advance. Even if the human being was evolved from the lower animal stratum, his creation in this mode still indicates

a great leap upward, and it cannot be gainsaid that the first evidence of this elevation, could it have been regarded, might have been, if not probably would have been, some token of his moral structure, only existing by the possibility of alternatives; for any modification of his prudence arising from greater knowledge would not have been an element any higher than that discoverable in the stratum from which he rose. Therefore Speculative Theology cannot abandon this position to science, and feels that its own hold of it is as yet the strongest.

But, even admitting this impartation of knowledge, man's fall (to call by this name his first yielding to temptation against his own judgment,—his thus moving counter to the original predispositions of his being) is still unaccounted for. To call his yielding selfishness, supposes him already selfish; to call it unbelief, is to make the motive for such stronger than the motive for belief, and that the motive-spring is insufficient to sustain him in his normal attitude; to call it weakness merely, is again to resolve it into the necessity springing from the relation between his structure and his environment. The difficulty here is so great that men have devised divers solutions, and easily interchanged them, all of which satisfy the mind only temporarily, and at too great expense. In all such, the fall becomes a matter of necessity or expediency, the conception of the eternal distinction of good and evil vanishes, and its genesis as a delusion has to be accounted for. The present author finds no satisfaction in any of these solutions whatever. Each one creates more difficulties than it allays. We must be content with the fact that moral evil has entered the

world, and understand it, and argue from it as we can ; and as was said before, we are reconciled to this limitation of knowledge, or failure of insight, by the conviction that, as we are, faith under this difficulty is needed for us to acquire the moral strength which is required for our moral recovery.

Starting, therefore, with the premise that man, created innocent and morally indifferent, but with the involuntary tendencies of his nature moving him towards good stronger than any opposing ones, nevertheless made the wrong choice, and brought to birth involuntary tendencies in the opposite direction, and strengthened those already existing, we have to ask if and how thereby his relation to his environment becomes changed. That such change occurred is asserted, expressed, and symbolized in the Biblical narrative by the declaration that man then became subject to death, and was driven from the garden of Eden. Whether this be an actual or a symbolic narrative is for the present purpose indifferent. In either case we have to discover the change towards or in his environment wrought by his moral reversal. We know measurably what this relation is, but have to speculate to discover whether it could have been any other than it is before the moral declension, and can be any other as result of complete moral elevation. In this enquiry great aid is furnished in the Biblical narratives, not from any array of facts, which must require historic and scientific verification, but from the philosophy of the universe implied in these writings, the glimpses of which are wonderfully suggestive. But while stating here this problem, we must postpone the enquiry till we have gathered further material from which to elicit

this philosophy ; and meanwhile explicate more fully the fact of human moral derangement.

Whenever in any human consciousness the moral distinction is apprehended, even in crude form, the discovery is made that the native spontaneous tendencies which sway the will are enlisted on both sides of the moral alternative ; and the inference sooner or later drawn that the preponderance of tendency is against the alternative which meets the assent of the reason ; or at any rate that the resisting power is inadequate to meet any and every form of adverse influence. This is the fact called "Original Sin." And the fact of the transmission of this congeries of proclivities, variously synthesized, is naïvely acknowledged to be such. Very early in human experience the phenomena indicating the principle of heredity were noticed, in the physical, mental, passionate, and emotional resemblances of children to their parents and ancestors. Thus obscurely was perceived the organic unity and continuity of the family and the tribe, and that of the human race inferred. Modern science has added new testimony to the validity of the principle of heredity, and thus the fact is established, nor ever even philosophically declined, except possibly by some accidental upholder of the thesis of the pure indifference of the human will.

This universal human characteristic causes a mental leaning towards the theory that the human race sprang from a single pair. The resemblances between the individuals of the race are more pronounced than any difference. The variations are differences in degree, not in kind. This view, while not absolutely necessary, may be implied, therefore, in

our further statements, till a contrary one is firmly established.

It appears then that while these spontaneous tendencies exist thus contesting, and sway towards contrary alternatives, the ideal end of the human being is not realized, nor can be till they are harmonized ; till one current gradually overcomes the other, and sweeps it along in its own way. Now the inherited nature in every case exhibits an internal discord (from which perhaps a corollary may be seen dimly to emerge, that the relation to the environment is also a discordant and abnormal one).

If we analyze the human consciousness, become more complex by advance in experience and reflection, we discover the same distinction not only in the involuntary proclivities, but in its voluntary decisions, and in its choice of ends by which to rule the plan of life. Here the propensity to adopt some selfish purpose appears to be very strong—so strong as to subjugate the involuntary tendencies of both kinds. This propensity may even be acknowledged to have behind it the impetus of past generations. And even when some purpose not deliberately selfish is adopted, some yielding to the sympathetic and benevolent impulses, the ease with which this is abandoned when some selfish aim beckons with super-attractive force is another melancholy evidence of human weakness.

But, however, if a right moral choice has been made, and a universal end adopted to rule the plan of life, then the involuntary tendencies harmonizing with it become strengthened, and the opposing ones weakened, and by degrees excluded. Such synthesis of tendencies, transmitted to offspring, places them

upon a vantage ground, and the movement is begun towards recovery. This recovery consists in the absolute extinguishment of all internal hostility, and the attainment, step by step, of pure spontaneity; for which is implied also the attainment of such moral strength and spiritual fibre as can maintain the moral subject without deflection, and ultimately without assault, in its harmony and perfection. But such a result, to our observation, is never reached on this planet, and there is no exception to the universality of the moral derangement and shortcoming. Yet, evidently, the movement towards recovery has begun, and takes its start in the moral sphere (another support to the theory that the moral declension took its rise in the moral sphere). The sympathetic and benevolent impulses have received an increment of strength from the moral decision, and these impulses have their roots in our physical being, and any change in them is already the beginning of a change in the environment, so far as the individual is concerned. Sympathy is largely physical, and implies the physical unity of the race, and the benevolent impulses, the finding joy and well-being in the joy and well-being of others, are the very warp and woof of the ideally perfect life. The moral condition thus reacts upon our physical being, which cannot be thought as disconnected from the physical universe, but rather as summing up in itself only all its ideas, and its fullest intent and meaning.

If, indeed, the moral movement has thus begun, it is simply a suicidal use of language to call such a condition "depravity." For this, if asserted, must be predicated of the entire character, and means that in every case, on sufficient temptation, the selfish impulses

would triumph. And instances to the contrary of this have been so numerous as to show that such notion of depravity is mere logical deduction from problematical premises, and not confirmed by induction, hence no true dialectic. If, however, the term "depravity" be used to mean human weakness merely, when the conditions, providential and mystical, for the needful strength are unsupplied, thus diluted in its meaning it is admissible. This is the burden of St. Paul's lamentation, and the foundation of his argument for the need of grace. But still, while any such weakness remains, the moral idea is unrealized. The moral strength, if attainable, must come from a new and sufficient motive-spring, and be sustained by the possibility of sacrifice. These, it is declared, are supplied objectively and providentially by Christianity, and are supplemented by a mystical influence. The end being a universal one, requires that the recovering influences shall be also universal, and thus again we have a vindication of the doctrine of grace, and for which even science furnishes more support than denial. The elaboration of this into the full Christian scheme for human moral recovery will be attempted in its proper place and order.

We may note that the fact of the universality of human moral derangement is admitted in those philosophic schemes which give to moral evil a physical origin, though they state otherwise the possibility and the means for its extirpation. With these moral evil was never purely such, but existed first in its most dilute form. The human being awakening in his animality has before him the task of making himself other than an animal, hidden powers to accomplish

such task being already coiled within him. He has to overcome his brutish impulses, as other aims are disclosed in his growing intelligence, and to rise in the scale of being by his own effort and strength. Only then when the higher aim has become clearly displayed in his consciousness does the deliberate yielding to the lower habitual attraction take a new form, and can be called moral evil. His reluctant yielding is simply moral weakness succumbing to irresistible influences. But as these influences have their ground in his physical being, so out of that physical being may spring counteracting ones. There is lodged in it, therefore, power to effect, through physical laws, the needed recovery, or at least to start in a progression towards it. The benevolent sympathies awaken in the human being and contest with the purely selfish ones, and when overcoming, produce habits, growing stronger and more fixed. Thus the improved nature is transmitted to the offspring, and may by it be further improved. The ends and aims of this improved consciousness are, however, only prudential at first, and needful adaptations to the limitations of the environment. This prudence, with the generations succeeding, widens its range, and proposes the well-being of a circle constantly expanding, in which the well-being of the individual is also involved. The inherited instincts may, and do continually improve, and in some far-off generation will be exhibited the required harmony of instincts and the ideal commonwealth. And so transfixed by the imagination of this ultimate state of things may the human being become as to make him willing to sacrifice his own immediate delight, and

thus transmit even the sacrificial spirit to the coming generations.

This scheme, it will be seen, has points of intimate coalescence with the Christian scheme itself, and has so much of truth and beauty, as to have fascination for the intellect, and to deserve attention to show which are the points of agreement and what of difference with the Christian scheme, and wherein it is strong and wherein it is weak. This it shall receive hereafter. Now we notice only its bearing upon the doctrine under consideration. Under this scheme no such epithet as "sin" could be given to this early stage of human aberrancy, nor indeed to any later one, except by modifying its definition. The early and imprudent acts of seeming selfishness are simply ignorant mistakes, to which by no standard can any blame be attached. These impulses possess such strength from their physical origin, as for the most part, or for a long time, to gain the victory even after the new prudential discoveries are made and have started weak habits. That man blames himself for his fault means simply that he laments his weakness. That he has the feeling called "guilt" means simply that he has something to fear; that he has not acted for his own true interest. In all this is much that cannot be denied. We feel our sin to be misfortune, though it may be something more, and our guilt is indeed apprehension of the consequences. So far as the above is a true description of the human process, the man has not become sinful or guilty in the highest sense. His evil can only be called moral, as it comes from a spiritual starting-point. So far regarded as in the

above description, the flood in which he finds himself struggling is carrying him helplessly along. The swimmers in this torrent are borne with differing speed, some casting longing looks behind, but helpless to arrest their own course, others endeavoring in despair to increase the velocity of the torrent.

All this is indeed sin and guilt inchoate, but the full notion of these is not yet reached, nor indeed under this ethic of expediency can be reached. The notion of sin is only in a higher sense valid, when the counteracting influence sufficient to overcome the force of the inherited tendencies astray is thought to have been supplied. Thus only is the subject morally free, and any inference of guilt legitimate. We must therefore examine the conditions required for the genesis of the judgment and feeling of guilt, which beyond doubt exist, to see whether they are delusions or constitute fact which must affect all thought and conduct.

CHAPTER V.

GUILT.

JULIUS MÜLLER, in his treatise on "The Christian Doctrine of Sin," finds an antinomy between the fact of "Original Sin" (so called) and the human self-accusation called "Guilt." In the survey of the ground occupied by the former, he finds no place for moral freedom, and that the seeming choice must be pre-determined by the necessities of the nature ; and on the other hand concludes that the consciousness called "guilt" is inexplicable except upon the admission of moral freedom, since the self-accusation implies that the subject might have decided otherwise. Hence his attempt to resolve this antinomy by the notion of an *extra-temporal* decision, involving the subjects, having come under time conditions, in the chain of necessity. An examination into the genesis of the judgment of guilt may show that there is no need of any such postulate ; which has, besides, its own other difficulties.

The *feeling* of guilt, in concrete experience, precedes the *judgment* of guilt, and ever after accompanies it, such feeling anticipating obscurely the fully formed and conscious judgment ; but as feeling, it is, in part at least, *a posteriori* in origin. It comes from the discovery in experience that suffering and ill-being are possible and actual ; and that while much of it is

indeed inevitable and indubitably *ab extra*, much beside might have been avoided, and has come from the violation of known laws of the universe. The simpler and more obvious the law, the sooner comes the retribution. The subtler and profounder the law, the remoter is the recoil. Sooner or later, and with variant depth of conviction, is the inference drawn that no law of the universe can be violated with impunity. Hence the dread of suffering, more or less clearly imagined, which is the primal feeling in human guilt. The inference is first and most readily drawn with reference to physical laws. To disregard the law of gravitation brings accident; to disregard the laws of health brings bodily pain; to disregard social laws brings various and remoter distress; to disregard the simpler moral maxims, such as command truth and honesty, is met by punishment in so many cases, as to arouse the suspicion or create the conviction that every violation of moral law must meet its return in suffering, or something equally to be dreaded. To set the whole life in violation of known moral law and by a refined prudence to evade its speedy, and fence off its remoter retribution may indeed dull the apprehension, since imagination cannot wander very far into the remote, yet not so utterly as to put to sleep the dread that the law of retribution has no exception, and that the deeper the ground of perversity from which such calculating violation may spring, the farther off indeed but the surer the return, and the more dreadful the penalty.

This dread of suffering, and perhaps permanent ill-being, is one constituent of the feeling of guilt, and the first form which it takes. It is, however, individ-

ualistic, and respects the subject as able to suffer or enjoy in and for himself alone. Thus far the feeling, and the judgment therefrom formed, that by transgression of the moral law the subject has rendered himself liable to suffering, are *a posteriori* in origin, and no other ethic is needed to explain them than an ethic of expediency.

But in the judgment of guilt there is something *a priori* in origin, and here in consciousness the judgment antedates the feeling. As the moral law comes to be understood as the law, not only for the individual reflecting subject, but for humanity as such, and for the whole rational universe, if it be in thought extended beyond humanity ; as it takes a universal form, and is thus absolute in its character, and is ruled as to its requirements by some ideal state of things, possible in thought to be realized ; as it is seen to imply a commonwealth, and an organic unity, moral, intellectual and physical, and therefore spiritual by virtue of the harmony and normal inter-relation of these three aspects or elements of all concrete being ; the knowledge of one's self that he is not yet a member of such commonwealth, and that while others are endeavoring to realize it, he is a disturbing and disorganizing element, either from wilfulness or weakness ; the knowledge that one withholds himself from the stream of tendency towards this realization, or by some single act, throws himself out of the current ;—such knowledge forces a comparison of one's self with the ideal requirement, and brings about the discovery that he is in an irrational state. Here is not only a contradiction to the reason, but a violation of the moral sense, (this name being given to the feeling which ensues *after*

moral judgments). This is not the apprehension of punishment, but the present discontent from the consciousness of discord. The moral sense is here identical with the æsthetic sense. That harmony and beauty which only can bring about the purest and highest æsthetic emotion is troubled by the discordant element, and when seen to be so troubled by the subject's own wilful act or neglect, the discovery produces this feeling of discontent, or spiritual pain, which too is an element in the complex consciousness of guilt. Whether it would receive this name, were it purely this spiritual pain, and not mingled with the feeling of apprehension for our composite being above described, may be questioned ; but that is a needless and unprofitable enquiry, since in the concrete they are never separate, but more or less intimately mingled.

In our conscious experience we find that the conviction of moral freedom accompanies this discovery of the violation of the prudential law of the understanding, as well as the discovery of the moral shortcoming towards the requirements of the reason and the æsthetic sense. These mental states would be inexplicable were not such moral freedom implied. But even if the conviction of such freedom be apparently abandoned and denied in some objective utterance, and the subject regard himself as determined and in the chain of necessity, the judgment and the feeling of guilt, as I have analyzed it above, would still exist in all the essential constituents. He may apprehend punishment and lament his liability to suffering, even though he think he has been irresistibly drawn along in the current of events, and dread the result of his misfortune in the one case, as he dreads the result of his

fault in the other : and his æsthetic sense may be violated by the discovery of his shortcoming toward his own ideal, just as poignantly when he regards his condition as remediless as if he thought it remediable.

If we thus eliminate the conception of moral freedom, the judgment of guilt does not constitute the judgment of *sin* ; and there is no true antinomy between this and the fact of the universally inherited selfish propensities of human nature, called or mis-called "Original Sin." Thus far there is no need of the doctrine of moral responsibility, or of immortality, or even of God as a personal principle. But these ideas, and the convictions ensuing, exist, as we have claimed, implicit in human consciousness. Were there no personal God, infinite in resource, no human immortality, no responsibility, these ideas and convictions could never have been reached by any physical process thought as purely such. They constitute the very essential fibre of human consciousness, and their very existence is the highest possible evidence that we belong to a universe other than merely physical. They are convertible terms. To say that we have these ideas is to say that we transcend the physical *nexus*. They show themselves in all human knowledge, and without them we could never rise above animal understanding. If these ideas are baseless and untrustworthy, all knowledge is baseless and untrustworthy, and we reach the vanishing point of pure subjective idealism only to recoil into a Pyrrhonism that contradicts itself in its very attempted attitude of negation.

If, then, we hold as firm against all possible attacks the truth of moral freedom, we find that it implies

the possession of a universalistic ideal more or less dimly descried, to be preferred to any individualistic end manufactured out of the material of the universe changeable by our physical liberty or power. This ideal, to satisfy the requirements of the reason and the æsthetic sense, and produce the judgment and the feeling called "obligation," must do so at all points. It must comprise not only an accord of wills, strong beyond assault, but free from assault, therefore in accord with the environment. Human aspiration, man's highest need, must be met. No want, no longing must be unsatisfied, since there exists no longing that may not be satisfied without removing the contradiction. No power can be denied the possibility of successful exercise. No limit must be set to the subject's advance and expansion. The personal God cannot be left out of this ideal commonwealth, thus environed. The whole structure falls to pieces if He is. Love, which craves the perfect object, can be content with nothing less than God. To deny to the soul a never ending approach to him, and penetration of the recesses of the infinite, or to leave out the unifying principle and erect here an impassable wall of darkness, would be to repel it back in an infinite recession. The desire for knowledge and the delight in it, would expire unless the field for knowledge were infinite, unless there were room for its activities through all the eternities, and unless there were indeed a perfectly satisfying object for such delight.

Unless, then, God, freedom, and immortality are ideas involved in the very mental structure of the human being, *sin* cannot exist, and no notion of it can be legitimated. And if sin cannot exist, then we

have a world in which more or less prudence only is possible,—in which any future generation, however it have attained a state of things more desirable, yet has not conquered nature, nor subdued the elements and all pain-giving powers, from which deranged and selfish instincts might again spring and renew the conflict, nor avoided death. Such a world is but little satisfying to the æsthetic sense, rather violates it the uttermost ; since the contradiction between the spiritual soul and the physical environment is more pronounced than ever, and seems to be remediless. As the desire for elevation and the ideal harmony becomes more intense, and these clearer and purer, the human soul would become more hopeless of gratification, and the acutest agony would have become possible.¹

But with the postulates of God, freedom and immortality, sin and guilt, become for our thought something more than liability to suffering, contradiction to the reason, and violation of the æsthetic sense thus far defined. These all must receive modification and new elements, as they connect with the idea of God ; and we find disharmony not only between the subject and the physical forces, not only between the actual and the ideal, but we have an abnormal or deranged personal relation, the normal and highest conceivable one declined, and a spiritual independency seeking to make itself absolute. Thus only does the notion of sin acquire its full significance, and the con-

¹ The terms “moral sense”—“æsthetic sense” are used, meaning thereby a spontaneous *judgment* accompanied by feeling, which bears resemblance to “sense” proper, in its immediacy ; yet it is a true judgment, and requires the presence of the absolute norm to furnish ground for the comparison.

tradiction its full intensity. If moral freedom be postulated, sin becomes then a wilful refusal to realize or aid in realizing that ideal for all rational existence which only can satisfy the reason ; and guilt is the natural yet attenuating pain at this contradiction. If immortality be postulated, sin becomes a refusal to accept the perfect well-being and the amplifying development, and proposes to stop up all other avenues of delight, and concentrate all complacency upon one—of spiritual independency ; and guilt become the apprehension of a hostile environment from which the subject is not yet strong enough to escape. And thirdly, if God be postulated, sin becomes likewise a refusal of that personal relation which is felt to be possible, and which is the true spring and real element in all original human desire ; for all going out of one's self for delight is a confession of dependence. It is the first element of love, gathering itself afterwards into clear consciousness. The soul, therefore, cannot become purely and intrinsically evil until it has acted from this spring and made for itself a world of ideas ; and thus, in its very attempted independence it confesses its obligation, yet declines all return, and ultimately scorns any new increments to its subjective world. Thus sin is potentially and may become at length an absolute reversal of the primitive tendencies of our being ; and a re-creation of one's self with material limited and shut off from further supply. In this case the judgment of guilt, which remains clear, separates itself from the feeling, which goes on to a vanishing point ; for while it remains, recovery and retrogression are in our thought possible.

In the ordinary Christian consciousness, the most constant and pain-giving element in guilt is the deranged and inadequate relation between one's self and the personal God, in which the man looks upon himself as temporarily severed from the source and security of all harmony and well-being, as having interposed an impediment in the currents of love flowing between Father and child.

The apprehension of suffering from violation of law which constitutes the primary feeling in guilt receives a new element from the acknowledgment of a personal God. Transgression and suffering exist. They are either entirely disconnected, and belong to different processes and only accidentally meet, or else they are connected by an intelligent will, which can adapt the latter to the former. The faith in such adaptation modifies the pain. Nature no longer appears a merciless tyrant, but a free movement, with far-off purposes of love. Thus while the pain which she brings is borne with more courage, the agony of guilt becomes so much more poignant that one hastens to extinguish it in repentance.

If, then, the total and complex judgment and feeling of guilt contain the idea of a personal God, the healthy moral consciousness and life *a fortiori* imply it; and we are ready to seek the indication of this idea from other, ampler, and purer sources.

CHAPTER VI.

THE PERSONALITY OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLE.

WE have seen that the reason can be satisfied with nothing else than perfection, and the removal of contradiction : and that the æsthetic sense falters over any thing less than a commonwealth of love, with a correspondent environment. The soul, in its moral endeavor to create such a commonwealth with such an environment,—to make all others perfect and blessed, and thereby to make itself perfect and blessed,—finds no thinkable connection of moral perfection with spiritual and physical well-being, unless there be an All-wise and All-loving Energy to adapt the latter to the former. Otherwise existence seems more and more a sacrifice, and that a hopeless and unmeaning one. Even though there could come to pass such a loving commonwealth as the moral ideal requires, contradiction would still exist if the environment were not correspondent, if matter were still hostile. To think that nature will change with the changing humanity is a thought foreign to any evolutionary scheme which is not guided by Almighty Love,—since this assumes the unchangeableness of the existent natural laws ; or fails to see that there is implicit in them the tokens of another law, which is only the manifestation of such Almighty Love. That the incoming of such law is possible, and may already have

given tokens of its presence, is in strict analogy with the facts of the past history of the world, as concluded upon by science.

The category which renders valid all scientific conclusions is that of causality, which is here fully admitted as one the human mind cannot repudiate, and which is the simple one to which, possibly, may be reduced all other categories. The universe is in movement and change, subjectively regarded, and necessarily thought as objective. This objective change exhibits what we call intelligence, and is adapted to our own intelligence. There is nothing arbitrary or meaningless in its changes (which is the postulate of all science). These demand, therefore, an adequate energy, therefore wise. The discovery of this wisdom is an analytic as well as a synthetic procedure. Did science assert that it was only the latter, it would contradict its own principle. There is implied in its methods that the wisdom and intelligent correlation in nature's movements are recognized, and not superimposed. It is impossible to think energy realizing an idea perceptible by our intelligence, but as *will*, which is only another name for this very relation and movement.

The human mind and the general human intelligence are also in movement, and their logical movement or change is not out of relation to the physical movement which requires such energy and wisdom; and how far this total movement is self-caused, and how far caused *ab extra*, is still a problem of philosophy: but these two movements can be separated only by abstraction, and in the concrete are never torn apart: and it is the endeavor of philosophy to unify

them. Therefore the outcome of human mental movement, or *aspiration*, is not purely subjective or self-caused, but objective likewise, and therefore must come within this category of causality. It must have in this realm an adequate source, which must, therefore, imply an All-loving as well as an All-wise Energy. That this principle is also infinite is inferred from the soul's own consciousness of its own infinity as related to the finite, and because it is thus obliged to synthesize any notion of All-wise and loving Energy with the notion of infinity in order to make the idea complete and this Energy adequate. Moreover, it finds already objectively the infinite space as the needed condition for the objectivity of the universe. Human aspiration assumes the infinite of expansion, otherwise it must fall back crippled, and sink towards the infinitely little and the infinitely poor. There is no limit in either direction possible for thought. Human intelligence grows, and the human mind can think no termination to its own developing capacities. Its horizon ever widens. It can be conscious of the perfection of its own love as a subjective characteristic, yet asks still an infinite field for love to expend itself upon. This boundless expanse in which it is moving is the infinite objectification of the Almighty Love. And infinite *time* is thus the necessary correlative. To be in perpetual movement and activity, or any process, requires it as a pre-condition. Pure space and time, unimaginable as they are, are thinkable, and the eternal form of the Divine glory, by whose determinations only do they become limited, and therefore apprehensible for human consciousness. Every attempt to reduce space and time to pure subjectivity has been vain

and suicidal. As the necessary conditions for physical existence they have as good a right to be posited as any starting-point to explain the movement of spirit. And such physical existence itself must have its possibility and its ground in the First Principle, as well as the pure spirit, with its logical movement: which, however, we know only as concrete, and therefore as other than pure spirit. A true dialectic must not reduce physical to logical movement, any more than the reverse, and the true unity is to be found only in the inter-relation of the two.

Any philosophy which excludes the physical universe as having a ground eternally valid, or thinks it a (so-called) creation out of nothing, fails to satisfy human thought, and will always be successfully attacked by purely materialistic philosophy,—which avers that the sudden appearance in time of a universe is no more thinkable than its sudden disappearance. The First Principle of the universe, in order to account for it, must be so thought as containing within itself the possibility of a universe, and the ground and origin of the principle of causality which it manifests: which is therefore not merely subjective and provisional, but objective, real and eternal. Therefore this First Principle is not adequately thought as pure spirit only; but as the human spirit is not pure, but determined, the Divine spirit, to be *causa sui*, must be determined, but self-determined, and we have to seek the conditions for such determination.

With this speculative conclusion the Biblical writings harmonize, which not only furnish us hints wherefrom to think pure spirit, *i. e.*, Father, Son, and Spirit, in their inter-relation, but speak of the Divine

into a systematic scheme of doctrine, and thus reach a true unity. It claims, too, or at least is willing to acknowledge that, in his dealings with mankind before this, are to be found hints and tokens of this new revelation about to be made, viz. : in the story of the Hebrew people ; all which is in strict analogy with the method in all previous revelations, in each of which is afterwards discovered by human scrutiny some premonition, or symbol at least, of what was to follow. The starting-point of this latest revelation (which the human mind concludes to be the latest, since no higher could come within the present capacity of its thought), is the Incarnation of the Eternal Son of God, bringing to human vision an insight into the inmost constitution of the Divine being, appealing to the entire sum of human faculties, to reason, imagination, and emotion, and alone furnishing the key to unify and explain all that went before.

But ere this last revelation can be rightly understood, there is incumbent upon Dogmatics that the idea of the First Principle, hitherto assumed, shall be recalled, and so scrutinized as to show the absolute need for thought of the distinctive peculiarities of the same as thus last revealed. And thus we have brought before us the first topic of a Dogmatic System,—the First Principle to be regarded as a Unity in Trinity. In this scrutiny Dogmatics claims to be guided and aided by the utterances of the revelation as externally authenticated, and handed down by tradition through an institution and through the New Testament writings. Such authentication, however, cannot be entirely valid till the doctrine of the Godhead so elicited is found to be identical with that reached by

speculation. For, if the two contradict, the former must be abandoned, or more rightly expressed and understood ; or the latter must be re-thought, and the two be in some way harmonized. This step effected, Dogmatics may thenceforward proceed confidently, since treading upon firm ground. Yet ever in its progress, this its starting-point must furnish the test of the correctness of its conclusions. Any alleged authority claiming to be supreme over the same commits suicide, and cuts away the very roots of the belief that a revelation from God, externally authenticated, is probable, or has obligation to be received ; though thereafter authority may have its proper place and its vindication.

God, then, both Speculation and Dogmatics, assume and declare, exists and is *One*, but a concrete one, and outside as well as within human thought. But as such He is more than abstract oneness, which nowhere *exists*. Every thing within the sphere of our knowledge is what it is by virtue of the sum of its relations to every thing else ; otherwise there could be no knowledge ;—and knowledge grows as these relations are step by step discovered. The attempted abstraction of every thing from abstract oneness, carries existence away to a vanishing point. Of what remains nothing can be said, for, if any thing is thought, there is assumed a relation to something else. This is what is meant when it is said that pure being when attempted to be thought, is equivalent to naught. But if, to be concrete, or *exist*, there must be such relation, it must be thought either as immanent, or transcendant, or both. If thought as only transcendant, then, if the subject, or one term of the relation be

eternal and necessary, the other must in like manner be eternal and necessary. Hence, holding to such transcendent relation only, we are obliged to hold also an eternal and necessary universe, and that, too, not in any pure form but as determined. In such scheme the highest notion of Divine freedom disappears, and only a lower and limited one is admissible. The notion of the Divine Love, too, undergoes degradation, since nowhere in such universe is a sufficient object for such perfect Love ; and thus the notion of the Divine complacency or blessedness also disappears, or is degraded.

This scheme, however, which for want of a better name, we may call Semi-Pantheism, is the only one beside the Christian doctrine of the Unity in Trinity, which has any rationality that will bear prolonged scrutiny : and it too, to account for its hold upon the human mind, must have elements of truth, for which the Christian scheme, if it be true, must have place. The latter must then, in contrast, be exhibited to show its ampler sufficiency as a First Principle, and hence its superior rationality.

The attempt of Dogmatics to elicit from the Christian tradition solely a doctrine of the Godhead has been a progression into clearer expressions, and more precise formulas ; yet its attainments must still be mainly negative, unless the speculative reason step in to give meaning to these expressions and formulas, and thus make a positive construction, a synthesis of thoughts rather than a combination of words. As, too, measurably dependent upon constant historical and exegetical enquiries, and often failing to find secure support therefrom, it must often re-

ture and gather strength from the speculative ground.

Admitting the truth as to the Divine Being to have been held in the early Christian consciousness by a sort of spiritual instinct, detecting, without being able to describe its own processes, the error in an imperfect or false formula (in which, as we shall see hereafter, we have ground for thinking there has been a mystical influence, or the activity of the Holy Spirit), still the attempt to fix the truth to be welcomed in sufficient and satisfactory words, must still have been progressive, and there is no limit to its progressiveness. Thus in Christian history the forms and phrases in which the truth thus instinctively held was sought to be expressed, underwent constant change in the way of clarification and amplification. Thus were formed the notable symbols of doctrine by the great Councils, which were the result of the endeavor to select such expressions as would arouse in the various minds regarding the same, identical conceptions; —a result only approximately and never entirely to be reached. Disputes as to the meaning of these expressions have not been wanting, and the thoughtful mind has suggested problems still unsolved by them, whose ultimate solution must modify the meaning of the whole. There is no such thing possible as divorcing the objective formula from the subjective apprehension of the same; and since the same words may arouse in different minds, equally intelligent and honest, different conceptions, such formulas are never beyond the possibility of emendation.

The creeds of the Christian church are, however, of great value as showing what *not* to think concerning

the Godhead. The vast preponderance of thought during the centuries has so far consented to them, respects them, and is willing to acknowledge that various schemes and notions rejected or fenced off in these creeds need not be re-examined,—that they are *culs-de-sac*, obliging only a retreat. The task is, rather, avoiding these, to obtain positive conceptions consistent with these negations, with the hope of reaching still improved formulas, not contradicting, but illuminating and developing the existent ones.

Here is indeed a difficult task,—to construct in thought and with positive elements a doctrine of the Godhead which shall be self-consistent and consistent with all other knowledge. One approaches such a task in the sense of weakness, almost with terror, yet with the conviction that it is entirely within the compass of human successful endeavor; that sufficient can be known of God to satisfy the heart, and the mind also, till it reaches the point where He is seen to be exhaustless, and, though past finding out now, yet still through the eternities further and further to be searched into. This limit of present endeavor we seek to illuminate to the extremest verge, so that between it and the depth of darkness beyond there shall be no intermediate twilight.

CHAPTER VIII.

PRELUDE TO THE INQUIRY, AND THE METHOD OF THE SAME.

ADMITTING the principle of causality, as ingrained in the structure of the human mind, and to be a relation which it is not possible for it to decline, we must think the First Principle as adequate to account for, originate, and explain to human thinking all physical existence and phenomena, all beauty, and all spiritual manifestation, thought, emotion, and aspiration. If it be said that God is past finding out, it may also be said that He has created the universe and the human mind to think of it, that He might be measureably found out. Whatever is known is his own manifestation, and all that is from Him is comprehensible for rational beings sooner or later, though not *per saltum*. To know that there is any thing of Him past finding out is itself so far to know Him. The principle of freedom or self-determination in ourselves obliges us to posit this as a characteristic of the First Principle. Only self-determination can be reflected as self-determination. Therefore, the universe must not be thought as a transcendant determining principle, or a process necessary to His own completeness, but as a free evolution, having as its final cause the realization of some idea. The universe is not rightly comprehended then but as a free movement, and any so-called

necessity is but its method so far discovered. Yet the admission of this Divine freedom obliges us to think that while its outcome may be comprehended, the fountain whence it issues cannot by thought be exhausted, for it is impossible to think any limit to his self-manifestation. To think any limit to this is to think a limit to our knowledge, and a cyclical movement, which is a strict form of metaphysical necessity. As no termination of the movement, or cyclical return into itself, has analogy in experience, or necessity for thought, we conclude that there must be an infinite reserve of possibilities in the First Principle which thought may penetrate, but can never exhaust. Thus all finiteness implies the infinite, and for human thought the infinite implies the finite. The finite or the necessary is the correlative of the infinite or the free, and the synthesis of the two is the Divine activity. Yet we are still within the closed circle of self-determination. Fuller vindication and elaboration of this will occur hereafter.

All knowledge derived *a posteriori* shows this progressive manifestation, new ideas, new laws or methods by which these ideas are realized, and new secrets and mysteries still remaining to be unravelled, indicating that the resources making possible such knowledge are inexhaustible.

That beauty exists, and that its emotion may be explained, also requires to think the universe thus as a free movement. Otherwise these must be relegated to mere physiological sensation and its excitants. The analysis of the emotion discloses other elements than these, only explicable upon the presupposition of the Divine freedom and perfection, thus calling out its

congener in human freedom and imagined perfection.¹ And again, such conceptions as love, compassion, or even justice have no meaning, but as presupposing both Divine and human freedom. These, then, would be mere phantasms thrown up by the inexorable physical *nexus*.

If God be free, then, and the universe a free manifestation of him in such forms and laws as to be apprehended, comprehended, and felt by rational beings, who also are a free manifestation of him, and that too in his unity, distinctness, completeness, and infinity, we must so think him as to make possible in our thought all this outcome. Whatever is transcendent must have its source in that which is immanent, and the immanent must be so thought as to make possible the transcendent.

That scheme of thinking which figures the Divine being as an abstract self-consciousness, aloof from all manifestation, yet freely creating a universe, is full of difficulties and contradictions. Such a being, in the antecedent solitude, is thought as having self-consciousness only by means of the multitude of ideas, images, and possibilities within himself, which, thrown into the absolute nothingness, become, at length, the universe. Here we have abstract will, which can never become force or power, since it has nothing to work upon. Such a being has no personality, since there is nothing to distinguish him as a self—no reciprocity, no love. If an eternal need to love, this argues imperfection and impotence, since the creation fails to exhibit an object to return such love, thereby

¹ For the full vindication and elaboration of this thesis, see the author's work on "The Beautiful and the Sublime."

implying imperfection in the creative love. Human imagination recoils from such an object, as well as human thought recoils from an object so far below its own possible idea.

The difficulties of this scheme have been so readily perceived by many thinkers, that they have fallen back upon the scheme asserting an eternal and necessary object for such an abstract subject; therefore a universe rendering self-consciousness and all thought and activity possible. But this scheme, as we have seen, is inadequate, since from it the idea of freedom disappears. For, if the universe exists necessarily, it must exist as a necessary process, for we only know it and can only think it as a process. We cannot think it prior to its own movement and change; and the method of its change must then be necessary, and thus there is no room for freedom. Also the idea of infinity has no place in this scheme, for no reserve of possibility beyond such determined universe in its movement can be maintained. God is tied to the universe as we know it, and can know it, and has no fountain within from which further existence can come. And the infinite space itself, which thought cannot elude, nor imagination compass, is itself a suggestion, and a symbol of such infinity.

And also under this scheme the notion of moral evil disappears, since it is derived from the notion of freedom; or what is called such appears only as necessary, or as a form of the good, and the universe is thus at the start defaced for our æsthetic sense and for our aspiration, and forever defaced.¹

Speculative Philosophy, Æsthetic, Ethic, all, as well

¹ See Appendix A.

as Dogmatic, require some other, profounder, and more sufficient notion of the First Principle than this Dualism or that abstract Monotheism, This human thinking long ago divined ; and in the speculations of Plato, Plotinus, and Philo we have the search after a more satisfactory conception of the Divine Principle. Similar endeavors have been abundant ever since ; and here, now, the larger part of human thinking for many centuries has confessed its obligation to the utterances of Jesus Christ and his early interpreters, as giving to the human mind great light, and beckoning towards a more satisfactory and profounder idea of the Godhead. The unified idea implied in these utterances was in its negative relations, and to a certain extent positively, crystallized, in the early ecumenical symbols ; and we have the endeavored statement of the Trinity in Unity as the essential definition of the Godhead. This, however, may be uttered in a set of propositions, as in the Athanasian symbol, yet awaken no corresponding thought,—thus be merely negative, or at most, showing that the pathways of thought here marked out to be avoided are not only unauthorized, but dangerous and untenable. But the thinking soul, not content to be led blindly, or he whose function in life is to lead others, or the philosophic lover of truth, or the poetic lover of beauty, demands more, asks what all this means, and labors more or less successfully to make clear in expression what he holds by a spiritual instinct, and to attempt in thought and in words a positive construction of the Godhead.

This attempt, then, is absolutely needful for the lover of truth ; and the first inquiry of himself is

where and how to begin. A synthetic proposition, full formed, when analyzed only gives the original elements of the synthesis. We must go back, then, to the starting-point of philosophy, vindicate it as such, and not start from any subsequent proposition of an assumed philosophy. And as philosophy has taken many starting-points, this becomes a choice of methods; and the method must first be vindicated. Many of the endeavors of theologians here, while of worth, yet have failed to satisfy, from neglecting at the start to vindicate their method against any offered for choice. Yet proximate satisfaction may be derived from these endeavors. Thus the *sine qua non* condition for all self-consciousness, that there must be an object for any subject, and the converging relation between the two,—a non-Ego, that there may be an Ego, leads to the result that in the First Principle, if thought as conscious, and therefore adequate, there must be this distinction, immanent, since, *ex hypothesi*, the transcendent is excluded; or the requirements of Ethic, that love demands an adequate object for the subject, and that this object shall also be subject to make reciprocity possible, causes the Divine idea to break into a set of relations which may further be thought into. Thus these gleams of light are sufficient for many minds to see that all unity implies plurality, and to think that, if an exhaustive exhibition of the relations immanent in the Godhead can be displayed, the absolute rationality of the same can be thus vindicated, and sufficiently for many minds to authorize the dogmatic statement, and put to rest the propensity for further enquiry. Yet these metaphysical and ethical requirements have validity solely

as flowing from and indicated by the assumed basis or starting-point of Philosophy.

What, then, *must be assumed*? We cannot start with pure being or naught, for this is reached by a prolonged process of abstraction, whose very activity assumes something, and the trustworthiness of that which makes these abstractions. We have, in any case, to wait to see whether what is assumed suffices to unify satisfactorily the whole world of thought; and the self-consistency of the scheme thus wrought out is the only proof, or above all proof, and thus only displays any rationality whatever. Nor can we take as starting-point the pure Ego. To say "I think," is to say that the Ego is not pure, but determined, and the Non-Ego becomes. Moreover, the Ego *feels* as well as thinks, and in the Non-Ego only is to be found that which can determine such feeling. Nothing can be deduced from any such notion as pure Ego; or that which seems to be is either a constant synthetic interposition by the concrete and determined Ego, or a constant abstracting process which reduces it at length to pure being, or naught. Or, if we take the world of matter as the starting-point, the narrowness and insufficiency of this is still more apparent, since we only know this as determined by the structure of our thinking principle, and thus as already synthesized by spiritual elements. And yet pure matter has as good a right to be assumed as pure or abstract spirit, since we know nothing of either except as determined by the other.

Our starting-point for any process of philosophic thought must then be that which thinks;—and that is the determined Ego, which implies relation both to

spirit and matter, and cannot think away the existence of either, or think either except as related to the other. Thus, the determined Ego, shows itself in our actual self-consciousness, yet never completely, since consciousness is ever in flow, and has to labor to gather itself and become its own object, and has not the resources of memory at will. But it asserts itself in all mental activity, whether voluntary or involuntary. This concrete Ego is the human soul, thinking and feeling under the limitations supplied by the world of matter, and under the determinations of the same, as well as under the determinations and limitations of the spiritual; and from the consciousness of its own unity may be inferred the unity of spirit and matter; and that the subjective unity can only be by virtue of that which is objective. But the soul-unity is not constituted by these relations to matter and spirit alone (which, therefore, so far, are not fully known), for the analysis of the soul-consciousness shows us something more. It shows us imagination, the power to combine material furnished from both sources, to form ideals, and it shows, above all, the ground of the existence and the stimulus to the exercise of such power,—it shows us Love, normal and abnormal, giving the impetus and the final cause. In this, the ability or the need to go out of one's self, Love and Life are identical. Thus in the concrete human subject we have a synthesis of three elements, relations to pure spirit, and to matter (neither yet fully known), unified by love, or feeling, or the instinct of dependence, which are equivalents. Only under these pre-suppositions is will or activity possible to be thought. These conditions for the concrete

subject we are obliged to carry over into the concrete object, and to think it as similarly constituted. Thus far subject and object are alike, yet each dependent on the other, and no separation is possible.

Thus is avoided the difficulty of those schemes which resolve spirit into mere modes of material motion, as well as of those schemes which make of matter a mere mode of spirit, or an equilibrium of (so-called) forces. It takes for granted, too, the trustworthiness of our faculties, and shows us, thus, as in a world that does not deceive us, unless negatively, and as we have not yet found it out.

The attempt to think the human soul as simple reduces it to nothing, as in the absurd attempt to separate substance and attributes ; for, abstract the attributes, and the residuum is *naught*, or rather the only *substance* is the upholding principle of any and every set of relations, which is itself complex, and consists in (1) the ground, (2) the idea, and (3) the activity. These are not separable, and together are reflected in every such system ; whereby we infer that the First Principle is such a system of relations, imaged thus in every thing which has distinctness and unity for our knowledge. All unity thus breaks into multiplicity. How, then, in our thought, must we arrange and describe this system of relations which constitutes the Godhead, in order to make it self-evident and absolutely rational ?

CHAPTER IX.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE GODHEAD, SUGGESTED OR IMPLIED IN THE CHRISTIAN SCRIPTURES.

IN attempting to formulate the Christian doctrine of the Godhead, in such wise as to create adequate conceptions, and a positive mental construction, two methods are to be pursued, either of which requires the other. The one may be called the exegetical method ; and consists in the examination of the utterances, the hints and intimations by whose aid the formulation of the dogma is sought. These are chiefly to be found in the New Testament Scriptures, and in the primal Christian Institution, or Church, in which the primitive traditions are enshrined ; each presupposing and producing a unique consciousness. The outcome of this consciousness assumed shape at length in the early Christian creeds, in which, for the most part, the Christian mind has *ex animo* acquiesced. But these creeds define the doctrine of the Godhead negatively, and to a certain degree only, positively. They still leave us the task of supplying meaning to their words. In the attempt to do this every generation of Christians has been obliged to resort to the speculative method, and has availed itself of its philosophy to supply positive conceptions.

This second method starts inevitably with some philosophic assumption and from it gropes after an idea

of the First Principle, which shall subserve its purpose of unifying all our knowledge. The history of the human mind before the advent of Christianity, shows that it was still groping in this direction without finding satisfaction ; or if any generation professed to find it for itself, it did not produce it in the generations succeeding. A great lift forward, a great illumination, full of suggestion and aid, was supplied by the utterances of Jesus Christ, and his disciples, as all Christian thinking has acknowledged ; and through this, progress has been made towards a satisfactory construction of the doctrine, at least for those capable of the mental effort.

If the two methods could be kept apart,—if the philosophy which gives the starting-point be true,—and if the Divine revelation be indeed made known to the human mind through these utterances, then the results of these two methods can by no means contradict each other. If they seem to do so, there must have been a faulty exegesis, or else an inadequate philosophic starting-point, or an aberrancy in the philosophic process.

But if again the two methods have not been, and cannot be kept entirely apart, if the attempted dogma requires the aid of philosophy to give meaning to its expressions ; and if philosophy, seeking to unify all knowledge, cannot ignore the fact of Jesus Christ, any more than it can ignore the fact of man, or the world, then, these methods thus interpenetrating, the results reached must square with the exigencies of either method.

As an exegetical problem, kept as distinct as possible, Christian thought, while for the most part agree-

ing, yet has not here found full agreement. The plan of this work does not allow the author to go fully into exegetical investigations, and they are avoided whenever it is possible, but some attention to this is required here in order that we may compare the result with the result of the speculative process, and by harmonizing them, vindicate the results as absolutely coalescent.

And first, these utterances of Jesus Christ, and of his disciples reproducing his teaching, maintain that there are immanent relations in the Godhead itself, and that the relations which the universe bears to God, of creation, sustentation, and evolution, reflect and exhibit these immanent relations. The words are such as to show that the universe is not thought as the outcome of the Father, *or* of the Son, *or* of the Holy Spirit indifferently; but of Father, Son, *and* Holy Spirit. Any Tritheistic conception is thus shut off. The universe must therefore show within itself such relation to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and that it exists as a concrete by virtue of these relations.

The first relation brought before our thought is that of Father and Son, a timeless process, phrased as an eternal generation. The words, taken from human analogies, suggest derivation of being, and an ethical or reciprocal relation of love. If any subordination be thought as result of this order, this must not be pressed too far, or it will lapse into a *quasi* Arian conception. It is a subordination of thought merely,—the dependance of one conception upon an antecedent one. To go beyond this, and make subordination in *will* an element of the definition is really a Tritheistic assumption, unless there be a Sabellian

via media. As the Son is the perfect image of the Father, nothing must be left out of that image that was in the Father. The text which has been the excuse for pressing the notion so far as to mar the perfect image in the Son, is Jesus' own saying, "My Father is greater than I." If this be taken to indicate the nature of the eternal relation, the Son is no longer the perfect image of the Father, and a step is moved towards the Arian hypothesis. It is not likely that such a word as *μείζων* would be used to indicate mere priority in thought. If the phrase be taken merely to assert the superiority of the Divine to the human, it is a manifest and needless truism. The difficulty is entirely avoided by making the saying refer to the *νέωσις* of the eternal Son, and that by putting off his riches and his glory He has become less than the Father, has parted with something which He is to regain in his perfected humanity. This interpretation is confirmed by the context, wherein He is contrasting this his first appearance with his second coming. We shall see by and by, when we come to treat this doctrine speculatively, how far it coalesces with these variant notions of subordination, exegetically inferred.

We have then Father and Son related to each other as expressed in the Nicene Symbol. But the relation of Father and Son to a possible universe, requires still a third conception to make activity or change possible, — a conception not included in the conception of the prior relation. This third conception is called the Holy Spirit, and is only possible when the two terms of the prior relation have first been thought, and inevitable when they have been thought. But for one expression in the words of Jesus Christ, the relation

which this third conception bears to the two prior, would have been, exegetically, thought to be identical. The phrases "Spirit of the Father," "Spirit of the Son," "Spirit of God," are indifferently used; though some ground for the choice of either term be discernable. Wherever expressions denoting *mission* are used they are for the most part put in past or future tenses. The preposition "of" translating the Greek genitive denotes an absolute and timeless relation. Once in Jesus' words the present tense is used in the new expression "*ὃ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεται*"—translated "which proceedeth from the Father." If this be taken to indicate what is meant by the relation expressed in the genitive, then the relation which the Spirit bears to the Son must be identical with that He bears to the Father. But we do not find the expression "proceedeth from the Son," and hence a good part of Christendom is content with the former phrase alone, and the doctrine of the Godhead is thus imperfectly formulated.

To resort to the phrase "proceedeth from the Father through the Son" is to depart from the literal exegetical requirements of the advocates of the single procession and is really increasing the difficulties of exegesis. The Son is either thus thought as passive medium, or, if the Spirit thus issuing from the Father receives modification from the Son, then the scheme is so far identical with that of the double procession, yet falls short of it, as lacking the perfectly reciprocal relation to Father and Son, whereby alone the Holy Spirit can be thought.

Before testing either scheme by the speculative process, let us remark that the exegetical difficulty to be overcome in the scheme of the single procession seems

insuperable ; for, in this case, the words "begotten" and "proceeding," or their Greek equivalents, if taken to express timeless relations, express no different relation, except so far as an ethical relation is implied in the former word. This relation, if not one of filial dependance merely, is reciprocal, and if the personality of the Holy Spirit, be taken for granted, an ethical relation, here likewise, springs up. Excluding this, each word has only the sense of derivation. Any distinction predicated of the relation of the Holy Spirit can only be thought by virtue of his proceeding from the Son as well as from the Father. He is then the result of a reciprocal relation ; and because Father and Son are prior in thought posited, such reciprocity alone becomes possible, and the conception of love emerges. The difficulty is to show that this reciprocal relation is constitutive and issues in a third personality, (and just at this point many attempted constructions lose their foothold). To get over this difficulty we must resort to the speculative process. But thus far it is clear that if, according to the New Testament intimations, the Holy Spirit proceeds from Father and Son, He proceeds from them as loving each other, and must, therefore, himself reflect the love of both.

Speculation must therefore give meaning to the doctrine as reached by exegesis, and thus vindicate it, and without its aid the contest is not so much between the schemes of the single and double procession, (for the former of these is incapable of philosophic vindication), as it is between the Christian doctrine of the Unity in Trinity, thought in the form of the double procession, and a unity in duality, which is as far as some philosophies have reached.

CHAPTER X.

INTIMATIONS OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLE DERIVED FROM ANALYSIS OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.

THE starting-point of speculation upon this topic is, and must be, as we have seen, the concrete human consciousness. As what is sought has to come within the capabilities of the human mind in order to constitute knowledge, this is taken for granted even in any critical scheme which endeavors to show the untrustworthiness of its processes. The human soul as perceiving, thinking, imagining and willing, even in a necessary and limited sphere, is still the highest thought, or suggestion of the highest thought, attainable by itself. Thus anthropomorphism is to be detected in any philosophy of the First Principle whatever, even in pure materialism itself. The First Principle *must* be this, in order to account for this, though more than this, since it has to account for the objective possibility of this. As an idea adequate to explain and unify all phenomena, as well as all spiritual manifestation,—all the material of knowledge, as well as knowledge itself, it can be no lower than either, and must have within itself the conditions for the evolution of phenomena, and for knowledge of the same. The principle of causality, the imperious law of the human intellect, must have its origin, therefore, in the First

Principle ; and no attempt to impugn the validity of this conclusion can be successful. Such indeed contradicts the very principle from which it argues. We cannot think of any thing at all, therefore of no process, of no evolution, of no movement or change, but under the conditions of efficient and final cause, but as requiring an energy adequate, and an idea guiding and ruling it. The discovered law which rules it, and the forecasted result, constitutes the idea for our intelligence, and the additions to our knowledge constantly recurring, show that we have not yet reached complete vision and insight of the idea. To reach our highest demand this energy must be adequate not only for all existent, but for all possible realizations, and all hinted or anticipated evolution of the idea. If this idea be limited, or (which means the same) if the possible realizations during its evolution be not inexhaustible, then, since we think in time, there must in our time-thought be reached a *plenum*, and a cessation of all activity ; which is soon discovered to be out of all analogy, unthinkable, and therefore impossible ; and thus a cyclical movement is suggested. But this again reduces the universe to a necessary process, constantly repeating itself, resolving itself periodically into its past elements, to emerge again in its determined inner-relations. But in this, the highest human idea, of freedom, disappears, which only is possible as self-determination, and therefore has no exterior limitations. Human freedom only knows itself as finite, or limited as to its liberty, by virtue of the correlative infinite, or the unlimited in energy, and in the possible realizations of the idea. We can think a limited fountain of ideas in the First Principle no more than we

can think a limited space, or a terminating time. The principle of causality itself requires that this idea of the infinite shall be accounted for, which can only be by assuming its eternal and objective reality.

The cosmological enquiry obliges to hold an adequate energy. The teleological endeavor leads to an intelligent principle. The moral investigation suggests a benevolent principle, but is met at once by the existence of evil. *Æsthetic* demands in the First Principle harmony and perfection, but is itself stopped and puzzled by ugliness and physical evil. Thus for Ethic and *Æsthetic* there is an insuperable difficulty. Could this be overcome, then, indeed, we might have a First Principle entirely within the sphere of knowledge, so far as any thing transcendent can reveal what is immanent. And because of this difficulty, our knowledge is clouded over, and it is held in the region of faith, or implicit knowledge, deeper than all knowledge which is explicit, and illuminating and urging forward the latter. Faith exists because the problem of evil is unsolved, yet because it is also felt to be ultimately soluble.

All these, therefore,—arguments for and not proofs of the existence of God—presuppose the idea in the mind, wrought in its very structure, and only serve to uncover and display it. Were the cosmological argument extended, or supplemented, so as to discover a Principle accounting for the presence of this idea, and the correlation of the infinite with the finite, we should then reach the limit of successful human enquiry. The whole speculative endeavor would be exhausted. But the problem of evil, or the negative principle, would still remain, and relegate the human conscious

will, seeking to act upon the assumption of this First Principle, to the region of faith, since knowledge is inadequate, since the elements of the idea deduced *a priori*, and those inferred *a posteriori* do not coalesce.

Later in this work will be elaborated the thesis that the existence of the contradiction, or of moral evil in the universe, bringing, as its correspondent, physical evil in its train, requires for the annulment of the same in the human soul, that the First Principle shall still, in some elements of its perfect conception, remain within the region of faith. But, this held in reserve and the difficulty acknowledged, we may still attempt to reach a proximately satisfying and self-consistent notion of the First Principle.

The completest knowledge of the human soul by itself shows it as a free intelligence morally and formally free, but with physical liberty limited, and with its own decisions variously and opposingly recurring, therefore not yet *really* free. We can think nothing higher in the First Principle than such real freedom, which is an immanent harmony, and the only true and objective necessity. But here, in our sphere, the infinite shows itself in contrast with the finite. Man is morally free, but physically necessitated, while God is physically and metaphysically free, but morally necessitated, and the name of that necessitation is the Divine Love. The intelligence of the human soul obliges it to find in the First Principle—intelligence, since its manifestation in the universe shows such intelligence, pre-adapted to our own intelligence and progress. God, as thus thought intelligent, is immanent in the universe, while, as free, He is thought as transcendent. If transcendent, the

ground of this must be in human thought, and cannot be in the universe, which shows Him only as immanent. In human thought only, therefore, can be found the conditions for the highest elements of the idea. Yet to leave the universe thus abstracted will leave a void in the self-consistent and perfect idea, since our own thinking is only under the conditions supplied by such universe, and it alone has occasioned our own mental awakening and development.

Thus the spring of the speculative endeavor is irresistible and imperious, that we shall find in the First Principle *personality*, and, therefore, that we must search for the conditions in thought which make personality possible, and for this end human consciousness must be examined.

The human soul finds itself a subject by finding that it is also an object, but a determined object—these determinations arising *ab extra*,—and therefore the existence of the universe is implied. We cannot think ourselves as out of relation to it. These determinations are not due to our voluntary principle, but only to our receptive capacity. Thus we have the Non-Ego, whereby is the consciousness of the Ego, the subject-object;—and thus the first element of the idea of personality is supplied. Resting here for a moment, we learn that we do not and cannot think of our concrete self as purely spiritual. The notion of pure spirit is only reached by persistent abstraction, therefore it is only an element of and not the entirety of our self. Moreover, every mental process whatever is mediated by imagination, and is accompanied by feeling. And these presuppose the actual, sensible world. Thus the human being is not pure spirit,

but a spiritual soul. It exists only as determined by the physical relations. Thought owes its being to these determinations. All human existence is therefore a concrete synthesis, and is at the same time ideal and real, and withal emotional, for the consciousness which apprehends it is never destitute of feeling. Our consciousness, then, is determined by the physical universe existing in space and time, and in perpetual movement, to which our own mental movement must be correspondent. But this alone does not exhaust the content of our consciousness, which contains also timeless elements, and which cannot come under the category of quantity.

Human personality is not raised to its full definition by this physical relation only, which, however, is still sufficient to produce the distinction of subject and object ; for human consciousness suffers and enjoys, and it finds other souls who suffer and enjoy, and thus the moral relation becomes possible, and finer elements weave themselves into its structure. Without this moral element it is not human. It is this which makes it human and renders possible an endless development. The human being cannot therefore think of himself as complete in himself, but as requiring, in order to elicit his potentialities, other beings than himself, between whom and himself love or its opposite, and the impartation of enjoyment or of suffering are possible. The more development proceeds and his experience widens the more numerous become the objects to receive and give such love, and the richer being he becomes. Thus human personality requires not only the physical world, but the commonwealth of thinking and loving souls. This,

therefore, its highest attainment, must be accounted for in its idea of the First Principle. And as all human activity exists only under these conditions, the Divine activity can only be thought to exist under analogous conditions, and we must find personality, thus fully defined, in the Godhead itself. It must be so thought as to make love possible, actual, and eternal, and it must be so thought as to make activity possible and real. The universe exists, but only in movement or change. There must be that, therefore, in the Divine principle, making possible such movement or change ; and time and space are either ideal possibilities in the Divine Being, or else have ever been concrete and real. Many speculative endeavors to construct in thought the First Principle have failed to exhibit this possibility of space, time, movement, and change, or of any universe ; and have given us instead only the unthinkable proposition of "something out of nothing." This sacrifice is not needed to conserve the Divine freedom, as we hope hereafter to show. If such words, however, as activity or movement are used in constructing the idea of the Divine Being in his essential, immanent, and eternal relations, they are used in an impure or figurative sense. We have, indeed, the scholastic notion of the *actus purus*,—which, however, is only a name for a timeless relation, and a sequence of conceptions. Real activity can only be under the preconditions of energy, idea, and possible movement or change, and this word is misplaced if used to express the timeless, changeless relations within the Godhead. We are not seeking something that *was*, or *became*, but something that *is*, and forever must be.

By the analysis of its consciousness, and the discovery of these conditions for its own existence, the human mind is necessitated to think all *existence* whatever as possible only under similar conditions ; and therefore that every concrete must be, not simple, but complex, and a system of relations. From the simple nothing can be abstracted. It defies analysis and definition. There must then be, in any such concrete, the idea, the energy, and that wherein and whereby the idea can be made real ; also an impelling spring to accomplish such realization. This is the only *will* possible to be thought, which is thus the focussing of these elements, and the primal step in all activity. In the world of *phenomena* every thing is seen to be what it is by virtue of its relation to every thing else ; and the totality is seen to be what it is, or seems to be, by virtue of its relation to the human mind, which can thus and no otherwise think it, and which can no otherwise be thought than as thinking it. Take away the relations of all existences to each other, and to the comprehending mind, and the inferred *substance* is a characterless abstraction about which nothing can be said.

How then must we think of the First Principle, if under these conditions ? If the Godhead is unthinkable as simple, what are its interior or immanent relations ; which must be such as to make it come up to our idea of the highest, as well as adequate for the lowest ? Thus we are obliged to discover what are the conditions of personality in the Godhead, and what are the conditions for any creative activity.

CHAPTER XI.

TRITHEISM.

AMONG other mental constructions of the idea of the Godhead, is the tritheistic one ; not only the spurious Tritheism of Arianism, but the admission of three distinct Divinities, their unity being assumed to be unthinkable. This scheme is not as clearly marked off as it might be in the Christian Creeds. The unity is indeed asserted, but no attempt is made to show wherein that unity consists, thus leaving the inference open for wrong or insufficient notions of unity. The distinct personalities, too, are explicitly asserted, but no attempt made to show how these constitute a unity. There is a seeming contradiction which has been a stumbling-block to the ordinary mind, by which the doctrine has escaped, for such, true rationality and been assented to upon the *dictum* of authority, the mind recoiling from any endeavor to give meaning to these expressions. Thus the definition is mainly negative ; but even as such has been of great value. Even among trained theologians, the doctrine of the Godhead has been so expressed as to imply a virtual Tritheism—as where the Father has been thought as representing and accomplishing the Divine justice, and the Son as representing and accomplishing the Divine mercy, and the Holy Spirit as the agent only of the latter.

Also when mere consciousness is thought as identical with *will*, and the relations of the persons of the Godhead as between three separate though reciprocal wills, we have a virtual Tritheism. And, no doubt, no higher or more consistent scheme dwells in the ordinary Christian mind. Yet the doctrine may be and should be so represented and taught as to avoid this misconception ; and how it may be will appear further on.

Much of the possible error here is owing to faulty psychological conceptions ;—that, as in the above instance, which identifies will with consciousness ; whereas *will* has no significance except upon the supposition of a field of activity rendering change possible, and an idea governing such change, and an energy limited or unlimited. As the human will is no independent faculty superadded to the congeries of faculties and relations constituting human nature, but is the entire nature itself converging towards activity, either beyond or upon itself, so the Divine will does not represent the personalities of the Godhead in their separateness, but in their inter-relation. That there is but one will in the Divine Being has been consistently maintained by the authorities of the Christian Church and her best theologians, the will with them being thought as the relation of the Divine nature in its totality towards the universe, and not as the relation and activity of either person, originating indifferently in either (the word “ nature ” here being used in the sense of essential being ; and something would have been gained, perhaps, for clear thinking by using the word “ essence ” or “ ουσια ” for this, reserving the word “ nature,” or “ φυσις,” to denote the

sum of relations of the Divine essence or substantial being to the universe). Thus creation is not by Father, Son, or Holy Spirit indifferently, but is by the whole Godhead, and all created existence must thus exhibit a three-fold relation, separable for thought by abstraction, but only rightly thought as each implying each other. Thus, too, human redemption or recovery is not rightly thought as the work of the Son indifferently, but as a concrete process, the work of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and originating in the Father; and in carrying out the same, a special functional relation must be thought of and to either person, the whole constituting a unity in activity and result, and each relation necessitating and explaining each other.

Pure and pronounced Tritheism is so unsatisfactory for thought that it has rarely, if ever, been explicitly avowed. It is as unthinkable as Polytheism. It does not show how each distinct Divinity requires the other in our thought. Each is limited in function, therefore in power, therefore not fully Divine, and the task of analysis and defining the conditions of personality adheres to each separate conception. The idea of an adequate First Principle thus evaporates; and the notion of the Supreme Fate of Polytheism is preferable, has deeper ground, and fewer difficulties. And Dualism too, which acknowledges the existence of the contradiction, and the inexplicable problem of evil, is a more consistent scheme than either; and has detained human thought longer in its meshes:—indeed, is a “Valley of the Shadow of Death” which every pilgrim of thought must pass through. Christianity has been accused of Dualism; and if any

explanation of it claims to denude the realm of thought of all mystery, and acknowledge no problem as eluding our limited faculties,—if it removes thus the need of faith, and acknowledges no distinction between faith and explicit knowledge, it renders Christianity, thus thought, liable to the charge. These perilous philosophic attempts always land either in Dualism, which represents evil as a necessary, eternal, and therefore independent principle, or in some form of Pantheism, which does not allow any such conception as moral evil, but regards it as simple negation, and physical evil as means towards a good, by courtesy called “moral.”

Not that faith is any new faculty utterly distinct from knowledge. This is the principle of mysticism, which, however, contradicts itself, inasmuch as it uses such knowledge to present an object for such faith. Rather faith is implicit knowledge, and truer in its outlook than all explicit knowledge. It holds to the centre whence all things radiate, even though the circumference be infinitely distant, and the area be dim; while explicit knowledge ever wanders in the area, and is forever seeking the centre. Faith does not, then, spring from known relations, though these are of use to define and illumine its object, but from unknown relations, and thus allies itself with a doctrine of grace. Thus it alone meets the instinct of aspiration, and suggests possibilities of elevation in the scale of being, only dimly, if at all, to be inferred from all knowledge which is explicit.

The Sabellian scheme, which makes the names given in the statement of the doctrine of the Godhead merely the names of three relations of the One Per-

son to the universe, separable in thought, and thus existing because transcendent, must likewise think a universe to make these relations possible. It thus lacks philosophic depth, as telling us nothing of the essential structure of the First Principle. He cannot be thought distinct from the universe; and thus Sabelianism is logically, if not avowedly, identical with Semi-Pantheism, and as a scheme attended by all its difficulties.

The Catholic scheme of doctrine admits these relations to the universe as actual, as transcendent, but attempts to show that they are only possible as springing from the relations immanent, which alone can explain them. It thus makes a profounder philosophic endeavor.¹

¹ See Appendix A.

CHAPTER XII.

THE UNITY IN TRINITY OF THE GODHEAD SPECULATIVELY THOUGHT.

IF, as has been indicated, we must seek the idea of the First Principle, and its vindication, in the region of pure thought, we have to analyze abstract self-consciousness, and must therefore abstract the universe; but this attempted abstraction does not fully succeed. We can only abstract the universe as determined; but the principle of causality which rules all our thinking obliges that we do not and cannot abstract something which is thus determined. There still remains an indeterminate *residuum*; for we have to show, in our complete enquiry, how the determined universe has become possible. This *residuum* cannot be a mere abstraction, for that is equivalent to naught; and we are seeking the concrete. This is not the Kantian *ding an sich*, but is the ultimate of our knowledge reached by analysis, and the *primum* for any synthetic procedure. It is the first and last term whence begins and ends our knowledge of the universe. It must exist under actual relations, and these such as to make its knowable determination possible. The First Principle, then, must be more than pure spirit; and what more will be shown in the proper order. First, however, let us notice the higher or spiritual elements of this concrete; and afterwards

what is needed to make the absolute concrete, which, after enquiry, will be found to modify our notion of spirit itself.

Human self-consciousness, when analyzed, exhibits, readily, the relation of subject and object, or the objectification of self. This may be called an act, but it is spontaneous, and cannot therefore be called *will*. As an act it must issue from the Divine will. There is no other object for the subject but itself, which thus becomes again a subject; and each is by this relation determined. But this union of subject and object, each determining the other, becomes itself an object, having in it reciprocity, which in turn becomes a subject, thus reciprocated. Thus only self-consciousness and thought become. Thus alone does complacency, or love, the first form and the ground of all feeling, become possible. This is our complex and true self, a tryad of relations, whose result is complacency, and through *existence*, joy or delight comes to be, growing deeper, finer, and more exquisite as our existent self develops and becomes richer.

Such self-consciousness we must find therefore in our construction of the First Principle, if its idea is to meet all mental requirement of adequateness, and do no violence to the principle of causality.

To translate this into ordinary theological language: God is then self-conscious, as constituting himself his own object, and thus we have the relation expressed by the words "Father and Son"; pregnant words, suggesting not only this order of conceptions, analogous to the human derivation of being; but also the relation of love. The Son being thus the perfect image of the Father, becomes in turn a subject, is such

as beholding himself in the Father. Any thing further proceeding from these, in our thought, must spring from them as thus duplicated ; and this third reflects not only Father and Son, but their reciprocal relation ; must be then himself a subject, regarding and regarded, and the conditions for the Divine complacency, or love, are thus laid. Thus Love, the impelling principle of all activity and further existence, is the only one word which can be used to define God, since for it is needful this triplicity of relations. This third subject, therefore, which completes the idea, is the active or energizing principle, whose impulse is Love ; and because thus the notion of holiness has become complete, and because the mode of his transcendent activity is secret or mystical for our present faculties, he is named "The Holy Spirit." But such activity is under the conditions supplied by the former conceptions, and the order of their genesis obliges us to refer every change, as well as every relation, to the first element of the composite idea. Thus the Father (so called) is the *primum* in thought, the ἀρχή, the πηγή, the αἰτία, of theologic language.

The process of thought here is very subtle, and each mind must pass through it for itself. We can only give such aid as words are competent for. Therefore once more we endeavor to give it.

God, in constituting himself his own object, is not to be regarded as generating a mere thought, a subjective impression which may vanish, but can be thought as self-conscious only as existing under this relation. For want of a better term, we may call this objectification an eternal *act*. The Duad being, in our thought, thus constituted, must further be thought as in the

relation of reciprocity, *i. e.*, each is a subject, and each an object. This reciprocal act must, therefore, be constitutive, as the first. The Father not only regards the Son as the objectification of himself ; but himself and the Son as in reciprocal relation. So the Son must also regard not only the Father as that of which he is the image, but himself and the Father as in reciprocal relation. And that which is thus regarded is not a mere abstraction, thought, or relation, but the union of two personal principles, in a third, which is also a personal principle, the three becoming thus the one absolute principle. That which he regards is the Father and the Son who meet in himself. Not till now, in our thought, can the conception of energy, activity, life, or love in its full definition, emerge. Energy pre-supposes the ground and the idea. Hence the Tryad of conceptions. The difficulty for thought is to regard this as a Trinity in Unity, *i. e.*, that the Unity cannot be thought but by virtue of the Trinity. There is little difficulty in thinking Father and Son. All philosophies contain these conceptions, though under other names. It is clear that without these the universe cannot be accounted for. Neither can it be accounted for without the conception of energy, and a life-giving principle. The question is, whether we can think this energy to reside in the Father, or in the Son, *i. e.*, to be a part of either conception. This is not adequate, since it can only be thought when they have been previously thought in the form above given ; and we can only think energy as we see it as exercised under the conditions supplied by the reciprocal relation of Father and Son. Thus as Energy, or Life, the Holy Spirit must be thought

as proceeding from both Father and Son, and from them in their reciprocal relation. As Energy merely he cannot be thought as proceeding from the Father only, since Energy always realizes the idea; and as Life, which superadds love to energy, he clearly must proceed from Father and Son. (Here we find the need and the value of the two terms for the second hypostasis, the Logos, and the Son, which thus together are exhaustive of his definition.) The vindication of the personality of the Holy Spirit (which is the chief difficulty for thought) is in the need that we shall regard these pure acts, which constitute the relations, as *objectifications*, constituting the complex reality or concrete. That which eternally and necessarily, and not freely, proceeds from Father and Son, must itself be eternally real, and if not personal, must be an eternal and impersonal universe, and thus we make shipwreck of the Divine freedom. The only escape from this is in holding the Holy Spirit to be also a personal principle. The love of Father and Son, being as love, eternally active, must objectify itself, and can only do so in that which can make return. Any further return must issue from the Divine freedom. Love, being now thought as grounded in the First Principle, may or must extend itself and multiply its objects. No other impelling spring for creation can be thought, which therefore is still free, or self-necessitated. But all activity from which a universe may spring requires also the pre-supposition of thought, or the idea. The idea, then, which rules the activity, is an element in the First Principle, and the idea susceptible of breaking into a multiplicity of ideas or thoughts. But the object, or the Son, is him-

self the sum and the possibility of all thoughts, whose unity constitutes the idea. He is therefore named the Divine reason, and the Divine word or utterance, the two elements of the definition of the word λόγος. Thus again, only by the pre-supposition of the Divine Logos can the universe be thought possible.

But both love and thought presuppose the eternal, inscrutable ground of all being, the Divine essence, which, however, only *exists* in this triplicity. Thus the Father, as such eternal ground, is past finding out, and can only be known through the Son and by the Holy Spirit, and no manifestation of him to present human faculties is possible but as manifestation of the Divine Logos, since it is to be apprehended by intelligence.

But to account for the universe, as something apprehended by human sense, and to which the human subject is seen to be in necessary relation, requires something more than this spirit existence, this synthesis of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. To say that it issues out of nothing is a feeble mental leap, which finds no landing, but only plunges into the darkness; and is, moreover, a declaration for which there is not the slightest warrant in the Christian Scriptures, which give us quite another scheme, or at least a suggestion. Out of pure spirit, or abstract self-consciousness, we do not yet see how the universe can have come; and thus pure spirit alone does not exhibit all the elements of the concrete, and never exists as thus pure.

We only know the universe as material, and apprehensible by sense, though synthesized by spiritual elements, hence as determined. Is it possible to ab-

stract its determinations, to remove from it the ideas which constitute our knowledge, to reduce it to unity, to think it in its ground and pure form? Or is this, again, reducing it to naught? Here, in the endeavor after this, *a priori* philosophy halts for a little; and the field for science and its *a posteriori* methods is opened. Philosophy cannot ignore these, and is under obligations to these for its further advance. Science insists that we cannot think away the material universe, and have no right to reduce it to modes of spirit activity; as philosophy insists that we have no right to reduce spirit activity to modes of material motion. And either assumption is impregnable. The mid-point between pure materialism and pure spiritism must somehow be reached. Science struggles to discover the unity of all material existence, and we may possibly divine though we cannot imagine the result. The conviction of such unity, or last ground, by science, which is its impelling spring, is itself an act or manifestation of *faith*. This is a grand endeavor; and the pathway, though strewn by many failures, still leads somewhither. Provisional theories, as the Atomic, serve their purpose, but do not reach beyond the difficulties. But both philosophy and science may here avail themselves of a suggestion made in the Christian Scriptures, which will give them aid at this point. These speak of the Divine $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$, or Glory, which is represented not as any thing subjective, but as objective, and that not as something depending upon or resulting from a created universe, though as enriched by it, but as something of which the universe is a manifestation, as something anterior in time, and as shared by Father, Son, and Holy Spirit

before the world, or the determined universe, was. This is spoken of as its outcome,—as showing forth the Divine Glory. But the universe to our knowledge appears as matter synthesized by spirit, in which synthesis consists its determinations. Therefore in its origin it appears as the Divine Glory, whose informing by spirit relations becomes the knowable universe. It is not then any thing spiritual or describable by the terms of pure spirit relations, but is rather the first form of the material, and that which may become susceptible of the physical relations. Since it eludes imagination, language, which uses physical images, is incompetent to describe it, and the nearest approach to this is its analogy, or its identification with *Light*, the universal and primal element or condition in which all material existence is known; as reason is the universal element or condition of all spirit movement. In this dim and indescribable region is the meeting-point of the material and spiritual, and the ultimate of thought reached by abstraction.

This is not *knowledge*, but the point to which the review of our sources of knowledge reduces us, and is held in the region of faith. The question whether such pure Light, or the Divine Glory ever *existed* as pure and undetermined, is a distinct question which will be taken up hereafter. But to this we are reduced by our abstracting analysis, and its conception is necessary for thought, though it defies imagination. This faculty stumbles if it regards it as a *ῥῆμα*, or chaos, seeing that this is merely a jumble of elements, assumed yet indescribable. But positing this, the Divine Glory, and likewise the Divine Being as heretofore spiritually defined, we have for thought the

possibility of a universe. Now through the activity of the Holy Spirit the thought of the Divine Logos may become concrete and real, and apprehensible by created rational souls, themselves preadapted to its apprehension. Towards this primal element of all material existence science slowly carries our knowledge, and it is rash to fix a limit or bar to its attainments. This problem too must grow simpler and easier, as will all other problems.

Much of theological language naïvely implies this admission of the Divine Glory. Such notions as omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence all presuppose it. These are the names of relations of the Divine Being to the universe, and each implies movement or development, and therefore that which is to be developed and present these attributes for recognition. Omnipresence requires the conception of space; and space determined has pure space as its pre-condition, which is not resolvable into any categories of spirit. Thus the Divine Glory must be thought as infinite, but susceptible of determination, as the infinite space is susceptible of limitation and of determined objects. Omniscience, too, presupposes the Divine Glory. The self-contemplation of the Divine Being gives us abstract being and relations, but does not give us any thing which the human intelligence can put into language till something more is supplied. Not until the Divine thoughts become real and concrete is this possible, and as these thoughts are an evolution, a movement which never stays, this presupposes a genesis, or beginning of realization, one of whose terms is, again, the Divine Glory. Omnipotence likewise requires both pre-conceptions—the

thought to be concreted and the element for its concretion—ere activity can emerge. These three terms are mere abstractions, unless describing the relations of spirit to matter reduced to some such pure form. They comprise the relations of the Godhead, thought as spiritual, to the universe. Omnipresence, as containing the ground of all being and involving the infinite, is the special relation of the Eternal Father ; omniscience, or the sum of all thought, of the Logos, or the Eternal Son ; and omnipotence, or energy, whose method is ever mystical, of the Holy Spirit : though all reality reflects and exhibits the three and in this order.

Whether these attributes, thus relative to the universe, are reducible in thought to their pure form, as pure presence, science, and potency is a question which will be taken up hereafter in a part of the inquiry wherein there will be found urgent need that the question should be examined, viz. : in the consideration of the doctrine of the Incarnation of the Eternal Son.

As pure spirit is a system of relations immanent, and as each hypostasis or term of the same has no meaning, but by virtue of its relation to the others,—as the Godhead is thus eternally constituted, and admits of no change, so the Divine Glory has no meaning for us except as synthesized by the Divine science and potency. Of it nothing can be said but that it is the possibility of all created existence, so far as it is material, as the Divine spirit is the ground of the possibility of all existence, so far as it has spiritual characteristics. Thus, too, are exhibited the conditions for all blessedness, which may become enjoy-

ment. Within the Godhead, thought as purely spiritual, are the conditions for pure love, and each hypostasis may be thought as loving each other, and itself in each other,—a timeless peace or blessedness. But in this alone is no fertility or variety. Love, as such, is more than mere complacency, is active, and because of it the immanent must become the transcendent. Thus through this self-necessitation the Divine Glory may break into life, its determinations may begin and expand, and a universe become, enlarging the sphere of the Divine Love. As out of the Divine Glory, synthesized by spirit, springs all concrete existence in endless variety, so the Divine complacency must be thought as belonging to it, and accompanying its evolution. God's own enjoyment is thus not only in all human enjoyment, and all animal enjoyment, but in the motion of all organic life and in the motions of the inorganic world, which thus may be thought as living and free. Thus only is the objectivity of beauty, or its emotion, explicable. Thus, through the created universe the Divine consciousness is enriched, and its Love shown to be not only intense as between perfect subjects and objects, but exhaustless as reflecting itself in created objects and subjects, rising step by step into a similar perfection. Glory is the eternal possession of the Godhead, yet it even can be obscured should Love require it; yet the obscuration can melt away, and display it again enhanced and enriched. That it has been thus darkened is not only declared in the Christian Scriptures, but the world is itself an evidence of the fact, as will be shown hereafter.

Love is indeed the sole attribute of the Godhead

thought as spiritual. We need not go beyond this to think it as pure. As man is capable of loving, he is so far in the image of God. But to think the Divine love as without weariness, or to imagine it, we require to think the Divine Glory, and a ceaseless activity and movement. Such activity and change, or evolution, is demanded, therefore, by the conception of love itself, and thus such activity seems a necessary requirement for the Divine love.

Here, indeed, seems a difficulty, and another plunge into *a priori* thinking is required.

We cannot abandon our thesis that the universe, as we know it, was a free creation, and not a process metaphysically necessary. But as thus freely created from the Divine Glory, it must be thought to have had a beginning, a starting-point of its evolution. The only alternative for thought is a cyclical movement with its periods of advance and of retrogression, (the "homogeneous" becomes the "heterogeneous," and the heterogeneous in turn becomes the homogeneous, the extreme of retrogression being the condition for a renewed advance, the universe becoming thus for imagination a wearisome monotony). Escaping this deadening dilemma, evolution, though thus requiring a beginning, does not, admitting the Divine infinity, require an end; but, as made possible by such infinity, an endless movement or expansion. But if the universe as a concrete is thought as having a beginning in time, are we obliged to retire upon the dreary notion of a void space and an undetermined time? If we cannot think the Divine Being but as loving, and eternally active, must we not think a universe as still eternally issuing, showing that free-

dom is still its principle, not by its abstract existence, but by its determinations? In other words, is not love, though free, self-necessitated to create, and is not this self-necessitation the highest form of freedom?

To think otherwise is a dreary alternative, from which imagination recoils, and thought halts and begins anew its questioning. No wonder the conclusion is readily reached that all *origin* is inexplicable, and that we have here a permanent antinomy. Of any universe other than our own we know nothing. We cannot deny its possibility, and if we reject the alternative of a cyclical movement as equally unsatisfactory, we have reached here an impenetrable abyss.

The Christian Scriptures, possibly, give intimations of spheres and modes of existence antecedent to terrestrial and human existence; yet of this not aloof from terrestrial existence, therefore as included in the universe; and thus the enquiry as to origins still remains. What little these Scriptures tell us of such modes of existence shows them but as reflections of our own, or as that of which our own is the reflection. This sphere therein displayed is shining with love and joy, but darkened also by hate and terror, and out of it has come all moral evil; and because of this it closes itself into darkness for all human investigation by our present limited faculties. But we may say that if the universe had a beginning, moral evil had a beginning, and the question still remains whether we are obliged to think any outcome of the Divine Love, any determination of the Divine Glory, antecedent. But, if admitted as possible, such outcome is closed to our knowledge, and any attempt to know it assumes

without warrant its resemblance to our present universe. Sooner or later we must confess our mental limitation, and here seems to be the point where enquiry must stop, and thought must retire back upon the region of the known, to find here one other and only one other problem defying scrutiny, viz.: how evil, moral and physical, became in such known universe.

We have, then, as the result of our speculative enquiry, these theses, harmonizing with the *dicta* of Dogmatics.

(1) The First Principle is a Unity because it is a Trinity, and the Godhead is thus for our thought constituted, as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in unchangeable relations, and in this order. Its sole spiritual attribute is Love, which this synthesis renders possible for thought, and which necessitates an eternal activity.

(2) As all concrete existence, which is the field of knowledge, displays a synthesis of elements with their relations, the physical element, the intellectual, or the idea, and the energy, whose impelling spring cannot be thought as other than emotional, there must be in the First Principle the ground and the possibility of these elements in their inter-relation. The ground for the elements by abstraction called *spiritual* is the Divine self-consciousness: the ground for the element by abstraction called *physical* is the Divine Glory.

(3) All created existence reflects the Godhead, and does not issue from either hypostasis indifferently, but from the three and through their essential relations. We find in it material reality, thought, and emotion, and an unceasing activity and change, or evolution.

Every material thing has its ground, its idea, its movement, and the delight in such movement. The Divine complacency follows such evolution. The terrestrial masses flow in such movement, and display the free principle of the same in their beauty.

(4) Man is the crown of creation, than whom, regarded in his possibilities of development, we know nothing higher, and reflects more entirely still the Divine being, not only in the material ground for his physical existence, which is wrought up into the highest form of organic life, and the highest beauty; but in his limitless intelligence, in his pure emotion, responding to the Divine emotion, and in his capacity for endless development. As the highest form of created existence, he is the image of the Divine existence, therefore self-determining or infinite,—thus as such set apart and aloof from God himself, in the midst of a field adapted to his powers, in which he can determine his own ends and his own career, and either affirm his independence and shrink into isolation, or freely coalesce with the ideal harmony, whereby alone the potentialities of his being are elicited and he becomes member of an ethical commonwealth, with an environment adjusted to his progressive changes. Thus since the relations existing in this commonwealth are required to elicit his potentialities and for his being to expand, the individual is not rightly thought, but as a member of this organism, thus physical and ethical, and mediated perpetually by the intellectual growth and expansion; each member of which finds its perfection and fulness of being by virtue of each other member, and of the whole. Nor can this organism be rightly thought but as a member

of a larger organism, including God himself and all other created existence freely acquiescing in the ethical requirements of the same. But ere this organism of humanity, which exists as a time development, can be completed and take its place in the larger organic unity, there is a contradiction to be removed and a normal development to be secured. Moral evil must be extirpated from it, in which case only can physical evil disappear, and the material universe be made correspondent.

(5) The origin of this contradiction is enveloped in impenetrable darkness. We can only note its actual characteristics, and we shall see, later on, what can be thought or dreamed of the destiny of moral evil, whether it can be entirely removed, or if not, under what conditions is its separation from the good in concrete existence thinkable.

Here, now, admitting human inherited disorder and disease, admitting human guilt or self-condemnation, and apprehension of suffering or loss as resultant, admitting human weakness and despair before the task of its own recovery; and admitting, on the other hand, the Divine love, and the Divine adequacy, we have rendered *a priori* possible for thought, an active interference as God's part towards the removal of this contradiction, and the restoration of the conditions for man's normal development, *i. e.*, a scheme of redemption, recovery, and elevation. And if any thing has been presented to the human mind as such, it cannot but examine the claim; or, in neglecting so to do, it violates its highest instincts, the fundamental pre-dispositions of the human being.

What has been said in this chapter concerning the

pre-requisites in our idea of the First Principle to make the creation of a universe, as we know it, thinkable, may receive further elaboration, and the notion of creation itself further explication ; which, in order not to separate too far the topics of our text, we will give in an Appendix.¹

¹ See Appendix B.

CHAPTER XIII.

A PRIORI PROBABILITY OF A SCHEME FOR HUMAN RECOVERY,—DISTINCTION OF MORALITY AND RELIGION.

WITH the external grounds for the belief that such a scheme for human recovery exists, and is in process of execution, we have in this treatise nothing to do. We aim only to show its rationality, and that its interpretation must submit to the terms of such rationality. To deny that it has rationality is to deny that it has self-consistent meaning. The terms are equivalents. Nor is it claimed that the evidence for its existence can ever be carried beyond the region of faith. The external evidence is bright or dim according to the depth of this instinct, which causes it to be gladly welcomed, or reluctantly admitted, or strongly repelled. The present aim is to show that the speculative reason and the æsthetic sense can be satisfied only with the removal of moral and physical evil; unless there is a persistent antinomy, arising from the principle of freedom, in which case only a provisional satisfaction is possible, reconciling temporarily our intelligence by showing the possibility and the conditions for the termination of the *stadium* of conflict. The æsthetic demands and the ethical demands are identical. The contradiction must be seen to be in process of removal ere the process of development can be acknowledged as normally

proceeding, and the far-off result must appear as a moral harmony, in which the physical world is subservient and correspondent to the needs, and even to the seeming caprices of spirit; including likewise a perpetual intellectual growth and expansion, as demanded by the idea of infinity. The one difficulty, and there is no other than one, which human thinking cannot triumph over, is, again, the existence, the origin, the nature of moral evil, and the destiny of the spiritual souls of which it shall be the characteristic. Here is an endless field for speculation, in which the human mind will never rest. At the present stage of man's moral advancement we can see that it is best that this problem should seem to be insoluble, since the principle of faith is the mainspring of man's moral recovery, whose force would abate were he trusted with this insight. It may possibly be that in the far-off generations, when he comes to know more of himself in relation to the sphere he lives in, glimpses of the divine meaning and purpose here may be afforded.

Any speculative endeavor, seeking to unify, thus is burdened with this weight; but if it can succeed in knowing and showing that there is no other insoluble problem adhering to the universe which we partially know,—that all seemingly difficult ones, when scrutinized, prove to be this in some form, we shall have reached the limit of speculative endeavor, and satisfaction beyond we cannot at present hope for.

In any so-called *a priori* method, we are indeed indebted to the *a posteriori* processes, seeing that all our knowledge is a synthesis of the two elements. Even our idea of the First Principle is thus indebted; for the very notions we import into it, of causality, of

infinity, of relation, of love, are derived from this synthesized experience. What has been sought is to rid the idea of the transient, of the changeful, of the needless, and present it as a principle in its immanent relations, complete and self-sufficient, the timeless basis of all time-movement, therefore adequate to account for whatever is beneath, or, in thought, beyond itself. The universe exists. The human thinking subject exists. Human society exists. And all exist, as, in, and by perpetual movement and change. What is the changeless principle underlying all these, their *substance*? Since to it we are compelled physically to submit; since we are ruled in our knowledge by the conditions it has supplied; since we know that we can give to our moral activity the form of acquiescence and harmony, and enter into the process which has been started by it, or can refuse our allegiance and retire upon our spiritual independency,—what is and what should be our relation to this Eternal and Supreme Principle? This question is essentially a religious one, and a religious need has been the impelling spring of all human thinking, and a religious end the result it has groped after.

Religion, in the proper and narrow sense, is the relation which the human person seeks to find and act upon between himself and the principle underlying the universe, assumed or felt to be also personal. It may expend itself in a *cultus* solely, or it may admit ethical elements into this relation.

Morality may be thought under various definitions: (1) as submission to some scheme of expediency for one's self as member of a social organism, and hence for such organism, terminating in the immediate pres-

ent, or in a future more or less remote ; or (2) it may be thought as obedience to an arbitrary will, either Divine or human ; or (3) it may be thought as the endeavor to realize the requirements of an abstract law which we find involved in the structure of our minds, by the fulfilment of which alone reason can be satisfied, which law may or may not be thought to be the Divine will ; or (4) it may be thought as the endeavor, changing in its means according to changing circumstances, to realize an ideal of perfection, in which all the demands of our moral, mental, physical, and emotional being shall be satisfied ; and if it must satisfy our aspiration at all points, the motive-spring for such endeavor must be free, therefore personal, and require a personal relation,—be, indeed, love responding to love.

In this last definition morality and religion coalesce and become identical. Starting from this their identity, we may again by abstraction narrow their definitions, and by religion mean only the motive-spring, the personal relation, and the peculiarity obedience takes therefrom ; and by morality mean only the *residuum* of activities and restraints after such abstraction, and those rules of living in which religion and morality, under any definition, coalesce. But if religion be true and unavoidable, the whole plan of life must be affected by it, and morality be colored therefrom.

Cultus, therefore, may be either pure and something superadded to morality, or it may be determined by both relations. Thus worship is an endeavor to intensify the personal relation to God, whereby is increased the force of the motive-spring ; and its vary-

ing modes have this as their significance. This is the religious element. But so far as worship is regarded as a means to an end, to facilitate our endeavor to realize the ideal, and render obedience more and more spontaneous, to turn sacrifice into its own needlessness, it has the moral element.

Thus without much elasticity in the use of words, we may use the word morality as including religion, and the word religion as including morality.

What *a priori* grounds, then, have we for concluding a Divine scheme for human recovery, and how in obedience to the requirements of our First Principle may or must it be carried into effect?

From observation and experience only we cannot conclude the unmixed goodness of the First Principle. Physical evil and suffering are evidence against it. But—the question of the origin of this being dismissed—we may still be conducted by observation to the conception of the Divine *Love*. We see that obedience to the moral law results generally in well-being and comparative happiness. If it is ever otherwise we see that it is owing to nature, sometimes inexplicably hostile, or to the principle of heredity, the bond between the members of the human organism, or to the wilful enmity of men, or to the requirements of the sacrificial spirit. But there is still encouragement enough to keep alive the faith that moral obedience will result in ultimate well-being. On the other hand, we observe that violation of the moral law brings suffering, and the profounder its violation the farther off, generally, the retribution. Thus the Divine love is seen to be so perfect as not to be indulgent, but severe to whatever is alien to itself. And,

besides, a close observation of human experience shows that to the morally obedient the suffering that comes from heredity or environment becomes remedial, purifying, and a means for spiritual strength.

Such facts as these indicate that human obedience and moral recovery are in the Divine mind and heart, and render probable that the task of rectifying humanity has been undertaken.

And other subtler facts show the same, viz. : that all human action and change cannot be accounted for by what comes within the range of knowledge,—that the understood relations to spirit and matter are not sufficient to account for it,—that there are unsounded depths in the range of human freedom, and that its determinations are relative in their origin to regions beyond the sphere of actual knowledge ; in other words, that influences from the unseen and unknown must have come to it, illuminating motives and supplying or strengthening the motive-spring. In this, as we have said before, is the philosophic, or even the scientific vindication of a doctrine of grace.

Moreover, if any such scheme for human recovery exists, it must be universal in its intent and operation, and the tokens of it be discernible in the earliest history of the human race, and everywhere where humanity is observable, for humanity is an organism, and every concretion of it a manifestation of the same idea. That it is both a physical and moral organism is shown by the instinct of sympathy, and may have abundant vindications. That any arbitrary selection from the mass of humanity is alone regarded by such scheme is a suicidal proposition, since violating not only the idea of organic unity

of the human race, but also that of the Divine Love, from which we infer its possibility. There may, however be manifold providential selections from it, needful for the requirements of the process, but the intent or aim must be for the whole. Yet the principle of freedom cannot be violated, and the regenerated organism must contain only those who freely are members of it. Hence the possibility of rejection of such scheme and the withdrawal from its influences must be maintained.

In this statement the Christian Scriptures and Christian history acquiesce,—which tell us or assume that the work of Christ was for all men. This is something more than an abstract or thinkable possibility, the conditions for realizing which are withheld. Some positive benefit must thereby reach every member of the human race. We are not, however, necessitated to think that the regenerated human race is identical with the actual one. As the latter is complete as a natural organism, the former can be thought complete as a newly created organism. The notion that the two will and must be identical is kept alive by human sentiment and human hope, and is in some degree encouraged by expressions in the Christian Scriptures; but cannot be shown to be *a priori* inevitable without violating the principle of moral freedom; nor can it be shown to our knowledge as probable, since to think its possibility we have to resort to means mystical, or beyond knowledge, and therefore such conclusion can only be held in the region of faith. What difficulties meet it there will be adverted to in a later part of this inquiry.

Thus we find the claim of Christianity in some de-

gree confirmed, and that the observation of human experience and the very idea we have been obliged to form of the First Principle suggest the *a priori* probability of a scheme for human moral recovery, mental advancement, and physical well-being. We may approach the enquiry into this by noting the evidence from history and observation that such a scheme has been carried out, which is the method of Apologetics as purely such ; or, as is our method, we may endeavor to show how, from our idea of the First Principle, such a scheme can and must be initiated and carried out.

We have then (1) a universe issuing from the Godhead, in idea perfect, yet to be realized by a process of development. We have (2) this universe, deranged by a mysterious or an alien principle, whereby its development is no longer normal, and contradiction ensuing, which has to be annulled previous to or along with the restored normal process. How is a new idea and a new Divine energy to enter it, and start the process of recovery? In dogmatic language, how is human sin to be forgiven, *i. e.*, its consequences annulled, human sinfulness cured, human character sanctified or made morally perfect, and the physical environment be made correspondent? In short, how is humanity to be regenerated? Through the entrance of moral evil the development has necessarily become abnormal. To understand this abnormality we require to contrast it with normality, and must do our best to penetrate to a true and consistent notion of this. As a dogmatic scheme we can only indeed study, and *a posteriori*, the abnormal development, and treating the Incarnation of the Eternal Son

and the Atoning Sacrifice as actual facts and doctrines, discover how they determine and issue in man's actual development. But the speculative method must first reach the idea of the normal development ere it can adjust it to the changed conditions introduced by the incoming of moral evil.

Dogmatic theologians have indeed ventured beyond their pure science, and busied themselves with this enquiry. Witness the Scotist theory of the Incarnation and the questions affiliated with it. They have not, however, always confessed that this is a speculative adventure. Dogmatics proper does not seek to tell us what would have been *if*—but what has been and is. Yet this is a legitimate and necessary endeavor of speculative theology, whose results, too, may serve to harmonize dogmatic statements.

What then, under the admitted conditions, was the Divine idea in the creation of humanity, and what was to be man's normal development? We repudiate at the start the notion that this idea was not the very highest. That sin has given birth in the Divine mind to a higher idea is to exalt evil and the contradiction into a means for a higher good than without it would have been attainable, *i. e.*, to make what *ought not to be* an element of what *ought to be*. The doctrine veiled in the "*O felix culpa*" is radically false and suicidal.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE DIVINE IDEA OF MAN, AS NORMALLY TO BE DEVELOPED,—DIFFICULTIES,—ANIMAL SUFFERING.

To obtain a satisfactory notion of the Divine idea to be realized in the creation of man, the human race must be studied historically and scientifically, and the individual man psychologically.

The notion that man was created a perfect being, is unsupported by any historical or scientific evidence, and not to be concluded from any examination of his structure. It gives us a lower conception of him than the one we derive from such examination. For thus he was not a self-developing, self-creating being, and therefore not properly spiritual. All history and experience show him to be and ever to have been progressive. All psychological analysis exhibits him the same, and progressive from the spring within him. He must then, to meet these requirements and the highest conception of him, have been created good and innocent, and start undeveloped, yet furnished with the possibilities and surrounded by the material for a normal development. The question of the mode of his origin is immaterial here, and while scientific evidence hitherto does not settle the question, no result it can reach can disturb our conclusion. A plant may have been developed into an animal, but there must have been a time when its life took the form of

enjoyment. This is an elevation in the scale of being, and is a true and proper creation, no matter how subtle and gradual the steps of the progress ; the evidence of a new idea now realized ; and something not to have been discovered, nor yet discoverable in the plant. An animal may have been developed into a man, but only by a similar elevation, by an irradiation from a spiritual source, whereby it becomes a spiritual soul, and by virtue of which it becomes capable of an endless self-development. This, too, is a radically distinct idea, and a proper creation, as much so when organized matter is the material to which the higher element or relation is to be superadded, as when unorganized material is thus treated. No trace of such spirit-consciousness is to be found in the merely animal—no evidence of the actuality or the likelihood of such endless advance. Speculative Theology is therefore entirely indifferent as to the mode of human origin, as to the *media*, be they more or fewer, between the Divine idea, and its concretion.

All *a priori* probability, as well as all historic and scientific testimony show that there was a time when the existing human race began to be. As to the historic and scientific evidence for the question whether this race sprang from a single pair, or by the appearance, simultaneous or otherwise, of many pairs, it is about equally divided. Judging *a priori* the former is the more probable solution ; judging *a posteriori* even, the probability is but little weakened, for the resemblances between the members of the race are greater than the differences. Their resemblances are radical and permanent, their differences are transient and changeable. And science even shows that gen-

eric characteristics are unchangeable. The idea of man remains the same, under every actual variation, and is to be detected in the lowest savage. But to reach the clear and full idea of man, he must be studied in the form of the most fully developed individuals, in order to find his probable future, and the final cause of his creation ; and enquiry in this direction is more hopeful and fruitful in results than any enquiry into his past history.

But here, at the start, we are met by the fact that human development is not normal, that it is disturbed by the contradiction of moral evil. To discover the ground of this disturbance two modes of solution are possible for thought, already adverted to, but here examined afresh and more fully. One is, that moral evil (so called) springs out of the actuality of physical evil ; the other, that physical evil and imperfection are the dialectic result of moral evil. Science, physical and physiological, and observation, seem largely to favor the former view ; and were it not that from this starting-point the condition reached by the more developed creature cannot be explained, we should be forced to adopt it.

This theory reminds us that man made his first appearance in a world already fully peopled with animal life ; that we find not only the conflict of physical forces, but the ravaging and destruction of vegetable life, and conflict and pain in animal life ; that the task of the human being, set in this environment and stimulated by want and danger, was to develop his inner capacities by overcoming these limitations, and that through this process, continued through the generations, he has acquired his present

intelligence and his present powers. It attempts, likewise, to show that the need of individual immunity from pain and of social harmony and consequent individual enjoyment caused him to make discoveries of rules of prudence protecting both himself and his tribe and his nation, and even protecting the entire human race, in which proceeding he is still advancing, and that the time may yet be reached when individual and national well-being will be found to be best secured by the well-being of the aggregate race ; that these prudential rules, whose origin for the most part has been forgotten, have crystallized into maxims, which become incorporated into the sum of instincts, and have descended through the principle of heredity into the generations, and that these constitute what is called the moral law. Thus physical evil appears as the condition for intelligence and virtue, and brings about at length the strengthening, the growth, and the expansion of the benevolent affections.

But we find not only in the most highly developed specimens of the human race, but in a degree in all stages of the previous development, and rudimental, probably, in the lowest, a state of the consciousness that is not explicable from these pre-suppositions merely. The utmost result, in thought, attainable from these would be that neglect of these prudential precautions, and violation of these maxims was inexpedient, and that the result, though not always a misfortune to the individual, was possibly such for the race. No notion that an absolute law of the universe had been violated could spring from these *data*. The fact of human guilt, or self-accusation, and the sense of responsibility could not appear. These, to explain

their origin, require the ideas of immortality and of self-determination. Thus in the foregoing explanation the principle of causality, which purports to rule it, is violated. And besides, the general conclusion that violation of the (so-called) moral law was followed by its penalty in suffering, which is alleged to be the spring of such prudential obedience, would be contradicted by the fact that the greatest conceivable violations of such law meet with no such retribution, and that it is possible by a more refined prudence to evade it; which iniquitous prudence would itself descend by the principle of heredity, and be a perpetual counter-influence to the spread of the altruistic instincts. In this scheme, too, the highest human virtues which exist, have no place or justification. No substantial motive is left for self-sacrifice, for the well-being of any possible generation of the future, that might be destroyed by some physical cataclysm, can have no more absolute worth in our regard, than the well-being of the generation existent, or of any one departed. And if the beauty of such a prospective state of things be alleged as an inspiring spring for such sacrifice, it can be shown that the very existence of the emotion of the beautiful depends upon the faith in a future life, and the perfection therein.¹

This solution of the origin and the nature of moral evil, though frequently reached by the scientific mind, and sometimes by the philosophic mind, yet fails to satisfy the latter, and must ultimately fail to satisfy the former. The religious mind is never entangled by it, and turns otherwhither for an answer to the question.

¹ For this argument see the author's work, "The Beautiful and the Sublime."

As for the other explanation, that physical evil is the result of moral evil, the scientific and historic evidence is deficient, and, aside from any alleged revelation of the Divine mind upon the matter, its evidence must be *a priori*; and derived from the study of human consciousness.

That man was created with a predisposition for good, but evinces a bias away from it, was a conclusion reached from an analysis of human nature by Kant; and a similar conclusion, in other terms, was attained by Bishop Butler. The incoming of such a bias may be called *the fall of man*. That it exists, is admitted. That it originated in some act or relation, thereby called moral, is necessary to think, unless we fall back upon the other explanation, which we have concluded to be insufficient. Admit, hypothetically, that man was ushered into his environment morally innocent, though undeveloped, and with a career before him of endless intellectual progress and of the acquisition of moral virtue or spiritual strength; admit from some unknown origin a perversion of his will—*i. e.*, a preference of the lower for the higher motive or end, be it ever so slight or faint, and the generation therefrom of individual impulse contrary to the primary ones included in his predisposition; and subject both these to the principle of heredity, whereby each is intensified or weakened in every individual, thus constituting for such a different synthesis of traits;—admit in this form the fall of man, and it explains the actual human history and condition far more satisfactorily than any other scheme. It may thus be said to have *a priori* probability. Did it have equal scientific and historic evidence to support it, it

would furnish a strong claim for admission as the best possible solution of the problem.

Science and ordinary history are at fault in discovering the origins of humanity. The only alleged history which confirms the explanation above is that of the Old Testament, and if this be found to enter into our speculative scheme more successfully than any other historic result, it is worthy of being followed out into fuller investigation. But here we are at once met by a difficulty that at first glance seems almost insuperable.

The problem is to find the Divine idea in the creation of man such as needing only to be normally developed, and not to require moral evil, or physical evil, as necessary for the same. He is to grow in moral strength, and for this, as the highest possibility for a created being, moral evil must be a possibility, and come to be thought as possible. Therefore temptation *ab extra* must be actual, and through triumph over it is the needful spiritual fibre to be gained; but, *ex hypothese*, he must not necessarily yield. He is to obtain expansion of his intelligence by his victories and his meditations. What then is to be the ultimate result of his development thus progressive, in which alone is the final cause, and the true idea of his being? Is a still new idea implicit in those which have gone before? What elevation in the scale of being is thinkable? Such elevation must affect not only his relation to his environment and to his race, but to the First Principle from which he sprang. If any nearer approach to this is possible, any further coalescence between the Divine and human, how is this apotheosis to be accomplished,

and can it be without a new Divine act? and can this be other than the entrance of the Eternal Son into humanity? This enquiry will be exhaustively made in the proper place.

At the present point, however, of our inquiry, we have found the difficulty meeting us that man is ushered into a world where physical evil already exists, where what our thesis alleges to be the consequence of moral evil appears by anticipation. No wonder that at this stage of the enquiry many have abandoned this solution, or been obliged to content themselves with speculations diminishing but not removing the difficulty. The fact of the existence of animal conflicts and animal pain before the advent of humanity is, of all facts, the most troublesome to reconcile with our thesis.

But let us look at this problem carefully. Observation and scientific inferences make known to us the physical changes in our globe, and in the solar system, and possibly in the stellar system, before the existence of life in our planet under such conditions as only we can know it. We note what has been called the conflict of physical forces, but our later science confirms the familiar *a priori* conception and reduces these so-called forces to unity. These are but various forms and modifications of one energy, thus by equilibrium, or partial preponderance, realizing by perpetual change the Divine ideas and accomplishing the various physical concretions,—thus perpetually bringing to our notice new thoughts, or more fully the content and implications of the old. All this process, which might be poetically described, shows by its very fitness for such description that it does not shock the

æsthetic sense. Reason finds no discontent, but rests in the spectacle and the story with satisfaction. This exhaustless field for knowledge and enjoyment is one element of its idea of the perfect life, and meets one demand and aspiration of the complex creature, enriching his experience, stimulating his activity, and opening out unlimited vistas of knowledge and delight. The occasional sublimity of these conflicts and magnitudes, if this be a possible emotion for a strong spirit set aloof from all peril or difficulty to itself, would be a vanishing quantity disappearing forever into the calm of its discovered intent and beauty, yet producing the conditions for new sublimities, in turn to be subdued. There is nothing yet that could be called physical evil.

And when vegetable life appears on the planet the æsthetic demand is still unshocked. Here comes to the birth new and exquisite beauty. Its very decay preserves the observing spirit from weariness, since it is filled by new births, new variations of the specific idea. Death here is but the vanishing into the distance of the lovely phantom, which is soon to gather itself into shape in new and variant form. The very downfall of the great tree causes at length a thousand minute forms of life to come to pass, and among them sows the seed of its own successor. A pure and holy spirit finds no contradiction in all this, but only new joy and the occasion for varied admiration and incessant adoration.

And when we find these physical motes or masses so animated as while they live to be capable of enjoyment (which fact is the most wonderful, entrancing, and suggestive one that all observation can furnish,

—the most precious of all facts), then surely the blessedness of the observing spirit, the inmost law of whose being is love, reaches a high degree. Creation is full of joy, and basks in the light and delight thus overflowing from the Divine source. But the æsthetic sense, on the point of reaching its utmost gratification, recoils, discovering that this glory is darkened by shadows and delight turned in upon itself in the exhibition of animal pain.

But let us reflect. Pain is one thing to the disordered soul of man, whom it reminds of his bodily weakness and of his insecure hold of his earthly possessions and prospects, and is so enhanced by his imagination and fearful forecasts, is so mingled thus with spiritual elements, that we hardly know what it is when these are eliminated and it is reduced to its purely physical conditions. It must be another thing, and only this last, to the animal, incapable of this imaginative process and these forebodings of future ill. Nay, the animal seems to take delight in its very physical pain. A superior satisfaction seems to come to it by running the risk of such pain. It is not often deterred from such conflicts as produce it by any present or apprehended suffering. An impulse that seems sometimes almost a reflective enjoyment sustains it. The sense of suffering is extinguished in a higher animal consciousness. It experiences this elevation, and if defeated in such conflict, or passive under assault, it yields when compelled, or convinced of its own inadequacy, and contentedly convalesces, or dies without lament. Thus in animal pain itself, or rather in the willingness with which it is risked or undergone, is a premonition of a higher life, an elevation of consciousness, and a prefiguration of sacrifice itself.

We ourselves, when enthralled by some emotion, or when our faculties are concentrated in some activity, do not feel our physical pain, and suffer under it acutely only when the mind is withdrawn from the circumference of our possible experience to this actual and temporary centre.

These, and other facts do indeed modify our first crude notion of pain, and diminish the terror and the intensity of the contradiction, but they do not destroy it, or reconcile us to it. We still think, feel, know physical pain to be abnormal, to indicate imperfect life, indeed to be in itself transitory, since death will end it; and we perceive that it is meanwhile for humanity, and possibly for animal life, vicarious and may be remedial. But it is still thought as a contradiction, as that which *ought not to be*. The instinctive belief is profound in us, that were there no moral disorder and shortcoming this pain would not be. And thus we connect in thought, all animal pain with moral disorder. What relation between the two is then thinkable?

Just here we find abundantly in scientific, philosophical, and sometimes in theological literature, an attempt to throw light upon this problem from the conclusion reached by observation that pain, which is the indication of a felt want, or a difficulty to be removed, is needed as a stimulus to exertion, and therefore essential for all life, which is progressive thus by action and reaction,—that bodily pains have been the stimuli which have aroused man's activity, and brought about his victories and his progress; and that animality can only be active, and find enjoyment, and secure its own development in consequence of this stimulus.

But all this is only partly true. All animal life does

not show this stimulus of pain, or other feeling than pure enjoyment. The motes in the sunbeam probably feel no more pain than the sunbeam itself. And, in the case of humanity, purely mental wants have furnished more powerful motives to start and urge on human progress than any bodily pain. We can think a world as progressive under a stimulus of enjoyment perpetually refining itself as easily as under the stimulus of pain. Nor would the stimulus be insufficient if animal life had to struggle with physical forces only, which cannot suffer, rather than with itself which can.

But admitting that, as the world is, pain is such a stimulus, we do not see that it is so necessarily; for if so, and if the creature is endlessly progressive, it must ever remain and be needed for such progression. The æsthetic sense can hope then for no satisfaction, and reason remains in a perpetual contradiction. Rather, if this contradiction be necessary and perpetual, no vision of a perfected universe could ever have been suggested for the æsthetic sense, no ideal harmony have ever found place in human thought. And without this hope, this stimulus of ideal elevation, human progress must sink back into animality, if it ever could have advanced beyond it.

Then likewise, in the incoherent scheme of which this solution is an element, the conception of moral evil is weakened to its own destruction. Moral good and moral evil are only two expedients, of which the creature may choose one as less terrifying and less painful than the other; and guilt, as self-accusation, is but a delusion.

Unless moral goodness first existed, moral evil could not exist, or be known as such. The conditions

for the contrast must be supplied. The creature then must be set in such an environment as to be free from the necessary sway of physical forces which can generate diseased instincts. The conditions must be impartial, if his goodness or his evil is to be free, and no physical want or physical pain can be the producing influence to his transgression. He must then be placed in the midst of a nature not hostile, but only, at the most, affording suggestions such as to make temptation possible through the creation by imagination of other ends than the one inwrought in the primary tendencies of his being ; by resistance to which to develop his virtue, and acquire spiritual strength.

We refuse, then, for the foregoing considerations and for others which grow upon us as we meditate, to be satisfied with the solution, under any form, which makes physical evil necessary for moral progress, or even as the necessary condition for animal life. It annihilates for thought the chief mystery of our existence, but at too great expense. It reconciles the human heart to moral evil and induces it to think its sin as simply inexpedience. It dulls the conscience ; and if its advocates are holy men, it is because their inner convictions are stronger than their theories.

But again, if this solution in any form is declined, what are we to think of animal suffering ? And here, in bringing this troubling problem up once more for examination, let us note that we cannot study animal life apart from its environment. To this it is adjusted. Upon the conditions supplied by this it depends. It is correlated to vegetable life and to the mechanical and chemical movements. The physical universe is a unit, governed by uniform laws, and

through which one purpose runs. It is in perpetual change and progress. We see in it the realization of ideas, and descry in it the far-off purpose far more clearly and confidently than we can see or conclude upon its origin. Animal life is observed at one stage of its progress, and only when it appears can we discover that there were hints of it, partial indications of it, in the previous concretions of the life principle. And only when human life appears do we see that there were shadowy indications of something higher in the animal creation. This is the truth in the idea of evolution, for which science is constantly supplying new vindications. Until animal life appeared we find no state of things in which human reason and feeling cannot acquiesce. In it, then, not only is realized a higher idea than any displayed before, but there is also indicated a still higher one as its own successor ; and if physical pain still remain in it as a contradiction of its essential idea, this contradiction must either have its origin in some alien source, or in nature itself, which too much exhibit the contradiction. But here we fail to find it till such nature becomes correlated to animal life, seeing that there is nothing in it to shock the æsthetic sense, nothing in which human reason and feeling cannot fully acquiesce. If then the contradiction first appears in animal life,—but its possibility is thought as inherent in the constitution of the physical universe, yet only coming within the compass of human thought when such universe has reached this stage of its development,—then, indeed, the thought emerges that this contradiction is to be removed through human development, in which case it is either a necessary condi-

tion for such development (which is the view we have abandoned), or else, supposing the contradiction to have an alien origin, it is still to be overruled by the human (restored normal) development, which, when it reaches moral perfection, *i. e.*, holiness and spiritual strength, will bring all nature in its train to be correspondent to itself, and meet its full requirement; in which correspondence, if animal life is still existent, animal pain must have disappeared.

But we still do not see how nature, if thought as thus exhibiting the contradiction when animal life becomes correlated to it, could thus present temptation sufficient to ensure the human declension into the abyss of moral evil. Rather it would seem to present inducements against it, and by its own sympathy to warn the human ones against such conflicts as defaced and tortured animal life come from. Thus nowhere in the physical world can we find excuse for, and the conditions for the incoming of moral evil. May we think, then, that it had its origin *ab extra*, and is there any ground for thinking influences *ab extra* possible?

If, when we analyze moral evil, as it appears in the developed human subject, the principle of it appears to be self-will, spiritual independence, the resolve of the soul to be a law to itself, and hence spiritual isolation, blind to the possibility that all other isolation may come in its train; and if, from nature alone no motive for such isolation can be selected for a spiritual being morally innocent, and with his primary tendencies all pointing to the realization of an universal idea, then, again, we ask, are there any influences beyond nature which can be thought as possible?

Here, as we have before noticed, a profound study of human nature and experience shows us that we cannot account for all its determinations from influences which come within the sphere of our knowledge. Heredity, environment, and education cannot account for all the decisions of human freedom. There are unsounded depths in the human being which indicate that he has relations beyond the sphere of our actual knowledge. The human will cannot be thought as an unrelated and indifferent force-centre. That he is a true universal, and hence related not only to the universe we know, but to all existence, is thus suggested. And if so, he must relate not only the self-conscious wills which share with him the common physical organism, but also all self-conscious wills whatever, and through *media* undiscoverable by our intelligence. In his highest and finest capacities, as well as through his physical structure he must relate the Fountain of his being. We can only account for what is best and highest in man by thus thinking him in such relation to the Highest. And possibly we can only account for that which is worst and lowest in man, and hence for his primal declension, by similar presupposition—viz., that moral evil exists in the universe beyond our knowledge, and did exist spiritually before the advent of man.

This is the explanation given or hinted at in the Christian Scriptures, which do not answer the question of the origin of moral evil, but change its form, and take up human history under this pre-condition. The mystery, however, still remains, but before stopping at its sharp edge, let us see if we cannot illuminate the twilight region between it and our knowledge.

The essence of moral evil is isolation, spiritual independency, refusal to join in the universal harmony, or to be a means towards the realization of the ideal perfection. It cannot properly be called a rebellion, unless there be a disputed dominion, which the rebellious spirit hopes to gain or to share. It may, indeed must, *become* a rebellion to keep itself from stagnation and barrenness of resources. It will, therefore, to enliven its own experience, seek fellowship, and use power, and exert authority. But as long as it makes this activity and fellowship a need to itself, the rebel one can still retreat, for this need implies the principle of good from which it has not thus far entirely freed itself. If convinced at length of its own impotence, it may either yield to the predispositions which it has repressed, or repel the same and retire upon its own spiritual independence, and have no need beyond itself. And then and thus does its evil become absolutely pure. It reigns thenceforward undisputed in its own realm, but this realm is only within itself. Its choice of evil is thus deliberate and wilful, and it enters upon a career of perpetual shrinking of itself towards a point unattainable, viz., cessation of being. This cannot be thought, for the infinite has no bounds in either direction. The infinitely little it is as necessary to admit as the infinitely great, though imagination can deal with neither. We must think the purely evil one then as beyond recovery since it has extinguished its own need of any thing beyond itself, as long as which lasts its recovery is still thinkable. This state of consciousness we cannot imagine, and when men have sought to depict an evil spirit they have inevitably incorporated in their ideal character

some elements of good, and the germ of all good. But to these terms the idea of pure moral evil may or must in thought be reduced.

But we have seen that there is no concrete existence that is either pure matter or pure spirit ; that the Godhead has its own glory ; that the soul of man exists as such by both relations ; that matter is informed by mind ; that spirit consciousness to go beyond itself must have *media*. Any created spirit whatever must have such *media*, and as a concrete have relation to the physical universe at some point of its development, and find it correspondent to its own spiritual condition. It must have an environment, whereby only it can have a history. Any actual or possible created self-consciousness prior to the creation of man must have *existed* then in and by some relation to the physical universe, whereby its progressive intelligence must have been secured ; and if through its power of choice as a self-determining activity, it has become morally evil, such change and contradiction of its predispositions must produce correspondent change in its environment, which thenceforward must reflect in its discords the discord which has arisen in the spiritual sphere. Thus to it, and to all spirit life affected in any degree by similar moral disorder, the lower realms must show that this pure evil has filtered down into them, and that it may find its own image there, in the physical convulsions, in the blasts which deform the plant-world, in the animal conflicts, and especially in animal suffering. If the evil principle touch and affect the human race, it too must find its environment correspondent either to its innocence, or to any moral change. Outside exists already the world of

convulsion and conflict and pain, but within it is placed Eden and the tree of life, from which nature may be regenerated. Thus as from moral evil physical degradation has sprung, moral good must be the starting-point of its recovery. And if, through the human share of this disorder, the actual start of the remedial process is lost or imperilled, yet it may be deferred only, and come in the form of a new Divine act, the premonitions of which may, according to all foregone analogy, at once appear. This new energy may oppose and penetrate the onward flow of moral evil and its consequences, and ultimately overcome it ; unless it be still possible for spiritual souls to fling themselves aloof from the current. What form this new Divine interference must necessarily take will be seen hereafter.

That God's creation, and the attainment of his ultimate purpose is at this expense, this fearful expense of animal pain and human agony, seems to us sometimes to have been needless, but there is no disguising or denying the fact that so it is. We see that it was a possibility involved in his highest creative effort, to set apart from himself self-creating beings. That this possibility has been made an actuality is again the problem whose solution escapes us. To rest in any solution attempted hitherto, is an impatient and cowardly resort. Other thinkers are not satisfied with so easy a triumph.

We resume our main topic with a final effort to clarify and harmonize our actual knowledge. At the advent of man upon our planet, we find that physical evil exists. The efficient energy working in the crude material has at length produced animal life, in abun-

dance and variety, and for the most part full of enjoyment. But in this realm conflict and suffering appear. The physical forces too sometimes issue in cataclysms, and swallow up vegetable and animal existence. Vegetable and animal life, if appearing after the sway of the mechanical and chemical forces, must have sprung spontaneously from the crude material, and to have produced the germ was a creative act. At least our present science so teaches us. But even if life could be reduced to the play of mechanical and chemical forces, its incoming would still be a creative act, as displaying a new idea. Into the prepared material (whether organized or unorganized is indifferent) are at length infused rays from the spirit world, indicating that thought has ruled all previous changes, as may now be recognized ; and a great leap upward in the scale of being thus occurs. In this new being the absolute and eternal are represented,—pure being, thought, love, the Divine Glory, activity. He is like and is to be more like that which he images in the endless possibilities of advance and enrichment. If he is to be thus normally developed, and not at the start victimized or retarded by the physical forces, he must be specially protected. That this is possible, even our actual knowledge of the world we live in shows, in which are some favored regions, so free from physical disturbances, and climatic derangements, and so protected by favorable nature, as to make human life comparatively painless, and its wants to be met by spontaneous provision or only pleasurable toil. Yet even for such a being, thought as morally innocent, nature must not be perfect. There must be room in it for improvement corresponding to his own advance.

There must be occasion in it for temptation and moral trial.

This thought is found in the Old Testament, which tells us of the garden of Eden—not an incipient heaven into which a perfect being was introduced, and out of which he fell, but such a Paradise as can exist even in this actual world, which it may gain ground upon, and possibly by degrees assimilate to itself—in which the innocent but undeveloped creature was placed to determine himself and grow in endless advancement. He cannot be figured then as existing in brutish stupidity and ignorance, though these are possibilities lying not far beneath him, but as at once discovering that he has capacities above all other animal life, to which it must ultimately yield. The existence of such a state of consciousness already shows the presence of spiritual elements. In the ability to create ends or motives, is already the recognition of his own higher intelligence and of his own freedom. Thus the principle of persistence in his predispositions is already his. The very first movement in his thought, distinctively human, displays the presence of the principle of causality ; and thus in this form he recognizes, though it may be obscurely, the source from which he sprang. And this is virtually the recognition of a personal relation (for he cannot possibly think any change but as the result of will and purpose), though all the implications of this are as yet undiscovered. It is so far naïve, simple, and pure. And this mental recognition cannot be unaccompanied by feeling. Thus the personal relation is implicit in the consciousness of undeveloped humanity, otherwise it would never have become explicit as a thought. For

this, *language*, which shows the growing clearness of his intelligence, would be needful. The sexual relation more or less pervading all animal existence is carried into the human, and in the love for his own other, and the discovery that he is a fountain of life, and that the world is to be peopled from himself, is already reflected and foreshadowed his love for God. Thus new vistas of knowledge and delight open and become clearer and clearer before him. But, as we have seen, temptation must be possible, otherwise moral strength, in whose possession alone would be security in the possession of all his good things, could not be had. His physical environment alone, as we have concluded, could not have presented to him an irresistible, or even any strong temptation. Yet unless there were prohibition, constituting alternatives, there could not be choice, *i. e.*, unless there were a limit to his knowledge of his world, or even of his own Paradise, unless there were a region of darkness into which, if he ventured, he must venture blindly, unless thus there were the possibilities of attainment of such knowledge, and therefore the suggestion of the experiment to be tried;—unless these conditions were presented, there could not be temptation and trial and victory, and elevation into the region of security. That man did not bear and has not borne this trial, is an undisputed fact.

Out of the possible relations with the unseen world, the Old Testament writings affirm, came stimulus to the suggested temptation. What this was in itself, here figured as partaking of forbidden fruit, does not appear; but to it man succumbed. His nature thus and then fell into disorder, and he transmitted to his

posterity his congeries of conflicting tendencies in various forms of combination. That man transmits thus his tendencies is a scientific fact, and that there were acts or series of acts in which the selfish tendencies had their origin, is an undisputed inference.

There appears then, thus bounded, the Divine idea in the creation of man,—a self-determining being related to matter and spirit, a social being, whereby his finer capacities were to be elicited, a being to be developed to the uttermost, to grow in knowledge of the content of the Divine mind, by degrees to obtain victory over and at length to dominate the world, to grow in moral strength till secure in his own holiness, to discover, preserve, and intensify the bond of love between him and his Maker, to find his own being enriched and expanding as this love multiplies itself, and flows into whatever is kindred to it. Is there any thing beyond this development thus far described, any point to be reached beyond the point where holiness has become strong and secure as God's own holiness? What further elevation for such a being is possible to be thought?

It is to be observed that in the foregoing speculation it is taken for granted that if the progenitors of the human race had repelled the intrusion of moral evil, their posterity would have been normally developed. That a contradiction should arise thereafter, introducing moral evil in a portion of this race, at first thought seems possible; but it is not readily thinkable. The declension could only have occurred in the primary period of innocence, for any persistence in the direction of the original predisposition must have strengthened the good principle and made it firmer

against assault,—the very imagination of any form of transgression growing dimmer and more incoherent, and going on to a vanishing point.

It *will* be regarded as the focussing of the nature, therefore, as the outcome of *character*, we must think human nature to have outgrown the first form of innocence, and to have acquired spiritual strength, still growing, however, through its own effort and the acquisition of knowledge. Only by regarding the will as an indifferent force-centre could we think otherwise.

And let us reflect also that the environment would have become more and more favorable as the result of such moral advance, furnishing new encouragement to persistence, and strengthening the primary tendencies.

The Old Testament writings, in locating the human disaster in the period of the early innocence, are thus truly rational. Only such development is required to be thought to make disaster possible, as was needful to bring the alternatives clearly before the minds of the progenitors of the human race. This is true, whether it have sprung from one or many pairs.

We have already given the grounds from which we conclude that the declension cannot have been inevitable in any case. Such a thought, though tempting, plunges us back helplessly, and reconciles us to evil.

Dogmatic theology, as we have said, has attempted to answer the question, whether any further elevation of man, normally developed, can be thought, and we have had what is known as the Scotist theory of the Incarnation, with its several modifications,—viz., that it entered into the Divine plan, and was to

be the normal result and end of man's sinless development. But Dogmatics as a pure science can never infer this doctrine from the *data* furnished by its admitted Divine revelation. The Scripture texts adduced to support it will not bear the burden, and there is nothing in the early Christian consciousness showing that it entered into the thought of those establishing the Christian Church. It is a problem suggested by after reflection, and therefore belonging to speculative theology. As such, it is a legitimate question for examination. Even the Scripture writers lead us to suspect that they had it in their minds. If discovered and established speculatively, it may throw light upon dogmatic assertions, and help to harmonize them. We may, possibly, through its aid better understand the redemptive process under the actual conditions in which it appears, by reflecting how man's normal development must have issued. We will then subject it to the closest scrutiny, and if found to have valid ground, avail ourselves of its aid in our further enquiries.

CHAPTER XV.

THE DIVINE INTENT FOR MAN,—APOTHEOSIS AS REQUIRING INCARNATION,—GROUND FOR THE SCOTIST VIEW.

IF man is thus created a spiritual soul, placed in a suitable environment, and set forward in the task of self-development under the influences of nature and of grace, and is to reach the realization of the highest idea for himself, this development must be variously and harmoniously progressive. It must be marked by increasing knowledge of nature and its relations to spirit, and by enlarging power over it as he discovers its laws, and how to make adaptations of them to his purposes. It must consist, also, in the intensification of the responsive love growing out of the personal relation to the Father of his being, who by degrees reveals himself to him, not only through nature but through grace, by showing to him not only the Divine thought in the universe, but the Divine thought in himself,—his relations to the spirit realm as well as to the world of observation, thus opening up new possibilities of enlargement and enrichment for his being. This strengthening of the personal tie we may call his moral growth (though, being spontaneous, it does not take in our thought the form of our actual moral experience). It must condition all his other development, and carry its advance in its train. He must, above all other requirements, be a loving being, for

knowledge and power unlimited cannot be trusted to a being whose love is subject to diminution or loss, for then there would be a perpetual conflict and contradiction introduced. Only then as his love grows stronger by trial can his knowledge and power increase, and his victories over nature become more easy and more secure. The end to be attained is the fulfilment of all the aspirations which have grown out of such love. The love of a son to the Father (the highest form of love for a creature), and the infinite response to the same (the highest aim of aspiration), must then be possible for him, and the prospect of it disclose itself with growing clearness. Such prospective response leads him to think himself intended to master the secrets of the universe, to find its material and its forces pliant and subservient to his will, whereby he can make new combinations and realize the same ; as thus intended to overpass the boundaries of the phenomenal world, to pass into the spirit realm, and to find at length the way to the inexhaustible Fountain made free of access. The prime condition for this normal development and its ultimate attainment is his moral growth and perfection. His innocence must be prolonged and made secure by his resistance to temptation. Evil must then be known as possible, but not experienced as actual,—must be only in imaginative conjecture (as is the case often now with the human child). The motive-spring of this moral growth is the personal tie,—the love implicit in his structure finding a new relation as it is met by antecedent and responsive love. His fulfilment of the Divine will is spontaneous, since all the tendencies of his being are set Godward and have met with no

counteraction. This, his fulfilment of the Divine intent, is not properly called *obedience*, which word implies rules and maxims minutely adapted to his growing experience. Such cannot be thought, for there is no need of such. Nature is not hostile, and presents no alternatives. No such are possible except a moral one, and this need not and cannot take the shape of a positive law, but only of a negative warning. Persistence in his moral innocence removes all difficulty which nature may present, if indeed any attempt upon nature likely to be made by him can be thought as presenting a difficulty. Obedience to rules, with whatever sanction, is the result of our present abnormal condition. These are but the adaptations of the principle of love to the changing conditions of our moral progress under a disordered environment. The filial idea, not the legal one, must characterize and explain man's intended development. The human relation of father and child is a more or less perfect image of this; the personal relation of the dependent one to the Fountain of knowledge, power and love growing stronger as he discovers the resources of this knowledge and the purity of this benevolence. There is then no *law* as yet, except in its negative form of prohibition, and that too simply in the form of *warning*. He is set forth in his career with predispositions coalescing with the Divine idea for him; but since he is to be so noble a being and create his own character, and is therefore morally free, he is warned that to decline or impair this coalescence is to peril his reward. To have any other than the Divine end, and to make a new end for himself, is forbidden, since the knowledge thus gained

will destroy whatever dominion he now possesses over his world. Now, according to his needs, he rules it, and will rule it more and more as his needs increase, and will ultimately subject it. To introduce a contradiction will cause him to become its victim and to succumb to the very forces which now he finds more and more subservient. Death, then, which is the failure to sustain his dominion over nature, will be the result of his plunging out of the existent harmony. He is warned thus of the consequence of evil, known as yet only by incoherent conjecture, the very imagination of it fading into dimness and intended to fade into extinction ; and its thought only remaining in the realm of abstract notions.

Thus we have the conditions, as far as our thinking can supply them, of nature and of grace, of influences actual and mystical,—in theological language, of Providence and of the Holy Spirit, for a normal and sinless development. God is thus progressively revealing himself, but in his fulness remains still hidden, for this knowledge can only come to the perfected creature. In this process his creature, man, is drawn closer and closer to him. The faith or the trusting principle is rewarded by new discoveries and confirmations. At length such spiritual strength is attained by this human race, that man is secure in its possession, and the moral requirement of his being is met. His love returns in full strength, and with no contrary solicitation, the Divine love. His will, within the bounds of his knowledge, is securely coincident with the Divine will. He has become holy. Being secure thus against any misuse of a larger liberty, he may now be freed from any remaining limitations and re-

straints, his faith may receive new modification, and the process initiated which will change it to sight ; a new and higher mode of consciousness be made possible, and he be allowed to lapse into it. His *nature* (using the word in its largest sense of the totality of his existence as concrete) may now be assimilated to the Divine *nature* (using the word here in the sense of the sum of the Divine attributes *quoad* the universe or any possible universe). The exhaustless depths of the latter may now be opened, and the highest form of created existence, implicit in his idea, now be realized. This is virtual *apotheosis*, and something towards which the ideal man is tending, for even in his deranged condition his aspiration can be content with nothing less.

The question now arises, Can this *apotheosis* be accomplished by his own lapse into it under existing laws, or is a new Divine act, and hence a new law, needful to accomplish it ? We have seen that during his development the external conditions for it have been gradually changed. His environment has ever been correspondent. This has not been by his own act but in consequence of his own act, and by Divine adaptation of his environment to his progressive state. If new depths of the Divine being are to be opened, if God and man are to be still further assimilated, it must be by a new condescension on God's part, bringing himself within the compass of man's actual and, thus far, limited faculties ; and if these very limitations are to be removed, and new faculties spring from man's own depths, God must supply a new objective condition. Here now we have the speculative ground for the doctrine of the Incarnation

of the *λόγος*, and for the Scotist position that this was involved in the idea of God's human creation, and must be such objective condition for further human elevation.

If the Godhead as to its immanent and transcendent relations is to be further revealed, it must be, for human faculties, as it has been revealed before, through the Logos,—for this represents the sum of the Divine thought, and all synthesis of being and thought possible to be objectified. Thus only, to a thinking being such as man is, can the Divine purposes and the Divine character be brought within the range of human intelligence and consciousness. If any new intuition of the Divine being is to be reached, the lapse into it must be attained by the perfection of man's hitherto mode of knowledge. But the revelation of the Divine thought to human knowledge is not all. Man's ethical requirement must also be met, and for this God must reveal himself as the Eternal Son, as the essential and the innermost principle of all derivation and dependence ; the timeless relation, immanent in the Godhead, thus entering into time, and exhibiting the pattern of perfect sonship, through assimilation to which the human ones are to be made sons. The Eternal Son must thus subject himself to time conditions, and through this only can the further elevation of the human creature be attained. In accomplishing this Incarnation the Holy Spirit, as the life-principle in the universe (for being and thought must precede the possibility of life, which in theological language means that the Father and the Son must first be thought ere the Holy Spirit can be thought), must be efficient. And the

love thus shown to the creature is not the love of Father, Son, or Spirit, singly and independently, but the love of the Godhead, since love cannot be thought, but as active and by virtue of the immanent relations of the Divine Being, nor responsive love, but as reflecting these relations.

If the Eternal Son is then thus to be incarnated, and through this further recesses of the Godhead be opened, it must be, as hitherto, by adaptation to the existing human capacities and faculties. If He is to enter into human life, it must be under the conditions of human life, even if those conditions are thereafter to be changed. He must not then spring into sudden and complete manifestation.¹ Such manifestation would be not only, perhaps, overpowering to human faculties even though improved and developed to their uttermost; but, moreover, would not show the adequacy of every form of the human to receive the Divine, nor indeed exhibit the full idea of the human, as a process of self-determination. To be this the Divine must meet the human at every period of its development. The Eternal Son, entering humanity and assuming it as the form of his existence, to raise it to perfection and make it commensurate to the Divine, whereby God may be glorified, must be born, and grow in stature and in wisdom, although the principle of ethical growth be already had in its purity. Thus by this gradual display of the capacity

¹ The old mythology tells us that Pallas sprang thus complete and fully armed from the brain of Zeus; in which myth, perhaps, is an obscure intimation of the idea that the Divine wisdom is the Divine being objectified, whereby the Divine becomes comprehensible for created existence, and the conditions for the predication of self-consciousness are supplied; though in this myth the third term—reciprocal relation, the ethical element—is wanting.

of the human to bear the Divine irradiation there is no change in the law of the human creation,—only according to all previous analogy, the incoming of a new law or observable relation. By this Divine condescension the creature is prepared for his own apotheosis (to call by this word his inlet further into the Divine, and the ever growing coalescence of the content of the human with that of the Divine consciousness). The disturbing question which meets us in our present theology, how far this self-limitation of the Divine Logos can be reconciled with his relation to the universe as its upholding principle, is here changed in form, and will be considered exhaustively in the proper place. But now this self-limitation cannot take the form it actually assumed as a redemptive process ; for there is no contradiction to be overcome. The human has become adequate to join with the Divine in the creating activity, and in moulding afresh the material of the universe, is never at variance with the Divine activity. In this case, in the child all possible human faculties already exist in rudimentary form. The insight only needs to be cleared that they may spring into use. The temporal is included in the eternal form. The pure principle of love exists to guide all activity to ends coincident with the Divine.

Our object in all this has been to show what speculative ground there may be for that idea of the Incarnation, commonly called, even in its variations, the Scotist theory. The essential element is that the final elevation of the human is to be accomplished by this condescension of the Divine ; and that it was included in the Divine idea of man as a race, intended

normally to be realized ; and that the Incarnation took the form it did only from the need of a redemptive process.

This is not a dogma of the Christian Church. It does not seem to have entered into the primitive Christian thought, and was no part of the tradition preserved in the Scriptures and otherwise, and which by slow degree became fixed in the objective formulas and guides for faith. Were this work exegetical in its intent, it might be clearly shown that the Scriptural texts adduced in its support are not sufficient to authorize its erection into a dogma. Nevertheless, in reading the New Testament it may be suspected that the thought entered into the mind of its principal authors, as a possibility, or even a dim descrial of the Divine purpose. It is easy to think that these men, who meditated much, and under peculiar illumination, must have impinged this thought, though not treating it as a harmonizing element in theology, therefore not as any part of the object-matter of the revelation in Christ. This they considered under the existing and needful form, as redemption as well as regeneration, as something adjusted to existing human conditions. Man's first need is to regard this as a redemptive work and to be studied as such, and when seen to be also regenerative, it ceases to be a speculative doctrine reached by an *a priori* method simply, since to study it in its actual form we are absolutely dependent upon the narratives which purport to give us facts to be authenticated by testimony, although having their doctrinal meaning ; and also upon the institutions and objective rites which constitute the historic Church : both which indicate the new thought which

has been sprung in the human mind, whereby its consciousness may become unique and Christian. Thus the dogma of the Incarnation is founded upon the fact of the unique personality of Jesus Christ, whose history we accept, as we do other history, on sufficient evidence, external indeed, but meeting the requirements of the internal demand and contradicting the fully expanded human reason at no point. It may be that in the scheme of doctrine thus founded there are parts still requiring reconciliation with each other,—*hiatus* to be filled ere human enquiry and anxiety can be at rest,—and for this we may resort again to the speculative method, thereby giving clearness and accuracy to the positive conceptions to which Christian believers are narrowed by the negative *dicta* of the Church and the guiding declarations of the New Testament writings. We approach then the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation with the conviction created by the above speculative vindication of the idea itself, and study it in its existing form.

This is in truth the first Christian dogma, the first doctrine founded on a fact, defined and explained through an alleged Divine revelation to human consciousness by the mediation of the Holy Spirit. Before it, indeed, we have in our theologies the doctrine of the Unity in Trinity of the Godhead : but this is not founded upon a fact or an event, but rather upon all facts and existences. As we have seen, some notion or idea of God must be postulated ere we can admit revelation at all, although the alleged revelation itself may supply *criteria* by which to judge, correct, and amplify this postulated idea ; but this does not furnish a positive construction, but only aids in the endeavor

to form it. This can only be accomplished by thought, by whose processes we reach the conclusion that no other than the idea of a Unity in Trinity in the First Principle is the necessary form of all life and existence ; that this alone lays the enquiring intelligence to rest, and allows the possibility of a religion which cannot change, and all whose rivals are but tentatives towards it, and, in their existent forms, evanescent. The doctrine of the Unity in Trinity, with this explanation of its formation, may be called a Christian dogma. By means of the suggestions externally given, and also, as we have a right to think, by means of mystical influences enabling their intelligence more firmly to grasp it, it entered into the mind of the early Christian writers, and received their *imprimatur*. But, as thus originated, it may be admitted even by those who hesitate at the doctrine of the Incarnation, for it is not a doctrine dependent upon testimony, except the testimony that men have so thought and professed to be divinely guided in the attainment and symmetrization of the thought. But this is only evidence for another, provided the doctrine of the Godhead so attained and professed will bear the scrutiny and the strain put upon it by the speculative processes. And should it be claimed that there has been a continuous revelation in some sense, and that the Holy Spirit even now clarifies the truth to be accepted, and disposes men to its acceptance, (and how this may be true will be noticed further on in this work,) still this mystical influence does not accomplish a harmonization of Christian thought, or render needless an attempt after a positive construction of the doctrine, otherwise good Christian men

would not differ as they do in the conception of the idea of the Godhead in degrees of accuracy or clearness.

To have found speculative ground for the doctrine that Incarnation was involved in the primal Divine idea of man, is not necessary for the construction of the doctrine of the Godhead, since the latter is antecedent in thought ; but it may be found useful in the endeavor to understand the existing relation between God and man. It is looked upon favorably by thinkers in all the Christian organizations, as helpful to clarify and harmonize Christian doctrine, to round out to nearer completeness our theologic system. It has thus high rationality ; and possibly may find in the future general acceptance.

Postulating then the idea of the Unity in Trinity as the necessary form of any doctrine of the First Principle, whose inadequacy is not sooner or later discovered ; postulating God's revelation of himself in the universe, this revelation reaching its ultimatum, for our present knowledge, in the creation and intended development of the human race ; postulating also the existence in human consciousness of the moral distinctions, of the sense of responsibility, and hence inferring man's essential immortality ; postulating finally the fact of human moral disorder, of sin as a spiritual withdrawal from the ideal and intended harmony, and the fact of the transmission through heredity of the adverse tendencies, the fact of human guilt or self-accusation, and the facts of a hostile environment, of human suffering, misery, and death ;— we have thus the ground *a priori* of the probability of an interference on the part of a benevolent and

loving Creator to correct this disorder, and of a scheme for human recovery. Such Christianity purports to be. Putting aside any enquiry as to its external evidence as beyond the purpose of the author's undertaking, we have to examine this scheme of recovery as made known to us in the Christian Church and by the Christian narratives and expositions, in the form in which the Christian mind through all these centuries has with remarkable unanimity agreed to receive it, to subject it to the closest scrutiny of human intelligence, and to vindicate its absolute rationality; in which procedure, likewise, light may be thrown upon any of its unsettled problems, or seeming contradictions, the removal of which will further exhibit its inner coherence and self-consistency,—which is the only test of truth.

It may be that man never would, or even could have evolved such a system from his ordinary sources of knowledge and by his ordinary mental processes; but he can find, when especially aided to its discovery, that it is confirmed by these, which coalescence may strengthen his conviction of the correctness of the methods through which he has accepted it as a revelation *ab extra*. And in the light thus struck forth, by this coincidence he may even go back to his former speculative endeavors and correct them, or find new implications in them. All truth is one. Every element of it illustrates and conditions every other. It is thus a rational system, and its inner harmony only can show it to be the absolute truth. This is the axiom of philosophy, which smiles at any attempt to gainsay it, and will go on in its unravelling and weaving career as long as the world endures.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION,—THE
HUMAN SIDE,—THE FUNCTION OF JESUS' MOTHER,—
HIS INNOCENCE.

INCARNATION is a Divine act, introducing a new relation of God to humanity, and hence through it to the universe. As the act of the Godhead there must be in it a special relation and function traceable to each hypostasis of the same. It must have its ground in pure being or spirit, out of which is evolved the system of relations which constitutes the Godhead as concrete. Thus the origin of this act is, dialectically, in this Fountain, or in the Father. But if the Incarnation is to affect man through his conscious life and experience, it must be brought within the sphere of his thought and feeling, otherwise he is reduced to passivity and is treated in the lower only, and not in the higher elements of his composite being. Hence it can only be thus related, and hence known, as the Incarnation of the *Logos*, as such representing the Divine thought, who is at the same time the Son, representing the object of love and its reciprocal return. Thus the revelation becomes capable of urging in humanity the paternal and filial relations to their highest point. And it must be accomplished through the efficiency of the Holy Spirit, the Divine Energy, or principle of life.

The Divine Logos *is* all that existing humanity can *know* of God in the strict sense of *knowledge*. Jesus himself said: "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." The Eternal Son *is* all that can be *felt* of God. Only as such is God concrete to our present faculties, whatever implications these terms possess. The Father and the Holy Spirit cannot be *known* except as necessary antecedent and consequent to our knowledge of the Son. Yet they are more than abstractions. We cannot be true sons except as we acknowledge the Father and realize the type of sonship to be shown us. And since fellowship with God beyond and beneath the sphere of knowledge is an innate and ineradicable craving of the human soul, it thus acknowledges the Holy Spirit as urging towards such fellowship. These cravings and aspirations lead to the hope, without whose reward something would yet be lacking, that with enlarged and purified faculties, and when this present disturbing medium of the phenomenal world undergoes its own modification or change, the Godhead in its essential structure may be brought more clearly and fully within the range of such expanding faculties of comprehension. But at present our conscious relation to the Father and the Holy Spirit is one of *faith*, while to the Son it is actual knowledge.

It is, then, impossible to think the Father or the Spirit as becoming incarnate, except under a Tritheistic presupposition. If we attempt to do so we have simply thought the Divine Logos under another name, and the antecedent and consequent conceptions by which alone He can be rightly thought would still remain, called by whatever names.

If God is to enter the human race and assume its life form, it must be with it in its essential idea and in the entirety of its definition. And the essential idea of humanity is something more than the abstract synthesis of body, soul, and spirit ; or, more properly speaking, of life placed under the conditions of self-consciousness through relations to spirit and to nature, whereby it becomes the human soul, individual by virtue of its own *schema*, which makes it an idiosyncratic creation. It is likewise that of a process of self-development, whereby the soul, self-determined within the allotted sphere, becomes, as to the ethical form, his own creator. The Eternal Son, then, to be incarnate, must run through the whole sphere of human development, and accomplish every thing essential to its idea. He must be born, be a child, grow physically, mentally, morally, religiously, and, since the contradiction has entered the world, must die and be raised again.

But if He is to be thus born, how is He to be conceived ? Here we have the assertion in the Christian Scriptures of the mystical conception by the Holy Spirit, which will be seen to be necessarily required by our pre-conditions. For, were a man to be conceived by the natural process, and be thus an offshoot from the parent stock, he must carry with him the disordered nature, and sin is inevitable. If a union of the Eternal Son with such a human could be accomplished, the abnormal tendencies must be annulled at the start, and that by some overpowering physical and metaphysical energy, excluding any need of an ethical process, and thus this man, as member of the organism of humanity, disappears, and becomes

a mere passive and exceptional organ of the Divine. There could then be no true human development, and no fellowship. This man is no part of our race, and we do not see how he could or need suffer and die. Such change in humanity is thus exclusive of its union with the Divine, and there is no need of such union. Every thing, then, essential to humanity and to keep up the human brotherhood must be preserved, yet innocence must be ensured at the start. How can this be, and yet his organic connection with the race be retained ?

If, however, it be hypothecated that the individuality of the man, thus made sinless by miracle, may still be sustained and pass through development as self-conscious ; this, then, might be still by a miraculous upholding ; and for this, as before said, there is no true union of the human and Divine needful, or any redemptive work. The suffering and death of Christ would be surplusage. The exquisite ethical meaning of the same disappears, and the Christian motive-spring of responsive love does not exist.

To accomplish the entrance of the Divine into the essentially human, restoring its innocence yet making its development actual and needful, the current of transmission must be broken, the Son must be incarnate by a new creative act, yet still be acknowledged as member of the human race.

The Holy Spirit, as we have seen, is the " Lord and Giver of Life," and is the efficient energy in all human conception, as in every other form of *life*. Life, as purely such, presents no moral contradiction. It comes to manifestation in the vegetable and animal world, accompanied only by the Divine complacency.

We have seen that, indeed, in the animal sphere the contradiction has entered it, as shown by animal suffering. The animal is a hint of the human, a step upward to it. The human carries its animal characteristics with it, and with them the possibility of pain. Any new organization of the existing human must carry with it this possibility. Hence the asseveration of the Christian Church, that the suffering of Christ was actual and needful, confirms the naïve inference from his story. But although the Holy Spirit, as the life principle, is efficient in the conception of Jesus Christ, under the needful conditions of all human life, the rule of the ordinary transmission of human life must be broken if innocence is to be regained. The life-current must divert either from the earthly father or the earthly mother. If we think it to cease as to the earthly mother, we have departure from all analogy, and the disappearance of all evidence of any connection with our race, and were this imaginable, we should find the difficulty of explaining the innocence insuperable, as will appear. The other is the simpler alternative, and it only can bring it within our intelligence. If, however, the earthly mother is thought as the medium of its transmission, and through this alone the required innocence be thought to be secured, then either an immaculate woman has to be created afresh, and as such is no longer a member of the human race, or by some miraculous interposition an existing woman is conceived immaculate, or made such, which likewise cuts her off from organic connection with the race, and renders needless any redemptive work, or reduces it to a physical and metaphysical, instead of an ethical process. Or if

any process of ethical development be thought to proceed in her person, it alone would have been sufficient. Though she died, she would have risen again, and any work beside, the birth of any son, any union of the Divine and human, would have been needless, for the same process might be repeated endlessly.

Dismissing then this hypothesis, we conclude that if the rule of the transmission of the life-current is to be broken, the medium of the earthly father must be dispensed with. This supposition, too, will be found to afford the needful explanation of the required innocence.

In natural human generation we find in each individual the sum of tendencies determined through heredity to a unique idiosyncrasy. In the case of the required Incarnation, such idiosyncrasy, derived through transmission from the earthly father, does not exist. Through the agency of the Holy Spirit we have the abstract idea of humanity again made concrete, which is a new creation, in every conceivable meaning of the word.

If we could think the mother to be merely the physical medium, supplying only the material which is to be organized afresh after the abstract human ideal, all difficulty would seem to be removed. As the existing man was organized by the informing Spirit after the Divine idea, out of the unorganized material, or out of material organized in the animal, morally innocent as it is (and Christian theology is indifferent to the alternative, and is willing to accept evidence, which as yet is as strong that humanity was a spontaneous birth as that it was a developed one), so now we have the new man organized from material

more highly developed in the mother. We may think this material to be physically pure and as morally stainless as we can think it without severing it from the stock whence it came, and which can in no ramification be perfected except through the forces, ethical and physical, let loose by the redemptive work of this mother's own offspring.

But, indeed, as thus thought, this is not a true and perfect mother, and the difficulty is not removed. We find from observation and scientific knowledge that not only is the physical structure and temperament determined from either parent, and that through some law yet requiring elucidation; but that soul-tendencies, or character, are also so derived, and from either parent. Can then any distinction be found between the tendencies or traits thus transmitted from the earthly father and the earthly mother that can render any more comprehensible the required innocence, and help to explain the sinlessness of Jesus Christ? Such tendencies as make temptation possible must certainly have been transmitted through the earthly mother, but the innocence or the undeflecting will is, by hypothesis, to be preserved. If the true humanity of Jesus Christ, his unique conception, and his sinlessness are admitted, we are led to think that there is, and must be, such a distinction in the transmitted tendencies of father and mother.

Here an exhaustive anthropology is required. There are tendencies in human character only explicable on the presupposition of man's relation to spirit, and also such as are only explicable from his relation to the world of matter. Virtues and vices derive from each, though not independently of each other. But

now we are concerned with abnormal tendencies only, and their possible extirpation or abandonment. On the one side we have animal passion and hunger and thirst degenerated into sensuality, gluttony, and drunkenness, animal strength and superiority becoming cruelty, indignation becoming revenge. On the other side we have the desire of knowledge making man indifferent and unscrupulous as to means, and consequent pride and ambition. These are well-known distinctions, which need not be enlarged upon, and all human sins have been often divided into sins of sensuality and of pride, into carnal and spiritual sins; though, of course, in the actual human, the two must mingle and modify each other. Sensuality may become devilishness, ambition may become blood-thirstiness, etc.

Now the question is whether this classification derives in any sense or degree from the relations to father or mother. If we could trace all carnal sins to tendencies derived from the mother, and all properly spiritual sins to proclivities inherited from the father, we should see how by the annulment of the latter currents entirely, the former would be left in such form as to be without spiritual modification and background, and to admit temptation through physical instincts only, assaulting but not capturing the innocent spiritual will. This enquiry is one so distinct and independent, and requires such close scrutiny of observation, scientific and psychological, that one cannot yet with confidence pronounce upon it; though such a possible result would furnish easier conditions wherefrom to admit not only the fact, but to explain the sinlessness of Jesus Christ.¹

¹See Appendix C.

Nor are we forbidden to think that, in the case of his mother, the inherited tendencies astray have been weakened by transmission through a holy ancestry, and are part of a providential scheme, and the condition for her selection ; that in her they have been reduced to that point and to such degree as to be transmitted to her offspring in just such intensity, and in just such combination as to make temptation possible and actual, yet to be always ruled by the holy will. We should in such case look to see in his human development what appears from his story to have been actually the case, viz., that spiritual sins hardly, if ever, produce a temptation, and never require a struggle on his part ; that there is no pride, nor ambition, nor any inward solicitation thereto ; that his temptations and victories should come rather from the other side, from the instincts of hunger and thirst, from the shrinking from pain, from the love of life, and the dread of death.

Thus is conceived and nurtured and born the man Christ Jesus, whose perfect humanity must be declared, or there is no proper Incarnation,—as has been asseverated by the Christian consciousness, issuing in the authoritative declarations of the Christian Church. It follows, then, that to meet the idea of humanity, there was and must have been a true human development. The Christian mind has only temporarily dwelt in other resorts, to which it has been led by the still remaining difficulties ; as when denying the integrity of Jesus Christ's humanity, or the fact of his mental development, or his moral growth, or the actuality of his temptations. Under the pressure of the difficulties these resorts are, even now, occasionally

rested in, and we always have in some minds a pure or a diluted form of monophysitism. These difficulties show themselves when we come to consider the Divine side in the act of Incarnation, and what limitations of the Divine element are thinkable, and needful,—whether there is any, or if so, what *κένωσις*.¹

¹ For further elucidation of the topic of the foregoing chapter, see Appendix C.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE INCARNATION,—A PRIORI PROBABILITY AND NEED OF KENOSIS.

THERE is a choice of methods in this enquiry, each of which may avail itself of the result reached by the other. We may start from the human side and examine the words and the deeds and the whole history of Jesus Christ, noting the estimation in which his followers held him, and reach the conclusion that here there has been, although a true human development, an exceptional human being, a unique consciousness, only explainable on the supposition that there has been a *κένωσις* of the Divine element. Or, on *a priori* grounds, assuming that there is to be an entrance of the Divine element more fully into the human sphere, this, unless it be merely doketic and deceptive, must involve a kenosis, which again must necessitate a development on the human side. Again, having studied from these same antecedents *a priori* what a kenosis must be, and what kind of kenosis is possible for thought, we may return to consider the actual human history, and be able to account for the words and deeds and the estimation held of Jesus Christ, as we could not before.

It is not our purpose to enter into any exegetical questions, except when absolutely necessary to state rightly the facts we are required to explain. Treat-

ing the New Testament as ordinary history only, we have in this and in other contemporary writings the evidence as ample as for any historic fact, that a man then existed whose history and utterances were extraordinary. There seems no deficiency in his manhood. We may possibly *add* some modification to the human idea, as we see it concrete in his personal individuality, but we can *subtract* nothing. He fulfils every predicate of ideal humanity, and every predicate of actual humanity except, in the judgment of most, one, viz., moral weakness and transgression,—which, indeed, is not a predicate of ideal humanity, or essential to its definition, and because it is not, is called *sin*. He is born, grows in stature, reaches manhood, hungers, thirsts, suffers pain, exhibits physical results of extreme emotion, and dies. He grows in knowledge and wisdom, seeks to learn, questions those who know, studies the sacred writings of his people, displays a marvellous and profound intelligence, indeed, but one still confessing its own limitations.

All this is human, and it follows from this that there was also a moral development, not necessarily in the sense in which it appears in ordinary humanity, in the strife with sinful tendency and repentance over actual sin, but in the clear and growing clearer intuition of such action as the idea of the moral law requires, and in the strengthening of his will by successful resistance to temptation. He is made perfect through suffering and triumphs over the most powerful temptation which can befall man, that to cling to life, to hold fast to the supreme gift of existence in the Father's rich and beautiful universe.

There is also a religious development, the constant

seeking of communion with the Father in prayer; and since his must be thought as human prayers, they must have been answered not only by the external arrangements of Providence, but also by the mediation of the Holy Spirit, who could be given to him, if sinless, without measure, *i. e.*, with such limitations only as were conditioned by his growing intelligence and actual need.

In all this we have the exhibition of a human career, normal and perfect in every element. Any attempt to impair or dilute this fact in any particular, the Christian Church in her external assertion of authoritative testimony has repudiated; and the Christian consciousness everywhere, when after temporary disturbance subsiding into quietude, has acknowledged the same. The extremest Catholic or Orthodox believer is, as to this particular fact, at one with the Ebionite or the Socinian.

From all which it would seem to follow that, whatever was in the Divine intent for man to be realized in further development after the article of death must also have been realized in him; and also that, if this idea has actually fallen short of its realization through the contradiction of sin (this contradiction not appearing in his case), such idea is now for the first time completely realized. But these conclusions, thus anticipated, will come up for full consideration hereafter and in connection with eschatological questions generally.

What is unique in the history of Jesus Christ is the absence of all moral weakness. Physical weakness, and temptations from the physical side involving painful resistance, are abundant, and were the occa-

sion for the putting forth of moral strength ; but of temptations on the spiritual side there are none ;—none to selfishness, or cruelty, or envy, or pride, or ambition, or covetousness. No inward solicitation replying to the external presentation of these is apparent. The grandeur of the kingdoms of the earth may present to human imagination a picture having æsthetic attractiveness ; but within the consciousness may be a higher and more entrancing æsthetic attraction obliterating at once the other. Such presentation, though temptation *ab extra*, is instantly and without struggle rejected. And even this may be regarded as only a temptation from the physical side, with its imaginative glamour.

Any purely spiritual temptation having contradiction to the principle of love, He does not seem to feel. Indeed such could only be thinkable on the supposition of some taint of moral evil still affecting the will through the spiritual side ; and to feel the contrary of love as attractive would be itself sin. The Scripture record, “in all points tempted like as we are yet without sin,” means this very thing, viz., that nothing contrary to the loving principle was ever present in his thought. Here then is something disconnecting him from the organic continuity of the race on the spiritual side, even while it was preserved on the physical side, only explicable by regarding it as a new creation, therefore a new interposition of the Divine,—which, as we shall see, involves a kenosis.

Also what is unique in this history is the persistent claim on the part of Jesus Christ of a singular relation to God and the Father. “My Father and your Father, my God and your God.” This has been much

dwelt upon by Christian apologists, and need not be treated at length here. He assumes his own eminence over all his fellow-men in his claim of freedom from sin (a claim which, if baseless, and unless a delusion arising from imperfect sanity, would itself convict of an intense form of sinfulness), demands their allegiance as his right, declares that the welfare and salvation of humanity are only possible through acknowledgment of his claims, by men becoming his disciples and following in his pathway. This claim, so imperious, *was* acquiesced in by his followers, and has been ever since with the faith that it was a right one and put forth on the most valid possible grounds. Hence when his personality had fully shaped itself to their thought and imagination, his followers did not hesitate to worship him, to pay him such honor, as was never before or since paid to human being,—they thinking that in worshipping this human one they were worshipping God himself, thus manifesting himself in the highest form possible to the human mind, and addressed not merely to the thinking faculty, but to the senses and imagination, and particularly to the profoundest emotions of the human being. This claim and this acquiescence are only legitimate on the hypothesis that the Divine is not only manifested but also concealed in this human spiritual soul, and thus that there has been a true kenosis.

The truth of such kenosis has also been confirmed by certain other facts of his career, which have indeed been questioned as facts, but which are admitted as such without hesitation or doubt by those who on other grounds admit a kenosis. We allude to Jesus' alleged domination over nature, to his miracles, cul-

minating in the wonder of his resurrection. Those who rest their conviction of the validity of the claim of Jesus Christ on these alone, and the testimony regarding them, do not always see that to be thus a valid argument it must be assumed, or rendered probable on other grounds, that there has been a true kenosis. When this is admitted, these miracles, and the resurrection in particular, become part of the argument, and present no difficulties for thought, either scientific or philosophic, to overcome.

(And here in a parenthesis we declare that a science which is universal and not special, which can show the unity of the sciences, and therefore the true significance of each separate one, which can relate satisfactorily all physical facts to spiritual facts, hence to human needs and human development, will find no difficulty in admitting miracles among its facts, or in showing that their probability is involved in the expectation induced from strictly scientific conclusions.)

In the present case we have an assertion and the exhibition of power over nature entirely unique. Similar events may have occurred before or afterwards,—even resurrection itself, in the sense of partial physical glorification. How this is to be thought or related we shall see hereafter. But all these, if real wonders, and while resembling the wonders wrought by Jesus Christ, fall short of his claims, and may be thought as instances of only partial and permitted power over nature, and not perennial. And they by no means give the impression that they who work these wonders have any dominion over nature and her forces such as the entire sum of wonders wrought by Jesus does in his case, and which, if

limited, is limited by the requirements of the kenosis, and the high ethical intent of the same. This superabundance of reserved power may indeed suggest a kenosis, but does not necessarily require it, since for some providential intent we may think such power given to men. But what does imply a kenosis is the claim to forgive sins and to judge the world ; for He only can forgive sins who is omnipotent and able to rule nature and annul the consequences of sin ; and He only can judge the world who is omniscient likewise, and can see into the recesses of every human soul and know its history and its condition in all the multiplicity of its relations. The exercise of this last claim is, however, reserved, and such reservation implies a kenosis. Until the obscuration is removed the knowledge required for judgment, that of the "Son of Man," cannot be. And this limitation of knowledge requires, too, that the instances of forgiveness were partial, and that forgiveness had its own limitations, since to be fully such it must require absolute and universal knowledge, and thus again a kenosis is required to be thought.

Thus all these requirements support the assertion of St. Paul that, to take the form of a servant, and to be made in the likeness of man, God the Son must empty himself. What *is*, then, such self-emptying? What kenosis can possibly be thought? According as we rightly think this will we understand, appreciate, and feel the redemptive work of Jesus Christ, the sacrifice of the cross, and bring to birth and legitimation the Christian motive spring. Thus without this we cannot rightly understand and relate the issue on the subjective side, in Christian faith, nor the doctrine

of Justification ; or, on the objective side, in the existence of the Christian Church and Sacraments ; or the mediation of the two, so far as is required by the notions of Predestination, Election, and Providence.

CHAPTER XVIII.

INCARNATION,—ITS POSSIBILITY AND NEED STILL FURTHER EVIDENCED.

INCARNATION,—the Divine assuming the human,—God becoming man,—The Word become flesh,—what do these expressions mean? What thought answers to them? It is evident that they bring nothing before the imagination until there be some fact upon which the senses may lay hold. The act itself, whereby the fact becomes, can therefore be seized only by abstract thinking. And yet, not until the final cause is apprehended can this act be thought rightly and as an act of love; and for this apprehension of the end or intent is required the intervention of *knowledge*, attained through the senses, and unified by imagination, and warmed by emotion. Not until we know of human misery and happiness, of ignorance and knowledge, and can think imperfection and perfection, can we regard any act or process avowed to lift humanity from one to the other, as an act or process of love. And, besides, if there be any thought reached by abstraction answerable to these expressions, what is abstracted must be clearly seen, and for this we must scrutinize our knowledge attained *a posteriori*.

Resorting to this knowledge we find that the Divine Principle manifests itself in all created existence. God is already there in his universe, though not ex-

hausted by his universe, because we see plainly that the universe itself exhibits a process, at each of its stages revealing more and more of its Divine Principle. In the inorganic world we find motion, and infer force, and the end thereby attained,—the idea thus realizing itself,—which are only other names for intelligence and will. Thus far we do not find in the creation, thus changing, love or enjoyment, but simply thought and potence ; and yet we who experience the force and recognize the thought and know so far the Principle upon whom this display depends, see also something more,—for it is absolutely impossible by any effort of abstraction to sever thought from feeling, or complacency,—and hence we infer the Divine delight as accompanying all creative energy. And, besides, even before the earth began to bud and blossom, if we exercise our imagination upon the material there supplied, we see something more than force and thought, we see *Beauty*, in its lines and colors and motion, and thus we see the Divine freedom, which, in the Beautiful we are so constructed as to recognize.¹ But all this is not yet *Love*.

And when the vegetable world comes to be, and we find a new thought and hence a new force or mode of motion, and that the new idea subordinates all beneath it for a time, and suggests a mode of being apparently less dependent and having its moving spring in itself, thus one step more aloof from the originating principle, and find occasion to wonder whither all this does tend, and wherein it will end, we see here still more of God, new beauty and complacency.

¹ For the full explication of this thought, see the author's treatise on "The Beautiful and the Sublime."

In animal life we find all that went before in new variety, and the previous suggestion made clear and real, of independent existence, in the power of locomotion; and, above all, a more wonderful fact still, individual enjoyment. Here is found not only the Divine complacency but the Divine complacency partially reflected, and in various grades imaging that which it reflects. But the creature does not yet recognize the source of his enjoyment, feels it but does not and cannot relate it in thought, is the object of the Divine goodness but cannot respond to it. Thus we do not yet find the Divine Love.

In the human creature we find the principle of causality to rule his mental movement, and that the thought and the enjoyment are related to their source under whatever name he chance to denominate this source. The highest idea possible for his thinking, self-determination, he finds made real within himself, and through this same principle of causality relates it to the source of his thought and enjoyment. That he can create his own ends shows him that in the sphere entirely his own, however small may be his physical liberty or power beyond it, he is indeed supreme and independent. Thus he learns more of God, as manifesting himself, and causing himself to be reflected in still higher form. But thus far, even, he has not found the Divine Love.

But he finds also in his structure a glimpse of the Divine intent for himself, an outline of a possible result of his conscious freedom, an outline more or less clear or dim of the ideal harmony, an outline of a loving commonwealth, which, as he develops, becomes a clearer vision. This is the origin and the meaning

of the moral law ; become *law* by being broken into maxims or rules adapted to the changing situations of the human race. This ideal harmony presents a high attraction and is that, he perceives at length, to which the original predispositions of his being tend. This ideal harmony opens out for him a new depth in the Divine Principle, and his individual independence and self-sufficiency may now be sacrificed to a higher independence and self-sufficiency, that of the organism ; and he learns that to follow this pathway is to become richer and fuller, while to follow the other is to become poorer. Thus the consciousness of this possibility of sacrifice within himself shows him the source of the same, and the conception of the Divine Love is reached, but not yet in such form that it can take possession of and appeal to his entire being. This supreme capacity to love others as much as he can love himself is the Divine Love manifested and reflected ; and hence the Divine Love can be recognized and responded to, and he can love God seemingly more than he loves himself, until at length he finds that in loving God and his neighbor he is truly loving himself. In all this every Divine attribute seems to find its manifestation or reflection—wisdom, power, freedom, independence, Love. Is any further manifestation possible ? Can any alleged Incarnation be more than this ?

Many rest here, and think there can be no more, or that there is no need of more. But if so, there is nothing new in Jesus Christ. He is simply the quintessence of the race, the nearest known approach to its ideal, as such thinkers are accustomed to allege. But, while we look more closely at this, the beautiful vision

fades out, if the historic presentation of him be trustworthy ; for he who says of himself what he did, and puts forth such claims, exhibits such self-assertion, ceases at once in our estimation to be regarded as the flower of the race, and sinks to the common level, if not beneath it. Thus this view, to be consistent, can only fortify itself by an arbitrary dealing with the narrative, by eliminating these particulars, or explaining them in such way as still to retain the notion of the beauty of his character and of his moral honesty. With these critical endeavors we have nothing to do, and only re-utter what has been often said, that the critical effort assumes the point to be proved, the impossibility or the needlessness of any further Divine manifestation, and endeavors to adjust the narrative according to this *a priori* requirement. But if on *a priori* grounds we can show that there *is* possibility and need of such further Divine manifestation, then this critical effort must give place to another, a wider and simpler induction, which must take this further possibility and need into account.

The past story of the world displays, as we have seen, the successive incoming of the Divine ideas, each one being an advance upon the other. Unless, therefore, we can show that we have already reached the highest within the possibility of thought, we have no right to conclude that a further display is impossible. We have seen that in the recognition of the moral law, in the moral ideal, which is also the æsthetic ideal, there is a recognition of a higher form of existence as possible than the actual, which displays a universal shortcoming, and therefore that the elements of perfect being, which only can satisfy the reason

and the æsthetic sense, are not in harmony. A curative process is required to annul this discord and bring about correspondence in the elements of perfect being. In admitted human helplessness, to initiate such a curative process must require a Divine intervention, since without it the actual motive-springs have been found inadequate. This intervention may then take the form of Incarnation, and must take such form, unless it can be shown that the restorative process can be accomplished in some other way. This curative process must be something more than a moral recovery only, for with this alone the discord still remains, nay, is rather intensified. The limitations of our actual existence suggest a higher idea of existence, one that to be brought about requires a new ordering, and subordination of the forces of the universe. Now the human being, notwithstanding the conviction that he is the highest work of the Divine Spirit, notwithstanding his aspiration, succumbs to the forces of nature. He cannot rule them, but is ruled by them. This, to his mind and feeling, is the intensest of contradictions, and precisely what ought not to be. To triumph over nature is not only what imaginative aspiration longs for, but what the moral mind itself demands ; which requires that this perpetual sacrifice shall at length issue in its own needlessness ; that all dynamic sublimity shall be converted into beauty. The forces which are to change this relation of the human subject to nature must then be started somehow ; and if such beginning is not dependent upon physical conditions merely, but upon moral conditions as well, or rather, then the moral must somehow or somewhere be fully displayed

and reach its acme, ere the physical force which is to change the relation to nature can be let loose. It is only needful then to show that in the natural sphere the moral has not thus reached its acme, and that it only did and only could in the alleged Incarnation of the Divine in Jesus Christ.

We have seen that, if the human race be thought to have preserved its innocence and to have been normally developed into moral strength and indefectible holiness, there not only may be thought and imagined a new and unlimited domination over nature as the result of this, but a new insight into the inexhaustible recesses of the Divine Being and its infinite possibilities,—therefore an apotheosis ; but as such domination and such insight require a new adaptation of the environment to the perfected moral consciousness, and new opening out of the Divine nature itself to meet the new requirements of the creature, this apotheosis can only be brought about by a new Divine act, which will thus display more and more the Divine Love, or make its apprehension more vivid, and thus bring out the utmost potentialities of the creature. We have seen too that this Divine act meets the full requirements of the human being only by taking the form of Incarnation. If then we can think, under this condition of man's normal development, a new exhibition of the Divine Love, *a fortiori* we can think it possible and needed under the actual condition of disordered humanity, and that in such form as to bring home to human thought, imagination, and feeling the utmost of the Divine Love, and elicit the utmost love of the creature. To be such it must be brought within the range of all the human

faculties, not merely the thinking faculty of the developed and cultured individuals of the race, but those of its ordinary members. It must come in such shape as to lay hold upon the common human heart. If we admit this Incarnation of the Eternal Son of God in the person of Jesus Christ, this its ethical power will be readily admitted. In him humiliated, suffering, expiring upon the cross, is a moral influence brought to bear upon mankind which we cannot possibly think to be exceeded. "And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men to me." These words show that He anticipated the might of the new attractive force He had brought to bear upon humanity. *A priori* then, it would seem to be self-evident that, if God is infinitely loving, that which, morally considered, shows forth his love and brings such human response as nothing else can be thought to do, must be physically and ontologically possible. To this, its physical possibility, we are now prepared to address our enquiry, reserving for full consideration thereafter its aspect of reconciliation and atonement.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE INCARNATION AS AN ACT OF DIVINE SELF-LIMITATION.

It is now to be contended that the Incarnation is an act of self-limitation, which has foregone analogies and partial anticipations, and is therefore, on grounds both *a posteriori* and *a priori*, a doctrine supremely rational.

God in making man, this image of himself, has made something in a measure independent and aloof from himself. Unless it reflected the Divine independence it could not be called his "image." Out of the material furnished by the Divine foresight he can construct ideal ends which may or may not fall in with the absolute Divine purpose. Even had he been normally developed and retained his innocence, it were too much to think that during the process his knowledge would have been perfect and the highest wisdom. Such insight would rather belong to his perfected nature. The liberty to *grow* into the Divine mind is needful for a self-determining being, who creates his own character and determined individuality. He must, even then, be thought as constructing his own ends, as free in a perpetually expanding sphere, and with more and more flexible material. He is then, in his essential idea, one who makes his own law, is an independent centre, and can either fall in

with the current of the Divine intent, or contradict it, and thus necessitate, should he do so, an arrangement of the whole machinery of Providence to annul the results of the contradiction. In the need to master and to harmonize the results of human interference God has limited himself. He respects the human will so far as never to compel it, and thus the act of love from which issues the human will, is an act of self-limitation.

Even in the animal world and in its power of independent locomotion, in the seeming assumption and execution of a purpose, we have the Divine self-limitation, though in an inferior kind and degree. In the animal the determinations of the environment grow out of the internal want, and we have foreshadowed the human relation of subject and object. The intelligence which determines the activity grows out of the enjoyment, and yet varies and enriches it. Animals of the highest intelligence only can respond to human fondness, and allow love to rule their purposes. This relation between man and beast seems to have a completeness in itself, and so far is aloof from God, and is his own self-limitation.

In the sexual relations of the vegetable world we have also a fainter hint of the same, as well as in its temporary victory over the unceasing chemical and mechanical modes of motion.

Nay, even in the inorganic world itself, God, in determining his own Glory, in its separation into the clear and obscure, whereby it comes to be known as light, and a system of action and reaction springs up, has limited himself. And thus self-limitation is the very first thing to be thought in any true idea of cre-

ation. And its perfection is to be found in the Divine being itself, for the very relations or pure acts which constitute the hypostases of the Godhead are acts or relations of self-limitation, and thus in the Eternal Sphere itself the self-determined forever becomes the self-limited ;—the infinite is perpetually resolving itself into the finite, and the finite again into the infinite.

The far-off purpose of all creation is thus the production of a race which can feel and respond to the Divine Love. Therefore Love is the spring of all foregone acts of self-limitation, and gradually prepares the created work to give the full response. Self-limitation is thus the essential element of sacrifice and its pure form. But this word, *sacrifice*, has come to have a more restricted meaning, viz., to that form and kind of self-limitation which is required to remove impediments ; in short, for redemptive purposes, or the annulment of the contradiction. It will be well, therefore to confine the word to this restricted use.

In the case of man's normal development, Incarnation would be self-limitation purely. In the case of man's abnormal development, and as conditioned by the existence of sin and its consequence, pain, it must take the form of sacrifice. The entrance into the actual human sphere must be conditioned by the discord and derangement in that sphere ; and to be appreciated as an act of Divine Love must adapt itself to the comprehension of humanity, become familiar with the opposite of love, with selfishness and hatred, and their consequences in pain and death. It must show itself in such shape as to be seen, felt, and responded to by universal humanity. This we shall see that it does in the suffering, dying Christ.

But now the problem is, what limitation of the Divine for this loving purpose is, under these conditions, required to be thought to make Incarnation physically possible? How is this self-limitation a *κένωσις*, a self-emptying, a parting with the Divine Glory, an exchange of riches for poverty, a leaving the form of God and taking the form of a servant,—by all which forms of expression the Christian writings endeavor to illustrate it?

This is indeed a difficult problem, so difficult that some have declined it as unthinkable, and refused to acknowledge any such limitation of the Divine as possible (who also have had to deal arbitrarily with the narrative): and thus we have had various forms of Doketism and Monophysitism. It has been a hard-fought battle in the Christian Church to vindicate the truth and the integrity of the humanity of Jesus Christ, and the reality and completeness of his human development. Even in our own day we occasionally see men, deterred by the difficulty of the problem, falling back upon the virtually monophysitic ground. And it is proof of the depth and truth of the instinctive Christian consciousness that it should have adhered to the truth of our Lord's complete humanity and by degrees defined it, in spite of the tremendous pressure and powerful prejudice the other way. But this controversy is never likely to be again, to any extent, reopened.

The problem is,—how to reconcile the axiomatic and persistent personality of the Eternal Son, the Divine Logos, and all that that personality implies as to his relations to the other hypostases of the Godhead and to the created universe, with the verity and the reality of

a true human conception, and development. Here we seem obliged to think, in order to fulfil the conditions of the human idea, an unconscious germ in the womb of the mother, in which, indeed, all feeling is potential and rudimental, and therefore all human intelligence possible, but which is not yet a concrete or determined self-consciousness. Some thinkers have cut the knot sharply here, and have gone so far as to contend, not only from the *a priori* need, but from the Christian Scriptures themselves, that in this germ the Divine self-consciousness is utterly in abeyance and obscuration, and that in order to this, the relation not only which the Divine Logos bears to the universe is suspended, but also that the immanent relations of the Godhead itself must have undergone interference and temporary suspension.

But one need not reflect very profoundly to see that this scheme is absolutely unthinkable, is suicidal and destructive, flows round to an absolute contradiction with itself, raises more difficulties than it solves. For that which the Godhead is in its essential system of relations is a necessity of thought. Only as a Trinity is it a Unity; only as a Unity is it a Trinity. To suppose any change in these essential relations is to abandon the thought of that Unity and to strike the Trinity into a triplicity, or a Tritheism, between whose members or subjects the relation is arbitrary and changeable. Nor is any suspension of the essential relation which the Logos bears to the universe, so that He should cease to be its upholding principle, any more thinkable. The universe forever shows the Divine thought, and all its motions are realizing the Divine ideas. Moreover, as we shall endeavor to show here-

after, in the Incarnation itself the Logos enters into the closest and purest relation to the universe, and shows himself most eminently as its upholding principle. To suppose this sustentation removed, is to annihilate the universe in our thought. This solution is virtually an incoherent Tritheism and lacks philosophic depth.

But while we decline, on these grounds, to go so far as to say that the Logos consciousness is lost, or can be in utter abeyance,—yet to rush to the other extreme, and say that it remains unlimited, and there is no real obscuration whatever, but only an unreal or pretended one, is again to deny the integrity of Jesus' humanity, and oscillate to the Doketic or Monophysitic extreme position. What limitation to the Divine is then possible and thinkable without obliging us to impair in our thought the relation which the Logos bears to the Father and to the Holy Spirit, and his relation to the universe?

The Christian Scriptures declare such limitation, not only in the various forms above alluded to, of expressing the kenosis, but in the words "God—*sant* his only Son." This may be thought to mean a mere temporal commission, uttered in the language of spatial severance; but this is an entirely unworthy interpretation, and one which really excludes the Father from any function in the actual redemptive process. This sending may be more profoundly thought as the kenosis itself, as a new act of self-limitation, originating, as all Divine activity does, in the Eternal Father.

Some, and they too of the very ablest theologians, abandon the enquiry in another way. They acknowl-

edge the truth and reality of Jesus' human development, acknowledge likewise the unchangeable relation of the Logos to the universe, and the unchangeableness of the immanent relations of the Godhead, and think of the Incarnate Son under two categories, and as having a double life, one in the eternal form, which is creative, another in the temporal form, which is redemptive.

If, however, self-consciousness is a predicate of all concrete life above the animal, and such life cannot be thought without it, we seem in this scheme to have a twofold consciousness,—one purely Divine, the other human, or Divine-human. This looks like the Nestorian scheme, which to avoid, however, none are more anxious than the advocates of the scheme above outlined. Some way of escape from this dilemma must be found.

According to the New Testament narratives, the Eternal Son did not, as Jesus Christ, exercise the Divine attributes—omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence. Some theologians have maintained that he *could* have exercised these, but voluntarily refrained, in order to remain true to his own redemptive intent; that is, they suppose him metaphysically competent to exercise these, but under a moral necessity not to do so. But the objection to this scheme is, again, that therein we have sacrificed the humanity. There could be no true human development if by a simple constraint upon his conscious power, he refrained from exercising these. To be able to exercise these implies perfect wisdom as well as perfect power, for these attributes cannot be exercised except with reference to the all-comprehensive Divine purpose; and if this

be a description of the consciousness of Jesus, there was no true human growth in knowledge. His humanity becomes a mere disguise and a passive organ. His prayers are meaningless, his sufferings needless. His love disappears, swallowed up in power. Even his truthfulness is impaired, for his death was needless except to sustain the delusion.

We infer, then, as does the Christian Church, that he *was* what he seemed to be, and that there was no exercise of these attributes, and besides affirm,—that such suspension of their exercise was involved in the very idea of Incarnation ; and that the consciousness of possessing these attributes was suspended in Jesus Christ by the very necessity that the primal act of love should take the form of sacrifice.

While, then, holding that any change in the Divine *οὐσία*, or the essential relations of the Godhead, is unthinkable, we are still required to hold, by the conditions of the problem, that some modification, or change of form, in the Divine *φύσις*, or the sum of attributes relative to the universe, *is* thinkable and possible, and therefore was actual in the person and in the consciousness of Jesus Christ ; so that there was neither omniscience, nor omnipotence, nor omnipresence. All this, of course, it is alleged, was true of him while in the state of humiliation. After his resurrection He must be thought of under other requirements, as will hereafter be seen. And yet, it is to be contended, as to these same attributes in their original and pure form, as *presence*, *science*, and *potence*, that He was unique, and possessed them, as they were not and cannot be possessed by any member of the existing human stock.

In treating of these pure attributes *science* should come before *potence*, because it furnishes the end or purpose of *potence*; and *presence*, or the relation which the Godhead thought as spiritual bears to the Divine Glory, must be thought before *potence*, as furnishing the conditions for its exercise. We find, then, that Jesus never claims universal knowledge, yet that He does claim superhuman knowledge. He is a learner in the temple at Jerusalem. He does not know the time of his own second coming; by which is meant,—not any calculation of years and days and hours, but that He does not see the process by which the Father's purpose and his own redemptive work is to be accomplished so clearly but that He can pray that the cup might pass from him; thus, that of all that was to come to pass before the unravelling of the complicated scheme of Providence He had no clear intuition. And yet He claims more than human knowledge; not indeed acquaintance with the minute facts of science and history, as though He knew these by intuition, and not as other men do, as the result of observation and reflection, but the ability to pierce beyond the appearances, and to understand the secret of their change, to judge rightly, to know what was in man, and to know him better than he knows himself, to see things in right relations,—even though all is not seen,—to know that the true human story, and the knowledge which shall survive the earthly cycle, is not the meagre or barren and meaningless detail of events, but the evolution of the idea: a marvellous illustration of which we have in his discourse upon the idea of judgment, that Divine discrimination and adjustment which is always taking place in human

affairs, but which has its crises, its culminating points, when it is brought home to human intelligence, imagination, and conscience, as it was in the time of the destruction of Jerusalem, and as it will be in the day of consummation. These things flow through his consciousness, lifted into prophetic vision, not in any chronological sequence, but as illustrations of the developing idea.

That the knowledge of Jesus was superhuman we Christians naïvely feel, when in weariness from all other human teachers as often misleading, as not worthy of our perfect confidence, we turn to him as the most trustworthy, as the wisest and profoundest. How poor appear all other human utterances beside his, how comparatively exhaustible, how sure sooner or later to disclose some internal defect ! “ Lord, to whom shall we go ? Thou hast the words of eternal life.”

The knowledge of Jesus Christ must, then, be thought as a true human knowledge, and as showing the wonderful capacities for knowledge of the human mind, yet as a unique knowledge. The sinless nature has allowed no clouds to obscure this consciousness, unless it be such beclouding as might come from physical pain or want. It is such unique knowledge also, because the sinless nature has allowed the full mediation of the Holy Spirit. And to be a progressive knowledge, we must think it as not overruled by the Divine element, and that the latter does not exist independently beside it, or run ahead of it, but adapts itself to it, so that the human is continuously becoming an ampler and ampler organ, and more and more commensurate with the Divine, till at the completion of his moral triumph, his attainment of

ethical and religious perfection in the article of death, it becomes a sufficient organ, and the unchangeable form of life of the Eternal Son.

It is obvious that the idea of potence may be treated in the same way. As dependent upon science for its exercise, it must follow the progressive development of the latter, and gradually surmount its own limitations. The perfected humanity only could say: "All power is given to me in heaven and earth." Now the pure potence has become determined potence, or *omnipotence*. All limitation in the relation to the universe required for the purpose of redemption has passed away.

CHAPTER XX.

DIVINE SELF-LIMITATION A NECESSITY OF THOUGHT.

THE authors of the books in the New Testament have done something more for the Christian disciples than merely to put forth the assertion of the Incarnation as a fact or dry doctrine. They endeavor to make it a practical doctrine, to elicit by it the Christian motive-spring, and thereby secure discipleship, by speaking of it as an act of love,—as sacrificial. They carry our thought into the Divine mind which originated it, and thus endeavor to show the Divine character. Even in the Divine sphere this act is sacrificial in the pure sense; and we are taught by them not only to think some change in the human element, but some antecedent change of relation in the Divine being. The Father sent the Son. The Son being rich became poor. The primal glory undergoes some further determination and temporary obscuration. Surely, whatever be the difficulties for our thought, here is described, as far as human language can allow, no dissembled or unreal kenosis, but an actual one, needed somehow to be thought ere we can rightly understand the result in the person of Jesus Christ.

We now purposely repeat ourselves and, with some additional preparation, bring up again the idea of self-limitation, to explicate it more fully, to show that it is a necessity for thought, and thus to show that the

Christian doctrine is profoundly rational, and no contradiction to our other knowledge. And this explication we make in the reverse order of that attempted before.

We find it, then, in the Godhead itself. In the very relation between Father and Son we have limitation. Absolute necessity has become apparent to our thought. God the Father *cannot* transcend himself as object. Nor can Father and Son go beyond their mutual recognition or spiration whereby is the Holy Spirit. Thus out of the bosom of necessity freedom springs, love and activity are possible,—possible only by this mutual limitation. Thus through it existence becomes something more and higher than essence, and the conditions are laid for a universe, to be enriched in an inexhaustible fertility.

And when, passing beyond the circle of the Divine existence, we attempt to think creation, we find in each step and grade of the same an increasing degree of limitation, until at length there comes to be possible an infringement of the Divine domain, which has become actual, and which a new act of self-limitation alone can overcome.

When the pure Glory, out of which all physical existence has come, becomes determined, is broken into the contrast of the clear and the obscure, and light comes to be, and the first of the Divine thoughts is manifested, to be afterwards recognized,—when action and reaction commence, and thus any concrete beyond the Divine being itself comes to be,—the Divine Glory is thus for the creature's sake obscured, and Love, which sees its end and recognition afar off, is content with the obsuration. The absolute Glory

which the Son shared with the Father was only in perfection "*before the world was.*" Thus love limits itself that it may find love returned.

And when vegetable and animal life appeared, whether simultaneously or in succession, we have a further limitation. Here the physical energy advances beyond its primal modes of gravitation, cohesion, and chemical affinity, and exhibits itself in new form, brings to pass the seed, or a centre with its idea wrapped up in itself, gives it a relative independence, yet retains its hold upon it by making an environment necessary to it. In the animal we find an independence one step farther aloof from the environment, in its power of locomotion, which thus transcends the limitation of space as vegetable growth does not. This relative independence makes hostility possible in a form beyond the struggles for supremacy of vegetable life ; hostility individualistic, and not coming under the universal law of vegetable life, and thus the possibility of sin is descried afar off, and becomes *a priori* thinkable. The two orders are related intelligibly and mysteriously. The animal feeds upon the plant, and the plant absorbs from the air, and drags up from the earth, and revenges, in rare cases, the wrong of its kind upon the animal race, by drinking the life of its unwary victims. In their prey upon each other of animal life, we learn that no independence is unlimited without risk ; that the attempt to assert it involves either destruction and carnage, or poverty of resources ; and that harmony and full existence are only possible by mutual concession. While it continues to be a law of existence that food is necessary as the sacrament of dependence, we see that

discord among the *carnivora* could never cease while they continue such ; and therefore that, in their idiosyncrasy as *carnivora*, immortality is not theirs ; that they have only purchased the possibility of enjoyment with the actuality of pain ; that, in the aggregate, the mass of enjoyment is in excess, yet the negative none the less actual. Thus it is seen that limitation is necessary for this form of existence, and that, so far as the Divine enjoyment is reflected in the enjoyment of animal life, this latter exists only with the possibility of pain ; that sacrifice thus runs through this abnormally developing universe, assuming higher and acuter forms as in succession the higher ideas display themselves. And this sacrifice is self-limitation, which takes the form of pain when reflected, through the mysterious contradiction which has entered the universe.

In human ability to form subjective ends, and to use the material of the environment accordingly, we find again a further limitation of the Divine, and more manifestly so when these purposes and activities are at variance with the Divine intent, and necessitate a providential arrangement to annul their consequences. This creature, to be able to respond to the Divine Love, must be free not to love ; to be the highest form of created existence he must determine his own personal relations and character. Thus God has limited himself, whether irrecoverably, so far as the contradiction is concerned, is another problem, which we shall discuss hereafter.

In the grades of existence, physical and vital, God thus shows to the human thinking subject more and more of himself, by showing that He has set off something aloof from himself more and more entirely, that

He has confined and concentrated his energies in the various forms of concretion, and that by this limitation the riches of his thought can be known, and the extent of his Love can be felt. On these grounds it becomes *a priori* thinkable that if He is to reveal more of himself still to the intelligent humanity it must be by further self-limitation. He has shown his thought and his power and his goodness, and enabled us to descry or, at least, suspect his Love. But love can only be recognized as Divine, when it is shown in purity and perfection, and for this result it must take the form of sacrifice. We cannot possibly think of any other way in which it can be made known to men, as they are, that Love is inherent in the Divine character, and that man may yield to him without misgivings. The meeting of the Divine and human in our world cannot be a mere physical or intellectual coalescence passing beneath consciousness, but must be an ethical and conscious one, and for this the Divine Love must be shown.

Here now we decline, and think we have shown the insufficiency of the thesis that so many Christian thinkers have been content with, that the Incarnation of the Logos is only one of many possible methods which God might have chosen for the redemption of humanity. Such a scheme is only consistent by introducing an element of arbitrariness into the Divine character, and severing the Divine will from the Divine nature. The psychology from which such a notion arises is faulty, and the idea of the Godhead from which it derives is insufficient. Besides, in this scheme the worth, the beauty, and the love shown in the actual redemptive process are so far diminished

for our thought as to weaken immeasurably the Christian motive-spring. Since the lapse which brought about the disaster was an ethical one, it can only be reached and cured by an ethical remedy. Nothing but love can bring the response of love. If sacrificial love is required for the ethical return, sacrificial love must first be shown. Man can give no love higher than that displayed by his Creator. He can set for himself no higher aim than God sets himself and reveals himself as setting. Therefore the remedy *must* be one which shows the uttermost of the Divine Love. And the uttermost of the Divine Love can only be shown by its taking the highest ethical form, that of sacrifice, or completest self-limitation. If we could think of more, other, or higher love than that shown in the Incarnation of the Eternal Son, God would be so far yet unrevealed ; and the highest motive force has not yet been brought to bear upon humanity. Thus stating the difficulties of this scheme, we propose to argue positively for the other, and from several distinct points of view to show that the actual Incarnation was absolutely necessary, and the sole possible mode of human recovery.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF THE INCARNATION FOR HUMAN RECOVERY.

THE doctrine of the Incarnation, as coming down to us through the Christian Church, contains four points : (1) the exceptional and supra-natural conception of Jesus ; (2) the true human development ; (3) the issue of this last in ethical perfection, in the alone perfect sacrifice, for which his death was essential ; and (4) the redemptive or liberating power, and effect of the same. The end or purpose is declared to be, primarily and negatively, the extirpation of human sinfulness, and the vanishing of the consequences of the same ; and, secondarily and positively, the rectification, exaltation, glorification, and beatification of the creature, so that the whole process may be called a regeneration. These liberating and reconstructing results in humanity, however, are not to be reached *per saltum*, but only by a process in which the consciousness of the human subject is efficient. Nor can they be reached by the individual as such, but only as member of a commonwealth. We have already seen that the human idea is not complete except by taking into it the individual's relations to the entire race, and the elicitation thereby of his full potentialities. Physically mankind is one organism, produced by natural propagation, in each case concreting the

idea of the race particularized by an idiosyncratic *schema* (which view combines the elements of truth in Traducianism and Creationism). Intellectually it is one thing, as is evidenced by the possession of a common reason, and because the essential and unchangeable material of its knowledge, as well as the forms of that knowledge, are identical in each individual. Thus in both respects it is bound together by the ineradicable law of sympathy. Ethically its idea is to be one thing, from which all discord is removed, and in which each fountain pours of its own fulness into every other. If, then, mankind is to be restored, it must either be as a whole, or the restored humanity must be itself a whole, having ideal completeness. (Whether or how far the restored humanity is to be commensurate with the actual humanity, the Christ-race with the Adamic race, is a question which will be discussed later, and in connection with Eschatology generally.) In either case, the new, redeemed, cleansed, sanctified, and regenerated humanity is the final cause of the Incarnation, which is to put in play the forces needed to bring about such result. They must therefore have their starting-point, and the new race its progenitor. If its members are to be bound together physically, it must be from a common physical origin. If they are to be bound together intellectually, they must have the same conditions of knowledge. If they are to be bound together ethically, there must be a common starting-point and an identical explanation of the new ethical experience. If they are to be bound together religiously, it must be by their holding the same relation to God, through the same medium. As the existing humanity is prop-

agated by the Divine Energy moving mystically, or the Holy Spirit, in natural generation (a thing in itself indifferent, except by Divine appointment) ; so the new humanity must derive from its progenitor through the same mystical activity, accomplishing the new generation. As the Divine Energy in the first case has its symbol, so in the latter it may have its symbol or sacrament. To be a true regeneration it must follow the analogy of the natural generation in every essential particular.

If the intended humanity is to be indeed new, and realize the unrealized idea of the primal one, it must be secured against all possibility of failure. The original human parents propagate their kind *before* ethical perfection is reached, if not after the great ethical disaster. The new parent is not to propagate his likeness until *after* ethical perfection is reached, and that not *in potentia*, but in reality,—not only in idea but in experience. Nor can any member issuing from this new stock remain such securely until it has progressed beyond imperfection and the possibility of failure. Therefore, to produce the perfect progenitor, this new man must run through the entire essential history and experience of humanity, redeeming and perfecting it at every point of its development. Moreover, the consciousness of fatherhood and brotherhood which his posterity are to possess requires as its condition that they should know him to have passed through such experience. And the motive-spring of the ethical recovery of any individual of the race yet to be must have been elicited by the knowledge of that sacrificial Love which will draw all men to him. No thinkable element of his human career can

then be missed which can enhance the conception of the depth, tenderness, and extent of that Love. Therefore this new man must be born, and grow in stature, knowledge, and wisdom, and his religious experience must be mediated by the Holy Spirit. Nothing can be lacking to our full sympathy with him, or leave doubt that He is our perfect brother ; and, likewise, He must be such as to start the faith that the Divine Love shows itself in him, or otherwise the ethical force which alone can restore humanity would be still deficient.

He is to be *conceived* and born, and to grow ; and here the difficulties of the problem appear. The question of the degree and kind of Divine self-limitation required for this comes up again to be examined ; yet before grappling with this problem we return once more to survey the antecedent pathway by which we are conducted to the conviction that such limitation was absolutely necessary.

That the human race, or that portion of it within the knowledge of the individual mind, might be rid of its misery and selfishness has probably, in some shape more or less clear or dim, been the wish, and hence the imagination, giving birth to various thoughts of its possibility, of every rational individual of the race. A possible imagination for any such is that of a commonwealth, harmonious and loving, where there are no needs necessitating conflict, and where each member of the race is free to make the most of each other and of the common environment, and thereby to enrich himself. This picture, thus beautiful, must exist in dim outline in every human soul, to be obscured or clarified by his after-experience. Thus only can be

accounted for the moral distinctions he inevitably makes. Whatever be the genesis and history of moral impressions, this is the form they take, when clarified for thought, of comparison of the actual with this ideal and imagined state of things. But if this race is to be more than a race of mere animals, mere peaceful ephemera ; if there is any mental life, growth, and advancement for them, there must arise differences of attainment, of development, and of spiritual rank. If all were monotonously similar, no varied experience or amplitude of being would be possible. Even with similar environment, if different in individual structure, development and the whole sum of needs and longings would be different in each case, and here would be the occasion for the same set of comparisons and contests as in the actual state of things. What is still lacking to ensure the needed harmony is moral strength, the spiritual fibre through which can come the persistent sacrificial spirit, which ever subordinates the individual want to the need of the whole. This, to be moral, can only be attained by self-effort and discipline. Mere *imparted* goodness, like imparted conditions for happiness, is a *gift*. Love is an *acquisition*. Man must create himself here as to the finest and most essential of his capacities.

Thus by no *per-saltum* procedure, excluding this need of self-creation, could God cure the disorder of humanity. It must be cured by a process of ethical development, as it has gone astray through a process of development ethically deranged or reversed. Moreover, since much of this moral derangement comes from inherited physical disorder, since the spiritual and physical elements in man exist in a con-

crete synthesis, and modify each other, and yet since the physical and spiritual elements relate to distinct realms, abstractly separable, and the terms of the former do not express the relations of the latter except symbolically (as when we speak of a moral force inducing the physical activity through the *media* of motives and representations ; or of a physical influence brought to bear upon the spiritual will) ; since thus the two are not identical, but analogous, though their inter-relations are manifold, then the process of human recovery must include and require both sets of forces or influences. The restoration is to be moral and social, mental, and also physical,—which last necessitates a change in the environment ; therefore the influences or forces must be of each kind. And these forces (so figuratively called), or modes of relation, must show themselves primarily in right relation and must reach the human race in the same necessary and unchangeable order. If all physical degradation and mental deterioration spring from moral deflection originally, and not reversely, then the process of recovery must start with a moral recovery, and intellectual and physical changes ensue upon and follow the degrees of moral development. But as this is an order of thought rather than one of time, the starting of any moral process, in concrete humanity, is at the same time the starting of a physical process, or series of modifications, with a mental one as their mediation, and all go on together, acting and acted upon ; and all this by a strict *a priori* necessity, which our thought cannot abandon without striking all its previous career into confusion.

The Incarnation of the Eternal Son was not then

an arbitrary matter, as has been fondly thought, and one of many methods which God might have chosen to restore the human race, but no other was possible for such an end. God's freedom is not caprice, nor can He be thought as repenting of his creation, or wishing to recall it ;—for, if so, our conception of him is so lowered that He no longer fills the dimension of our highest idea. His freedom, rather, is born of his necessary being, and cannot transcend it. We see what his idea for man is, and we can think no higher, —a self-creating being, whose freedom is to become again necessity ; and thus the circle of being is complete.

But the fact is before us that man has fallen short of this destiny, and the problem is: by what sort of a process can his normal development be again recovered? The Incarnation of the Eternal Son purports to be an ethical act, and the starting of such a process as we have seen to be required. It is an act of Love, shown to be such by being an act of self-limitation, which becomes sacrifice because of the derangement produced by the moral deflection. To be regenerative it must then first be redemptive or loosening to the bondage of evil. As in the old creation the law of heredity prevails as the bond of union in organic humanity, so must it be in the new creation, or the idea of the human is transcended. The proclivities of the progenitor must pass into his offspring, and with them the restorative forces of the new form of life. And this requires, as we have seen, that the progenitor must himself have first reached perfection. This is alleged in the language of Scripture and Theology. The Church cannot exist, Christian baptism

cannot be till *after* the ascension of Christ and the coming of the Holy Spirit. In him and in his career, from his conception to his exaltation, the whole history of his Church is summed up and outlined ; and this must first be studied in order to find what the story of that Church is to be.

But before we can study the ethical development of Jesus, and how and wherein its perfection was reached, we must go back and grapple with the problem which meets us from the Divine side : for if this be indeed an Incarnation of the Divine, this must condition and render unique the human development. We are hopeful that, even in this difficult question, light and agreement among Christian thinkers will at length be reached. The progress of theological science has been slow, and the followers of Jesus Christ have been called upon to exercise patience here as well as elsewhere. But we have noticed how by degrees it did advance until nearly universal agreement has been reached as to all the particulars of our Lord's career, and the interpretation of the same, from his conception to his death. The deep anxiety of Christendom still lingers about the questions of his conception and his death, the beginning and the end of his human career. These are his *magna opera*, which only explain fully all that is intermediate. But the need and the meaning of his death cannot be rightly understood without clearing up our idea of his conception. In theological language, we must have a true notion of what the Incarnation was in its inception ere we can have a right notion of the Sacrificial Atonement ; and as the latter is the final cause of the former as to its negative or liberating intent, neither can be fully under-

stood without the other. They ought not to be treated of separately and in independent treatises. As in the conception we have self-limitation in thought and idea, in the atoning sacrifice we have it made real and brought home to human imagination and feeling. The present author is fully convinced that the seeming want of progress in the theological doctrine of Sacrificial Atonement has been owing to the want of satisfactory conclusions about the former doctrine. It may be that full satisfaction cannot yet be had, but we are on the way to it, and we hope to throw a little light upon the pathway. Christology has shown an advance, though unprogressive for long intervals. It has in modern and recent days received light and impetus from the thoughtful labors of the Danish theologian Martensen, of Thomasius and Eb-rard, German Lutheran theologians, and of the Roman Catholic theologian Pabst. To avail ourselves of the labors of these reproductively and critically is indispensable, and this will coalesce with our own constructive endeavor, though the thought of Pabst will be availed of in connection with our consideration of the doctrine of Sacrificial Atonement.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE KENOSIS ITSELF,—THE SCHEME OF THOMASIIUS.

IF the Divine Logos is to create and assume or, rather, assume in creating humanity, undeveloped, yet containing in itself the whole round of its potentialities,—if this germ in the virgin's womb, when animated, that "holy thing," is to have no defect but be as real and complete as any other animated human germ, what change, if any, is to be thought in the Divine Logos himself, making this possible? If the physical development goes on of itself, as under the ordinary law, and the Logos is figured as external to it and contemplating it, in all his omniscience, we have thus far no true union or incarnation, and the *communicatio idiomatum* would be an absurd language, as was contended in the Nestorian controversy. If, on the other hand, the Logos be figured as reducing himself, in the entirety of his relations, to the dimensions of this human germ, what becomes of the Divine self-consciousness? Can the Logos cease to know that He is fulfilling the Divine will, and the consciousness of his relation to the Eternal Father be in abeyance? Must there be oblivion of his own loving act? Is not all such statement but *words*, after all, to which we can attach no meaning? Can we think the mutual love of Father, Son, and Spirit to be suspended, or the essential relations of the hypostases of the Godhead

to be severed? Or, in the third place, can we divide, in thought, the consciousness and the attributes of the Logos, appropriating to the human germ whatever is needed to constitute the perfect union, and leaving the residuum in its unchanged relation to the Father and the Holy Spirit, and to the universe? Or, fourthly, while retaining the relation to Father and Spirit as a necessity of thought, can we make in thought any severance or modification in the relation to the universe,—in the attributes,—retaining all that is essential on the one hand for the sustentation of the universe, and on the other retaining only what is needful for the redemptive work? Can we make any abstract and profound distinction between modes of life and modes of consciousness, leaving unimpaired and still in essential harmony with each other, the limitation required for the kenosis, and the conditions required for the necessary relation to the universe? If by any thinking this last can be done, we may so far advance to the solution of the problem. Each of the previous methods lands us in a contradiction.

The kenotic theory of Gess starts with an unthinkable proposition. The theory of Martensen leaves us unsatisfied, and with the problem yet unsolved, though much be said by him that we may retain and recollect. The theory of Thomasius contains much that we feel authorized to carry with us, and shall find helpful in our investigation—though wondering why he should not have followed the pathway he himself marked out some steps further. In the effort of Ebrard we have glimpses of thought which promise satisfaction, but still too abstract and cloudy to make our thinking clear and precise. We do not propose fully to repro-

duce and criticise these theories, but, availing ourselves of what in each has seemed to us to be true and possible to be harmonized, to give the result, as it has arranged itself in our own thought.

Yet here, as in all theological advance, the negations and unsatisfying tentatives must first be clearly apprehended, in order to be rejected. We must first know what not to think, in order to know what to think. Only by looking closely into these projected pathways of thought can we apprehend the fine distinctions and, at first, minute deflections, which yet, when followed, lead very far apart and astray. In order to make our thought self-consistent, we must fence off such perversions of meaning or unsatisfactory formulas as have been tried. In this sifting process we shall find in each that element of truth which has given to it temporary vitality, and its own period of duration.

One of the schemes of explanation which we have already alluded to and characterized is that of Gess. For the satisfaction of any who may desire to see it more fully reproduced and criticised, we give the same, condensed yet sufficiently ample, in an appendix.¹ But there is so much in the view of Thomasius which coalesces with our own thought that we must incorporate it in our text, in order to show the difference or deficiency.

It has points of resemblance, and yet of difference with that of Gess. Thomasius admits and starts from the Chalcedon formula. The preëxistence is acknowledged, and there is in Christ Jesus but one Ego, conscious that He is God, and that He is man.

¹ See Appendix D.

Yet as the God-consciousness in its fulness is not identical with the limited and changing human consciousness, and since the reality of this last in its development is assumed, there must be some limitation of this God-consciousness. The Son of God, through the mission of the Father and in the same will with the Father, assumed human nature in its integrity and according to its idea. In this, were there no self-limiting, and did He continue in the apparent human nature to be all that He was before, in the entire round of his relations, and did we yet predicate essential humanity of him, there would be involved a duality. The consciousness of the Logos *per se* would be one thing, of the historical Christ another. If there was but one consciousness, unique, and such as was possible in the hypostatic union, then the Son of God must have entered into the form of human finitude, and there was a self-emptying, as according to St. Paul. This self-emptying could not be of that which is essential to God. Such a thing is impossible because unthinkable, and makes the very First Principle of all thought changeable at will, and to meet the requirements of some theory afar off and deduced from this very First Principle. Here does Thomasius part from Gess, and avoid entangling himself in this labyrinth of difficulties. The self-emptying is therefore a change in the form and not in the essence of existence, and a putting off of, or a subsidence from the Divine glory, as is declared in the Scriptures. In order to make this thinkable and to see how in the personal union the two natures are yet preserved entire and distinct, Thomasius asserts, that *God is not destroyed by self-limitation, for self-limitation is an*

act of will, and thus does not negate but affirm existence. The absolute were impotence if it could not determine itself as it willed (this "will" being understood as not arbitrariness, but as the relation of the *οὐσία* to any possible end). God's power of self-exinanition must be wide enough to give ample room for his Love to display itself. Love is the sole measure of the depth of the Incarnation, otherwise power is the master and not the servant of his loving will. On the other hand, humanity is assumed entire, with reasonable soul as well as body, therefore possesses personality, is a self, and Jesus is conscious of being a man as well as of being the Son of God. The difference is that in him the Ego was not born *out of* human nature, but *into* it, in order to work out of it, and through it a complete Divine-human person. This requires us to think that the Son of God, during his earthly career, is stripped of *omnipotence*, *omniscience* and *omnipresence*. But these are not attributes essential to God, only attributes expressive of his relation to the universe, which is a *free* relation. The kenosis has been, therefore, not in the *immanent*, but in the *economical* Trinity. He retained the essential attributes, absolute power, truth, holiness, and love. In becoming incarnate the Son of God entered into a state in which He could reveal these. Neither is it a state of helpless passivity, for in the conception the kenosis was a free act. In the death the kenosis is free. In these two particulars the kenosis reaches the highest point of activity. They are the *magna opera* of redeeming Love. *How*, we may not be able to explain, but it may help us to understand it, to consider that Potence does not signify something impotent, or empty, but

Being concentrated to its innermost ground, fulness concentrated in itself from the circumference of power and activity, therefore having power over itself.

In criticising the view of Thomasius, as thus far stated, we may remark that, at first, it does not seem that he had done any thing more than re-state the problem, but that very clearly, and had given us additional reason to think kenosis possible (as in the passage in italics); but later on does give us some help toward making it thinkable (as in the concluding sentences above).

Much of the criticism which has been brought to bear upon the scheme of Thomasius can be brought to bear upon any scheme whatever, and is merely a summary of the difficulties involved in the naked problem. In our own judgment he cannot be understood (as by some) as making the Incarnation essentially two distinct acts: one, the creation of a new humanity by the Holy Spirit; and the other, either the assumption of the same by the Logos, or else a uniting of the same to the depotentiated Logos by the activity of the Holy Spirit. These are the two possible forms of the heresy called Nestorian.¹ We

¹ We may call to mind, in this connection, the refusal of Justin Martyr and others to think the "Holy Spirit" named in the annunciation to the Virgin Mary by the angel to be the third hypostasis of the Godhead, or any thing more than the common Jewish conception of the word, the Divine power working mystically, the *δύναμις ἐπιθετος*,—they imagining that thereby would be put in peril the truth that the Logos created his own humanity. They must then have desisted, in their thought, as a possible form of doctrine, what afterwards appeared as the Nestorian heresy. Very likely no other understanding of the angelic words was in the mind of the Blessed Virgin; but the alarm was needless, and would have vanished before a profounder notion of the idea of *creation*. That the Logos created his own humanity by no means excludes the activity of the Holy Spirit, the energizing principle in all life. Creation is the work of Father, Son, and Spirit, and not of Father, Son, or Spirit.

think, rather, that he should be understood as considering the Incarnation to be one act, which, however, may be looked upon as two-sided, and to have negative and positive aspects. The act of assumption is the act of creation, and conversely. This is the Catholic view, which Thomasius can by no means be thought as intending to depart from. If *all* the Divine attributes are negated in the act of limitation, we have indeed a complete depotentiation, and the difficulties remain in full force. But evidently he did not wish to be so understood. He is unwilling, on the one hand, to admit that the Logos, after Incarnation as before, has power to radiate forth to the circumference of action, seeing that thereby there would be no real limitation whatever; yet is not willing to admit that the reduction in the sphere of Divine activity is such as to reduce it to impotence. Rather, he seeks to reduce all the Divine activity, which is relative to the universe, simply and solely to its pure and fundamental form. Thus the transcendent attributes of the Logos are dispensed with as to their full and knowable exercise, and are reduced to their primal form, to their ground in the immanent attributes. Omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence are reduced to abstract potency, and to the eternal form of all knowledge, and the eternal ground of all existence. These transcendent attributes have no necessity for thought. They come as a set of relations, in thought, *after* a universe, freely created, is assumed. Think away such universe, and they disappear, except as to their abstract ground. We understand Thomasius as here differing with Gess, and agreeing with Ebrard in holding a distinc-

tion between modes of exercising the Divine power, as will be noticed hereafter. Nor is this view, that in the Incarnation the attributes exist in their pure form, impugned by Thomasius' representing the development of Jesus to follow the conditions of all human, moral and religious development, *i. e.*, under the mediation of the Holy Spirit. The New Testament Scriptures certainly favor this view, and it is implied in the Chalcedon formula. Therefore the power to work miracles, and knowledge beyond the ordinary human, did not spring direct from the Divine element in him, but through and after the manner of the human mediation, and were accompanied by a human consciousness (modified by the Divine element, of course), and not by a consciousness purely Divine. This is not, as some of Thomasius' critics have said, a reduction to impotence, but the Divine power still operating through a progressive mediation. The totality of power and knowledge was *given* to him when the human development was complete, after the resurrection.

If Thomasius *must* be understood to mean a complete depotentialization of the Logos, then indeed grave objections lie. There seems a breach in the loving mind which gave rise to the Incarnation, if it can plunge thus into oblivion, only by degrees, to awaken from it. In such case the ethical element in Jesus' early development is wanting, and it only appears on towards his maturity. There is not much in the Scripture narrative bearing upon this, yet the occurrence in the temple during his childhood shows certainly something more than the enquiring mind, shows the sense of the highest human obligation, of

loving obedience ; and this love may be thought as something more than the responsive human love, and as the Divine condescending Love, which knows itself as Love, though the end of its mission and its condescension be only by degrees more and more clearly disclosed.

The question may arise in this connection whether the continuity of personal identity requires an unbroken thread of consciousness, which the fact of human sleep, in our case, would seem to deny. But since Jesus slept a real sleep, this difficulty disappears as such. It may still, however, be questioned, admitting the preservation of our individual identity, whether indeed the human consciousness *is* ever broken, whether memory is a trustworthy indication and measure of it ; whether it may not have its history independent of brain-conditions. Allusion to this possibility will be made in another connection.

If, however, the complex consciousness of Jesus during his childish development be thought as excluding the consciousness of his Eternal Sonship, then the difficulties are insuperable. We have only and solely a human development in which the Logos has no share. It is no longer ethically unique. Some arbitrary point of coalescence or assumption must be thought as afterwards attained, as at his baptism. He has, as the Logos, and according to the modes of human consciousness, no fellowship and sympathy with our childhood and youth. To this we must object, and assert that the very assumption of humanity as his form of being requires that the progressive human consciousness shall have been from the start a Divine-human one ; and therefore not only determined as

ours is, by his environment, but modified and determined by his Divine personality. The rudimental consciousness of the human infant is not unconsciousness, nor yet a merely animal consciousness. All human consciousness is potential in it, waiting for its progressive elicitation. While, indeed, we cannot transport ourselves, by imagination, into this, yet we are obliged to think it. If the break in the continuity of the Divine Love cannot be thought, we must then conclude and endeavor to think how this Divine loving consciousness can limit itself to the dimensions of the rudimental consciousness of the human infant, knowing that it has reduced itself to this dimension, and willingly ; and as a necessity from its own loving act, which being loving it cannot recede from, confines itself to this.

Thomasius, however, has not followed to the end the pathway he himself marked out. He emphasizes the assertion, remember, that the act of Incarnation is the utmost act of Love, and that what Love requires for its exercise must be possible. Love may, indeed, be figured as consenting to oblivion of consciousness, knowing that it would be recovered by degrees, but this has the difficulty that Love is represented as excluding its own activity, and the development must be thought as proceeding without it. If the Love of the Logos can pass into unconsciousness, it must as conscious Love retire also from its relation to the universe ; or else we must figure a double consciousness and a double life, the very dilemma we are seeking to avoid. Regarding this as by no means to be admitted, and proposing to give ampler reasons therefor hereafter, and in our criticism of Martensen, we

still adhere to the postulate, which seems to be naïvely suggested in the narrative, of one only consciousness, that of the Eternal Son of God and of the infant Jesus. How is such a modification of the former possible to make this thinkable. If possible, it may be made thinkable by reflecting, that herein the Divine consciousness concentrates itself for a new creative act. In so doing it does not cease to be the upholding principle of the universe, but plants within it the germ of a higher form of existence. As theretofore every new form of existence had been a temporary supremacy over all that was before, so this new form is to accomplish a like supremacy, and therefore a suspension or limitation of the forces that went before. The larger the issue required, the profounder the Divine self-limitation needful. Could we think God as annulling his own act, we could think him as withdrawing the sustaining force of the developing universe and allowing it to lapse into its primal pure element. It is easier than to think this,—to think him, for a new creative end, to reduce the force and the knowledge which sustain it to their primal, central, and simple form. Thus it may be argued that in the Son of God thus subsiding to the creative centre, and originating the germ of a universe which shall be secure from the defection and discord of the old,—in this putting forth of the uttermost act of love, and the utmost of self-limitation, there is displayed the highest effort of energy, and the essential form of all energy. It is not impotence, but potence concentrated for a greater effort and result than before. The same end as in the primal human idea is to be reached, indeed, but in reaching it, difficulties, spring-

ing from the defection, are to be overcome. Thus the form which this self-limitation takes becomes pathetic and sublime, though through these reaching at length the perfect beauty.

The old universe proceeded from beneath and was to be developed till its highest possibility was reached. The new universe starts from the highest possibility reached in the concrete Christ. Through the defection, the old development has been a departure. Through the redemption, the new is a return. As the old creative process hid by successive steps the Divine Glory, the new creative process displays it by degrees. The regeneration is to reach the circumference from the centre, the whole *κτίσις* from the new humanity, the new humanity from the glorified Christ.

In this way we may perhaps see that the act of self-limitation in the Incarnation, which at first thought looks like the loss of omnipotence, is really more than omnipotence. It is infinite Potence. It is more than omniscience, for it is that out of which all knowledge comes. Thus the Divine power and knowledge are most real when, to human superficial thought, most hiding themselves. The highest effort of Love must issue in a higher result. The new creation must be fuller and richer than the old, and all this fulness and richness was in the consciousness of the loving act which started the process. In this the conditions of all development are preserved, and the Holy Spirit is the mediating, energizing principle. And all issued from the Father, is grounded in the absolute conditions of existence, and is to restore the Divine Glory to its cloudlessness. Thus it is the Love of the Trinity in Unity. But the limitation pertains to the Eternal

Son as the Logos alone, otherwise it could not come within the sphere of knowledge. No other limitation is thinkable, and any words which endeavor to express it have no meaning.

Further vindication of this scheme of thought will be given, and something added to it in what follows.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE KENOSIS,—THE SCHEMES OF MARTENSEN AND
EBRARD.

MARTENSEN holds to the retention of the immanent relations of the Godhead (thereby parting from Gess) to the preservation and exercise of all the attributes, and that the Logos continues to be unceasingly the world upholding and governing power. The kenosis, with him, though real, is only relative to the purpose of redemption and the fulfilment of the idea of humanity. The severance between God and man, the wide departure of the creature from the Creator must be annulled through the mediation of the Logos. This annulment must be realized in a process, since the corruption of the creature comes by a process. Therefore the entrance of the Logos into humanity, as a restoring principle, must not be *per saltum*, but through time-conditions and development. The preëxistent Logos reveals himself to the world in the God-man. This does not mean that He ceased to exist in his world revelation and mediation, but that He enters humanity as a holy seed, that He may arise within the human race as a redeeming and perfecting revelation. He was therefore in his mother's womb, not as the self-conscious Divine Ego, but indeed a true unborn child, as any other—a "holy thing." But as such He

was conscious of himself as such, as with the developing human consciousness He was conscious of himself as human at every point of the development, and knew himself as the Divine-human continuation of the everlasting life of the Godhead. Hence He says, "I and the Father are one," which implies personal distinction in unity. He never says, "I and the Logos are one," because he *was* the Logos in human form. Thus in the Christ revelation the Godhead is never outside the true humanity. It is the fulness of the Godhead within the compass of humanity, properties of the Divine nature transformed into the properties of human nature. He thus lives a *double life*, and indicates his personal identity in the two spheres by referring to his preëxistence. The Deity in both is the Deity of the mediator God, of God as the revealer of God. As such, He creates and sustains the physical universe and man, is supreme in the realms of matter and spirit, and will transform man and the universe.

Much of this is a re-statement in other and very fitting words, of what has been stated before, turning the doctrine towards us in various lights. But in the entire presentation there is a seeming paradox. We acknowledge, with him, that all the essential relations of the Logos to the universe must be preserved, and that the Logos assumed all the conditions of humanity, but we are still left in the dark, how to reconcile the two. If the relation to the universe requires uninterrupted consciousness, and if in the rudimental consciousness of the infant He is conscious of himself only as such, there seem to be two forms of consciousness, which, if any thing, must be meant by the "double life." What then becomes of the one per-

sonality? Can it have at the same time two modes of consciousness? Perhaps this is the mystery, as Mårtsen thinks it, but we are not convinced by his disquisition that it is accurately founded, and that here thought must stop. We ask ourselves whether or how this double life and double consciousness are possible, the personal identity being preserved.

Are we ourselves illustrations of such double life? Do we carry on one thread of consciousness through our brain and organism, and another without it? And are our remembered dreams, but the coalescence of the two? Is our brain consciousness but temporal and a disguise, and our other life the timeless and real one? And have we, in our time-life disguised, an instinct occasionally of the timeless real life within and beneath? Is the latter the fundamental and perennial one, whose modifications from our environment through the senses constitute our experience? Does the experience so darken it that the labor of after-thought is needed to separate the obscure from the clear, and to discover that far within is the consciousness of our relation to the First-Principle, showing itself through the law of causality? If so, is this a double life? Is it not rather a single life, having undergone modification and limitation, a life waveful on the surface, but waveless and still beneath? Is not love the name of this God-relation, and the true token of our origin, therefore the highest and purest form of knowledge, the knowledge of the Eternal in its innermost relation to us, only becoming mixed knowledge through the environment, which limits while it enriches it,—even as the creative acts limited yet enriched the consciousness of God? May in this way the dilemma of

an asserted *double life* be reduced to the terms of a single life? Of this hereafter.

If there be such fundamental consciousness, becoming complex and, otherwise than by intuition, recognizable through the sensory, thus becoming a brain-consciousness, then we should expect to find, as we do find, our vanishing and remembered dreams made up of this mixed material, yet dealt with with such mockery of the restraints of time, as to suggest our spiritual independency of the same. And we should not be surprised to find the evidence of creative power over such material, such as never appears during our brain-consciousness with its time and space conditions.¹ It may also suggest something concerning the mode of existence when these organisms of ours shall have been deserted. This may have been the thought and meaning of St. Paul's utterance that "we groan in this tabernacle, being burdened," that he felt, as we, that we are restrained and confined by it in this more profound sense than is usually given to this feeling. But much more as to this eschatological question hereafter.

Was it true, then, in the case of Jesus, that the inner, true, fundamental, and ceaseless consciousness and life of the Logos was thus continuous and world-embracing, as retaining that out of which the world came, only not remembered in the human organism and through the human brain, except by occasional monitions and a growing clearness in the apprehension of the personal identity, of which both the intuition and the experience were predicates?

¹ The author begs leave to refer in this connection to the chapter on "Dreaming" in his treatise on "The Beautiful and the Sublime," and more upon the same will be added hereafter, in another connection, in the text of the present work.

In this way, possibly, one might carry the thought of Martensen beyond the point where he stopped short, and avoid the incongruity of a double life; but there may be another way of reducing the dilemma.

It is hardly worth while here to defend Martensen against any charge of Apollinarianism, since he did not hold that the Logos was in the place of the human rational soul, but, since the idea of humanity is concrete only in the individual as member of an organism,—that the Logos through the Holy Spirit created such a rational soul, assuming it as his form of life, and, since member of the organism, to undergo development. In this Ebrard holds with him.

This author attempts a still profounder analysis, and because profounder, his meaning is more difficult to seize. The terms by which he indicates that the Logos, in the Incarnation, *hid* his Divinity are, that He exchanged the eternity-form for the time-form of existence. He did not lay aside his omnipotence, and other attributes, but retained these so that they could be expressed not with reference to the collected universe, but only in reference to particular objects in time and space. Omnipotence remained in an applied form, as in the power to work miracles; omniscience remained in an applied form, as in an unlimited power to see through all objects that He wished to see through; omnipresence was retained as a power to transport himself whither He would.

By the two *natures* Ebrard understands not two parts or pieces united, but two *abstracta*, the human being a possible form of being for God, as well as the Divine. Human nature was not an existing thing, but a complex of properties. The Son of God, giv-

ing up the eternity-form, and entering into the time-form, became a human life-centre, forming for himself a concrete humanity,—body, soul, and spirit. Hence in him the Divine nature and human nature stand related as *essence* and *form*. He is, therefore, not partly man and partly God, but wholly man, and this man is the Son of God, who has freely denuded himself of the eternal form of being and entered into the human form; a Divine person has made himself a human person without ceasing to be a Divine person.

Ebrard charges the old Lutherans with Nestorianism in treating the two natures as concretes. The Reformed, he said, were right in saying that a Divine person assumed human nature, but, not grasping the distinction between the eternity-form and the time-form, they failed in their endeavor to show how the concrete consciousness and life of Christ are to be conceived. Hence they too, in holding that the Logos incarnate was omniscient, etc., and that the human nature was not, were virtually Nestorians. The true view is that the powers of the Godhead revealed themselves not as alongside of the powers of humanity, not as superhuman, but *in* the powers of humanity, in such powers as were possible for humanity according to its idea. Because Jesus had never fallen into sin, his human powers exceeded the ordinary human powers, and were by degrees what the inherent powers of humanity were intended to be, had man been normally developed, governing and not subservient to nature. Applied omnipotence in him is therefore dominant over nature. Applied omniscience is the dominion of spirit over the objects of knowledge. Omnipresence applied is the dominion

of spirit over spatial limitations. The *posse peccare* was true of him, as thinkable, and in order to give actuality to his temptations (*i. e.*, metaphysically possible. It does not appear that Ebrard held it to be morally possible, and he may thus have still held the *non posse peccare*).

It is evident that Ebrard intends to differ with those who hold the entire depotentiation of the Logos ; therefore, with him, the exchange of the eternity-form for the time-form is not absolute. He expressly says, that to say that the eternity-form can cease to exist is meaningless ; therefore, with him as with Martensen, the Logos must continue to be the world-governing power. In eternity there is no past nor future tense, but an eternal *is* ; no process requiring time, only a process having its order of thought, and that an order we cannot change.

As to the question whether in the period of immaturity Jesus was conscious of his identity with the world-governing Logos, he acknowledges that unity of person is not identical with continuity of consciousness, as in sleep. He does not call in question that the Logos was self-conscious while the child Jesus was unconscious.

When charged with any Doketism, he repudiates it, asserting that the Logos does not exceed the dimensions of humanity, but only actualizes its true idea. He was what Adam was intended to be, with a different environment. When it is objected to him that he makes in Jesus God and man practically one, he says "Just so," and claims Scripture evidence for the doctrine that creation would have issued in Incarnation. He was not then super-human, but ideally

human, and the two natures are two aspects of the same being. The Son of God became man, sinless, wonder-working, but still man, and as such not possessing the eternal world-governing form of God, not even the eternal form of the ethical attributes, such being incompatible with the idea of man.

Whether, thus far, we have been materially helped in our conception of the doctrine, is questionable. While there are elements of truth in the presentation which fall in with our own line of thought, there are also incongruities which derange it. There is one point, we think, so weak as, if it be a necessary part of this scheme, to vitiate it as a whole. When he says that in the incarnate Logos omniscience remained in an applied form as an unlimited power to see through all objects that He wished to see through, we must infer that Jesus' confessed ignorance of the last day was only a voluntary ignorance, a refraining from the mental activity or attention required to bring about the knowledge that was yet possible. This has always been one of the last positions of Monophytism to be deserted; but Catholic Christendom has refused to occupy it, as impairing the integrity of Christ's humanity. It seems to reduce his whole earthly manifestation to unreality and pretence. It must be inferred, to preserve the integrity of his humanity unimpaired, that all the restraints pertaining to human finitude were real. The *Divine will* shows itself in the self-limitation required for Incarnation. The *human will* shows itself in the earthly career, progressively becoming commensurate with the Divine, and actually such at and after his ascension.

If, in this form, the notion of an "applied" omni-

science cannot be maintained, and is a disturbing and not clarifying distinction, the notions of applied omnipotence and omnipresence must be given up with it as not at all helpful.

Quite otherwise must be regarded the miracles of Jesus. All force or power has but one origin, in the Divine will, and the modes of the exercise of energy are at harmony with themselves (as science, too, shows in its doctrine of the correlation of forces). If seemingly independent centres of force are created, as in animals, these are still reducible to their origin. The physical harmony is not impaired. The wilful diversions of nature's forces by men are overruled, and made to blend into the general harmony, and to subserve the providential scheme, as entirely as the capricious movements of animals. God is still master of the *content* of human action, though the moral *form* be man's own. Jesus as human was a centre, from which could radiate such use of nature's forces, and in his case, such putting forth, being loving and relative to human needs, must have blended with the Divine intent, or only ever strayed from it through deficient knowledge. In carrying out his holy purpose, ends relative to human needs suggested themselves to his unique consciousness, and, his human will being here absolutely coincident with the Divine will, He could and did work miracles in accordance with the absolute principle that ethical perfection brings in its train domination over all the lower forces, and that this last may show itself measurably during the progress of normal ethical development. Thus Jesus' miracles were no more "applied omnipotence" than those wrought by his disciples. In each case they are rela-

tive to the extent of their knowledge and the degree of their ethical or religious growth, though in his case far exceeding theirs; and omnipotence is in germ in Jesus' potence as it is in germ in his disciples, though in their case only to be reached in and by the perfected organism, which is what St. Peter means when he says we shall be "partakers of the Divine nature" (*φύσιν*).

Ebrard says, that eternity as the form of extra-temporality is not the highest, but the time-form filled with the highest essence *is*. God as *causa sui* cannot enter into time, but as objective to himself, as the eternal, personal Logos, He can. Omnipotence is not to be thought as if there were a sphere of possibility outside of God, but that the sphere of the actual has its principle and *prius* in the Divine will. So omnipresence does not mean that there is a space outside of God, but that it is in him, and every thing in it has its *prius* in him. So omniscience means that his will and reason are the principle and *prius* of all that is knowable. All this is said in answer to the question—how can the Divine and human properties be united in the same subject?

These definitions of omnipotence, etc., though not exhaustive, may serve the present purpose and show that the Divine and human properties can be united in the same subject, *provided* that the human be made commensurate with the Divine. This, however, unless there be an absolute coalescence and the human consciousness become absorbed into the Divine and lose its individuality (which is a form of Pantheism), must be an *infinite process*. The knowledge of the creature is bounded by the universe of which he is a part. It

cannot master the infinite of possibilities included in the Divine essence. The life of perfected humanity must still be progressive. If so, is not the life of its head, or progenitor, as human, still progressive? Is this what is meant when we think God as enriching his own Glory with the infinite particularity of ideas realized? Can we think of God as stationary, and otherwise than in perpetual activity? Is not the time-form, then, after all, higher than the eternity-form, seeing that through it Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are perpetually glorified? Does not all thinking, whether *a priori* or *a posteriori*, forbid us to think that any thing stationary is ever reached, and that the possibilities of creaturely existence are other than infinite? For such an endless progress, which is still to be a harmony, and grow in extent, richness, and beauty without contradictions, the actual contradiction must first be removed, and since the initiatory act is to be both redemptive, regenerative and beatific, it must, as primarily redemptive, take the highest form of love, or self-limitation, possible to be thought, while still preserving its own consciousness as such active love.

We have in Ebrard another endeavor to formulate a set of conceptions relieving us of the dilemma of a double life. His treatment of the crucial question involved therein,—How can the Eternal and the Incarnate Logos have an identical consciousness? is as follows.

1. God's Love first calls forth the existence of a time-sphere, *i. e.* nature, the universe, with man super-added as its intent and purpose, whence it becomes, in its relations, ethical, spiritual. Man is nature's crown,

its centre or principle, physically the last in order, spiritually *prius*. Humanity being an organism seeks to express itself in a perfect form, in which the unity of man with God and the glorification of God in time will be completed.

2. The Logos knows himself as the world-governing principle. He sees himself in the world not as it is corrupted by an abuse of human freedom, but as it is an organism in and by which it (human freedom) can work its purpose. Thus humanity, in its historical course, has explanation from its centre, its root idea. This idea is the God-man. This idea Jesus realizes, and thus He is the end and centre of the rational universe.

His development was normal. He was ethically harmonious. The Eternal Logos knew God as his Father, knew himself as the Redeemer, as the Second and true Adam, as the God-man. The Eternal Logos knew himself as the incarnate Eternal Logos. The consciousness of both is perfectly coincident, the consciousness of the perfect interpenetration of time and eternity.

From this presentation it appears that Ebrard does not go even as far as Martensen, in admitting a limitation of the Divine consciousness in the incarnate Logos, and predicates of it so large knowledge as to leave it difficult to see how the conditions for, and the actuality of, the infantine consciousness are to be preserved. In avoiding the alternative of a double life, he gives us the Divine life with so little limitation, that we are unable to see how this can blend and become one with the rudimental unconsciousness of the infant. For this, if possible, a new effort of

thought is required. May we then return to the modified form of a double life, reduced to the terms of a single life, as given in our comment upon Martensen's views above, as helping us in this difficulty? Admitting the distinction between the physical or brain-consciousness and the purely psychical one (which makes it easy to think that we preserve a continuous thread and undisturbed identity, even when the brain-consciousness is suspended), can we apply this to the case of Jesus as the Logos incarnate? But—as only human, Jesus must have existed under these same conditions, if they be indeed such. Therefore the psychical consciousness exists independent of the hypostatic union, and not by virtue of it. This were Apollinarianism. Whatever modification is accomplished from the Divine element must pertain to either form of human consciousness. This distinction then does not reach the true problem, though it may be helpful, as an analogy.

Retaining then whatever aid may have been derived from the speculations of Thomasius, Martensen, and Ebrard, we retire for a new adventure to weave the whole into a scheme measurably coherent.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE KENOSIS,—THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE INCARNATE LOGOS.

HERE some recapitulation may be wise, to show what attainments in Christological science beyond the Catholic formulas, may have been speculatively reached.

The thought which has accompanied the use of the word *ούσια* is,—whatever is absolutely essential, necessary, unchangeable in the constitution of the Godhead. Its essence is to be a Trinity in Unity—a threefold set of relations, each of which implies each other, and by virtue of which all subsists as One concrete. This is the postulate of all knowledge, the ultimate result of all analysis. No change, modification, or limitation of the Divine *ούσια* is therefore thinkable.

By the *φύσις*, on the other hand, is meant the sum of the Divine attributes relative to the Divine Glory, to the universe in its pure form, or in its determined form. This only comes within the sphere of our knowledge when determined, and while we can think these attributes in their pure form, as potency, science, and presence, they only come within our empirical knowledge in the forms of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. These belong, therefore, to the economical Trinity. All Divine acts re-

quire a relation to each hypostasis of the Godhead. Every act is therefore composite, and exhibits these three relations. We have heretofore endeavored to show that the Incarnation, being a Divine act to be apprehended by the human rational soul, although grounded in the Father, and accomplished by the Holy Spirit, is yet of the Logos as the Eternal Son, and that it is impossible to think any other Incarnation.

Modification, change, in the universe, and hence in the modes of Divine activity, is perpetual, these modes involving the Divine self-limitation in various degrees. What degree of such limitation is thinkable, then, for the purpose of Incarnation?

(The word "substance" may, without loss, be discarded, or, if used, will mean the Divine essence itself, thought as that which stands under and upholds all created existence.)

According to St. Paul, one purpose of the Incarnation was an ethical one, *i. e.*, to exhibit perfect human obedience, and realize the idea of human Sonship as related to the Almighty Father. For this it was needed that the Eternal Son should "be made in the likeness of men,"—that for this change in the *μορφή* or form of existence a self-emptying was needed. This kenosis then could only be in the sphere of the *φύσις*, and was required only so far, yet entirely so far, as was needed for the perfect human fulfilment of the Divine will. As an act of Love, it must therefore be sacrificial to the extent required by the existing condition of mankind and the universe. Thus the limitation of the *φύσις* is ruled by the necessities of the *μορφή*. Whatever is needed to display the Divine

Love in this act must be possible, on the one hand ; and on the other, whatever is needed to bring about and exhibit the responsive love, the uttermost of human virtue, or spiritual strength, must likewise be possible. And both must be actual in the Incarnation regarded as a process, and appreciable from the narrative by the human mind and heart. The production of this perfect human love is the absolutely essential condition of human recovery, and the animating principle of that recovery, regarded as a complex process, reaching all the elements of human nature.

But, even though the Divine Love and the Divine modification of the human development have urged the experience of Jesus towards this possibility and actuality, the Divine limiting and modifying element must at length itself retire, to all appearance, from the concrete human consciousness, but in truth sink out of sight within its depths, in order that He may display the utmost of human spiritual strength. This was accomplished upon the cross at Calvary. We think that we have a right to make this use of the saying of Jesus : " My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me," regarding it as true for the mind of the utterer, in the sense above. It is helpful to explain the limitation of the Divine consciousness in the incipient Incarnation itself. These two were, indeed, the *magna opera* of the redemptive process. They are those in which the Divine element seems most obscured. We shall hereafter explicate more fully this utterance, but note it now to indicate that God can exist in essential union with man, yet the Divine element retire from the concrete human consciousness, or rather, the Divine relation of Father and Son

retire into itself, and be seemingly withdrawn from the latter, as to any human mode of appreciation. The eternal paternal-filial relation remains, as is implied in the very words; but the human mode of apprehension and acknowledgment of the Divine sustaining influence has undergone obscuration. As the eternal filial relation must be thought still to subsist here, so it may be thought to subsist in the infantine consciousness, in which all determined knowledge is yet only *in potentia*. So far as human language can intimate, in this utterance on the cross, *Love* only remains, while knowledge is darkened. And in the infant consciousness Love may remain without determined knowledge, as that which is the spring and final cause of all determination whatever. Thus, we may think that the Eternal Son, sharing the Father's Love, yet parting with his glory, or obscuring it to the uttermost, can find room in the rudimental consciousness of the child to be conscious of himself, as thus purely loving, even though, by imagination, we are entirely unable to reduce ourselves to any such dimension. Farther than this we cannot go, and it is preferable to the expedient of thinking a double life; nor can we convince each other here, and end controversy, till a larger portion of thinking men has become familiar with the thoughts about the essential elements of existence, and has crystallized them into clear forms of expression.

In conclusion, let us repeat that, in justice to the requirements of our First Principle we must regard creation as an act of Love, and that the highest creative act is the highest act of Love. The end to be attained in the original creation, the perfect human or-

ganism, was failed in and is now to be attained by a new creative act, and that to be redemptive and regenerative, as well as beatific. The new act of Love must carry the weight of a redemptive process. It has to remove impediments, therefore must take the form of sacrificial love. No otherwise can any ethical response be elicited. The utmost of self-limitation which such Love may require and human thought cannot go beyond, must then be possible and actual.

This limitation consists in the reduction of the attributes to their pure and eternal form. Potence is *prius* in thought to *omnipotence*. This latter then may sink back into the former in order to spring forth in a new creative act and reach in new form the circumference. The utmost act of love is then the utmost act of power, and what looks like a limitation of the latter is its highest form of exercise. From this central act of Love alone can issue the force which is harmonizing, and overcomes all opposition, and allows no conflict. From this alone can come a universe of pure and perfect beauty. From this centre alone can all things be viewed in their right relations. Only this knowledge is perfect, and therefore true in the absolute sense, as a symmetrical synthesis of all elements. Knowledge will have become a movement in an ever expanding circumference, in which no error is met, no contradiction to be annulled. We have a right to think that, starting from the point it did, the knowledge of Jesus Christ was true knowledge, susceptible of increment, but requiring no correction of its essential elements. He was never deceived, had no theories of man and nature to wind his way out of, which

is what the finest other specimens of the human race are perpetually doing.

If, then, in the Incarnation, omnipotence and omniscience may be thought as reduced to their pure and primal form, how does this affect the consciousness of the world-upholding Logos as such? As we hold, and necessarily, that all the universe is present in the Divine consciousness (which is taken for granted in all prayer), and that the Divine joy is felt in it and throughout it, the universe must still be present in the consciousness of the Incarnate Logos, as something to be loved and restored. But this consciousness *must* be thought as obscured as to the determinations of the universe and as recovering knowledge of the same according to human modes. No otherwise can we avoid the dilemma of a double life. The Logos must then be thought as, in the Incarnation, continuing to be the upholding principle of this universe solely as an object of Love. The consciousness of the Father's Love and his own filial Love: the consciousness of the universe as an object of Love must still remain. There is then a reduction to the pure and eternal relations, to such as were before the world was. As we may think this, the pure Glory, as undetermined, in like manner we may think the consciousness of the eternal Son, in the incipient Incarnation, as undetermined. Whatever be the difficulties for imagination, we must, in thought, sacrifice every thing required to be missed, that the Divine Love may show itself in the highest form.

The seeming unsatisfactoriness of such speculations is, because imagination cannot follow them, rather than that thought cannot grasp them. But there is a

limit to human thinking power ; and here is our limit. No knowledge can be so clear as to lift us out of the need of exercising faith. But faith, to be true to itself, must seek the utmost of knowledge, in order that it may fix the line beyond which, and bound clearly the region in which it is to exercise itself.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE TEMPTATIONS OF JESUS CHRIST.

WE have seen that the Incarnation as an act of self-limitation must, on account of the contradiction, take the sacrificial form. This must show itself, therefore, throughout the whole career of Jesus and reach its culmination in his death. Such sacrifice requires resistance and steadfastness. The temptations and trials of Jesus, therefore, must be real. Without these He would be not only not actually human, but not even ideally human, for the idea of the human is to be a self-creating spiritual soul. The soul is only spiritual by virtue of its ability ethically to create itself. *A fortiori*, in the actual state of humanity the Divine intent for man requires that he shall also be enabled thus to resist successfully. In this resistance and victory consists his moral development ; but the highest exercise of it and the perfect attainment are alone liberating. According to the New Testament the perfection of Jesus was not attained till after his death. Not till then did his body pass beyond the possibility of pain and death, or did He claim omnipotence, which implies omniscience. Moreover, the Scriptures ascribe these results not to the hypostatic union abstractly regarded, or to his mere innocence, but to his developed sacrifice, to his death, to his victory over the highest assault of temptation, to the

display of the utmost of sacrificial Love, though all these are potential in the primal act of self-limitation.

The New Testament narratives thus imply a *philosophy*, which, too, the Old Testament does not contradict, but supports, and for which we shall attempt a speculative vindication hereafter. This is, in brief, that in all ideal and perfect existence, the elements of the synthesis must be in harmony and correspondent, that when the ethical element is in perfection the other two elements follow and become correspondent by a law as fixed, by a necessity as absolute as are the immanent relations of the Godhead. There is nothing arbitrary about it, nor could it be otherwise. God is here simply consistent with himself and herein shows himself. The universal law is then illustrated in the person and in the history of Jesus Christ, and physical and mental perfection come as the result of his moral triumph, all which is a revelation of the constitution of the ideal universe. In order to connect these results thus necessarily with his atoning sacrifice we have to consider more deeply than hitherto his sinlessness and his temptations.

Our human thinking, at the best, is so much disturbed and clouded by inherited or acquired physical proclivities, or perverted by spiritual propensities, that we cannot reproduce in imagination the sinless consciousness. But, proceeding cautiously, we can think its conditions. A sinless consciousness has in it these three or four elements: (1) the mind or will to fulfil the Divine will, the whole law of love, and at any required sacrifice, never to deflect from it; (2) an accurate thought and correspondent imaginative picture of the moral ideal realized, and hence the clear under-

derstanding of how far any proposed action, when fully understood as to its motive, its overt characteristic, and its immediate results, corresponds to the requirements of such ideal ; and hence (3) the ability to judge, as accurately as the conditions of the finite and limited human intellect will allow, of the ultimate consequences of an action, whereby its moral quality is determined. And we may add (4) the negative condition,—the absence of diseased and abnormal inherited or acquired tendencies.

A consciousness having these conditions is subjectively sinless, even though perfect knowledge be not had. And we may declare it to be also objectively sinless, if the aim of all moral activity be rightly regarded. The ideal commonwealth of love, by which the moral quality of all acts is tested, is a commonwealth of *holy souls*, not an aggregation of holy acts, for in it all acts are holy, however free, and no other acts are possible. There is no *law*, in the moral sense. And even in this imperfect and limited world actions have worth or unworth according to the quality of the fount from which they spring. God has not released his dominion over their content, which proceeds according to *his* law (or method of procedure) only. Mere overt actions, irrespective of their moral form, *i. e.*, their motive, have no moral quality. So far as they blend or not with the current physical forces, they are part of a complex of forces, all of which is under Divine guidance, and is a providential scheme. Such an ethic as this shows that the fact of Jesus' confessed ignorance of the entire method of this providential scheme, and his prayer for relief in the garden of Gethsemane, and his outcry upon

the cross, are not inconsistent with his objective sinlessness.

And now, as to the above-given elements of the sinless consciousness, it is evident that He is not alone in the possession of the first. There is many a follower of his, and many a one antedating his appearance upon the earth, who has had the same mind and will never to deflect from the requirement of the moral law, and to fulfil all the Divine purpose. Every Christian proposes just this to himself, and, when the issue and the alternatives have been plain, has not been found wanting, as all martyrdom shows. But such a mind may be possessed without the spiritual strength to sustain it in this attitude at every possible time of trial, and is not therefore perfectly free. Unless then it have passed beyond the possibility of such defection, it cannot be said to be subjectively sinless. In the case of Jesus Christ, there is not in his whole career any the slightest evidence that this mind to do the will of the Father was ever in peril and trembled in the balance.

And also, as to the second element of the sinless consciousness, here too any difference between his conception or imagination of the moral ideal realized, and that of his holy follower, or even predecessor, can be only in degree, and not in kind, and possibly not in degree as to the unifying element of such moral ideal. For every Christian has this imagination of the loving commonwealth, bound together by this spiritual passion, where there are no individual interests to conflict with those of the whole, where all is harmony and peace and blessedness. Any difference in the representation of all this is not a moral but an

intellectual one, affording more or fewer elements of the picture subjectively represented. Therefore then, supposing the contemplated action to be fully understood as to its consequences, there would be little or no difference of judgment in any consciousness having the first requisite of sinlessness, as to how far it met the requirements of the moral ideal, when tested by the imaginative presentation of the commonwealth of love.

The third element of the sinless consciousness, whereby it becomes objective, as we can conceive it, would consist in the ability rightly to forecast all the consequences of any proposed action, and to know its bearing upon the final result. But this would be to possess the Divine insight and knowledge, and such power is beyond that of the finite mind. Not only would one have to be able to trace all the consequences of an act in the indefinite future, even when following known laws, but also to foresee all deflections and interferences. Since God may divert the physical results of actions, and make them subserve moral ends, such knowledge would consist in acquaintance with the whole providential scheme. With such knowledge faith would be needless, and spiritual virtue a thing *given*, not *gained*. Besides, such limited foresight of the results of actions as is attainable and trustworthy is dependent upon degrees of mental ability, and the kind of training, as well as upon moral insight.

The knowledge of Jesus Christ, as human, was not perfect in this respect, otherwise there could have been no such prayer as his in the garden of Gethsemane, nor any evidence anywhere of human weak-

ness, nor any obscuration upon the cross. It was because his knowledge was not perfect here that temptation was possible for him, and conflict, and victory, and increase of human moral strength. For, in forecasting the consequences of an action suggested to him, there was room for alternatives. "*If* it be thy will." Uncertain which way the Divine will might lead, in the immediate concatenation, there was room for solicitation on the one side, from the instinctive clinging to the Divine gift of life, and away from the inexperienced future into which He might be called upon darkly to plunge. But the Father gave no sign of release, and He went forward in steadiness. The mind might be darkened, but the will was not weakened. There was room for resistance and decision when no gleam of light came to show that the dark road might be shunned. It was this liability to inward balancing of alternatives, and the conscious need of strength to fulfil his mission, that made his prayers possible, and so real and persistent. As human, He must needs drink from the Eternal Fountain to sustain himself. Had his been the absolute Divine insight, there would have been no need and no possibility of such prayers. As it was, they were no pretence nor unreality, but as true prayers as our purest ones, therefore mediated by the Holy Spirit, and an element in his religious development.

Jesus' temptations, to be true ones, must have been something more than mere external solicitations, physical phantoms impinging a rock of adamant. There must have been also such a subjective solicitation as could be possible under the conditions of imperfect knowledge; for to suppose the knowledge

perfect, and yet the subjective solicitation, would be to abandon the notion of his sinlessness. Thus, while in the flesh, *his* development, too, was one of faith, not of sight, showing itself strong and true to the right pole even when in dimness and uncertainty, therefore, like ours, and showing him to be truly our brother.

The fourth and negative condition for a sinless consciousness we have said to be the absence of diseased and abnormal tendencies. Through such as these do our temptations come, and take other form than his, whence the mass of human sin. So far as these depend upon physical relations, it is apparent that the physical fountain of humanity needs purification ; and we have seen that the channel of such proclivities from any human paternity had in his case been cut away. We have endeavored to show that, without violating the law of heredity, such tendencies as came from his mother must be thought such only as to make true temptation possible, yet not to infringe and take their place back of the spiritual will and become a determining power for it. The very liability to hunger and thirst, the very possibility of pain, the very certainty of death are tendencies inherited from his mother, showing that, thus far, human nature had not been fully restored, and could be only through sacrifice, through the victory on the cross. We may then, without contradiction or misgiving, think these tendencies to mark human weakness and not human perversity, and to be not inconsistent with moral innocence, but only conditions for the reach of moral perfection. What is required is not any correction of native propensities, but the acquisition, through temp-

tation and resistance, of spiritual strength, which, when reaching its culmination, becomes liberating.

The temptations which met Jesus in the wilderness seem to have been quickly triumphed over. There is no record of any struggle, and we only infer an inward attractiveness coalescing with the outward suggestion, which, however, is at once rejected. Those which befel him in Gethsemane were intenser. They consisted in the shrinking from death, the profoundest instinct of the human organism, perhaps the ground and the rudimentary form of all special instincts, and in which the creature thus inwardly pronounces death as what *ought not to be*; and why it is now required Jesus does not clearly see. We do not find that any of Jesus' victories over temptation illustrate the might of his sacrificial love till we come to those at Gethsemane and Calvary. These indeed do, and that so markedly, that we do not wonder that even for this reason alone the New Testament writers lay the whole weight of the redemptive efficacy of Christ's work upon his *death*. Nevertheless, this must not be so isolated as to cause us to disregard the sacrificial virtue of his entire life, and especially that of the primal act of Incarnation itself. Besides, it is only by abstraction that death can be so isolated. We begin to die as soon as we are born. The physical forces attack us, and the inward vital spring holds out as long as it can, but weakens and succumbs at length. Pain is an evidence and a reminder of this conflict. The needs of food, clothing, heat, and shelter remind us of our peril, urge us to ward off the hostility, and thus the human being knows himself as mortal. Whatever thoughts and feelings then cluster in Jesus' mind at

the hour of death are only an intensification of what went before, yet rendered unique by the consciousness of his Divine Sonship, whereby He is led to think it possible that He may escape death, knowing death to be the wages of sin, and himself sinless. But the same sacrificial mind which yields itself to death pervades his whole life. That death may have special significance and virtue, as we shall see further on, but it is not as something superadded to his life, for this severs it from the primal loving act of Incarnation, but as the culmination of what pervades his life. How far this sacrificial mind was redemptive before its culmination upon the cross we will now enquire.

Human nature, in the concrete, is a synthesis. In the original creative act it is such, for it is the elevation of the animal soul into the rational, the irradiation of the physical being by finer light from the spiritual source. As such it is a triplicity, the elements of which cannot be torn apart in fact nor fully separated in thought. Any attempted abstraction is misleading and delusive. To think the animal mind without the spiritual elements is to think away the human. To think the body without the soul is to think mere dead matter. To think the soul without some organs, and without relation to any physical environment, is to think it arrested in its progress,—reduced to isolation. What this relation may be after death we will hereafter fully consider, but now we only note that during his earthly career man is a unit, and that no change can be thought as taking place in any element of his being without affecting every other element. The moral element changes the mental and the physical. The mental affects both. The physical

reacts upon each. All this is a truth of psychology, emphasized by a scientific physiology.

The object of this disquisition is to show that the development of Jesus Christ must have been, from infancy, thus symmetrical and involving the interpenetration of these elements. The progressive mind affected the bodily development, and *vice versa*. Inasmuch therefore as his was a unique consciousness and development, and that from the start his human consciousness was modified by the loving consciousness of the Eternal Son, and that the difference between his and the ordinary human consciousness must have grown more marked as his life went on, so the correspondent changes must have gone on in his physical being. Not only did the mental and the moral in him modify each other, but each modified and was modified by the physical element. If then we suppose an incessant moral growth, not in the sense of any accumulation of innocence, but in the sense of the acquisition of moral strength, there was also the needful and correspondent mental expansion. Thus, any temptation befalling him, once known as such, resisted and overcome, could never befall him a second time, but be, indeed, an impinging of a phantom upon the adamantine rock. Thus in the mental and moral sphere, thus unitedly abstracted for reflection, we see that his moral growth, which was itself an extension of the sacrificial mind, was redemptive, and loosened progressively the ties of the bondage involved in the earthly sphere of faith. And thus his moral and mental advance must have affected his physical being likewise, destroying the force of such remnants of physical proclivity as had made temptation actual,—and was so far redemptive. We should look also to see a

gradual acquisition of power over physical limitations, and expect the time to come, in his development, when He should assert and exercise it,—when miracles should appear, not voluntarily refrained from theretofore, but only possible, in the form in which he wrought them, when a certain stage in his moral and religious career should have been reached. The Apochryphal gospels which represent the child Jesus as a wonder-worker are therefore not only unhistorical, but unphilosophical, and theologically absurd. The domination over nature was renounced in the kenosis, was not withheld thereafter by any voluntary refraining, but by the very requirement of the kenosis, and in a degree it was regained at a certain stage of his development when the full equipment for his ministry was reached, which was signalized at his baptism. Thus then we should look to find his body becoming more and more spiritualized, and some token that this was so may have been afforded by his disappearance from the crowd of his enemies, if this be thus rightly interpreted.

Thus his work was redemptive in the vital sphere, whose processes go on independent of the will. We may rightly infer then that He was regenerated in body, not *per saltum* and after his death, but progressively and during his life ; and that his glorification was in part anticipated. This explains what took place on the mount of Transfiguration. It would follow then that his body in the grave was not preserved from corruption by any merely external sustaining Divine power, by any miraculous interference with known laws, but by its own inherent quality, and through a profounder law, even though He had passed through death. We shall see later on that

this death was itself necessary in order to free his body from the possibility of corruption, and consider whatever seeming difficulties are involved.

On these *a priori* grounds we conclude that his sacrificial life was thus far redemptive, *i. e.*, emancipated human nature from its disability to some extent, at every part of his human experience. The Incarnation itself, as a higher form of creation, was a guaranty that this whole redemptive process would be carried on to a successful issue, and that by means of a progressive consciousness still human, though Divine-human. Human nature is preserved from lapsing in the scale of being, not by a physical miracle, but by a moral efficiency. The physical miracle would be an exhibition of Divine power, and not of the Divine Love. Love implies a response, and the unfree obedience were no response. This experience of the "man of sorrows" is no surplusage, no mere dramatic show for the imagination, no picture intended to show the Divine wrath, and to inspire terror, but a strictly necessary experience. This alone shows the Divine Love in such human form that we can apprehend it. Its putting forth in the beginning involves and alone brings about, through this process, its response at the end. The mind which "sent the Son" is met at length by the utterance, "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit." By this result reached is the Divine complacency over man restored, the Divine Justice satisfied, do the hostile powers begin to subside, and Atonement is accomplished, not in idea only, or in mere potentiality, but in reality. The regeneration of the *κτίσις* commences, radiating from this centre. Eternal life is humanly possessed.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE DIVINE JUSTICE.

IN order to consider with full preparation the question, How was accomplished and in what consisted Christ's Atonement? (using this word in the most comprehensive sense,) certain definitions of terms must be made, and preliminaries of method settled.

It is beyond the purpose of this treatise to enter at large upon the question of the nature of the Old Testament sacrifices. What is postulated concerning them is what seems to be the Bible view of them, and the general theological opinion, viz. : that beside being a ritual worship, having points of resemblance to the *cultus* of other religions, and adapted to the particular intent of rearing a "peculiar people," they were by Divine prescription connected with the coming Christian dispensation, by being (some of them) made symbolical or pre-figurative of the sacrifice of Christ, showing forth on a lower plane the one only true sacrifice which was to take place on a higher. They were not, then, independent rites having intrinsic and absolute virtue, to which at length the sacrifice of Christ came to be superadded, but were of worth by Divine prescription, and served their temporary ends. There was no absolute law of sacrifice to which they as well as it were obliged to conform. The one

sacrifice of Christ alone reveals the absolute law, and the pre-figurative ones had their significance as being, more or less exhaustively, symbolic illustrations of it. They were not properly moral acts, except as acts of obedience to a Divine prescription, whose moral end they upon whom they were obligatory might not clearly see. So far, then, as the slaying and offering of a living animal was made a condition for the withdrawal of the disabilities induced by transgression, this was made such by an arbitrary prescription, yet not purely arbitrary either, since having intrinsic fitness, and becoming means to an end afar off. As educational in many respects, they were indirectly moral, and as acts of obedience done in faith, religious acts. As prefigurations, however, they cannot exhaust the full significance, nor let us into the deepest secret of the virtue of the one only atoning death. Of themselves "the blood of bulls and of goats" could not put away sins, but by relieving the offender from the penalties of the law, they could prefigure the Divine intent to relieve the sinner from the penalties of sin as violation of a moral requirement, and which *do* follow from an absolute law ; but they do not show us how, in thought, to connect the two. Hence the atoning work of Christ cannot be adequately understood by studying these sacrifices. Rather *it* must be studied to find out what they prefigure, and how far they pre-figure it. If, however, we reach the key to their typical meaning, we may, finding them to some extent truly analogous, use the light attained by their study to scrutinize very closely the atoning work of Christ, and bring out all the richness of its meaning, thereby illumining the one purpose

which runs throughout the whole of the Divine dealing with mankind.

So (to anticipate), in the parallel case, the atoning sacrifice of Christ must be studied to find out what is commemorated and illustrated in the Eucharistic offering, and having discovered it, we may use the reflected light of the Institution of the Holy Supper to scrutinize again, and illumine the atoning sacrifice.

Thus, then, the atonements of the Old Dispensation cannot fully teach us what was meant and done by the Atonement of Christ. Rather, this last must be studied from its own history, from the centre outward, and not reversely. This is a question of methods, and the one we follow is thus indicated.

Nor, so far are we fettered by long habitual use of terms, can we move forward successfully without subjecting to analysis certain words, and until we conclude what is meant by the Divine Justice and the Divine Forgiveness. Confusion here has resulted in helplessness.

Justice is a conception springing not directly from the immanent relations of the Godhead. In thinking these, there is no room for any such conception. It comes rather from the transcendent attributes, and is *a posteriori* in origin. But all practical or moral relations of the Godhead towards the creature must be traced back to the simple and pure form of these transcendent attributes, to their unifying and immanent one, viz. : the Divine Love. Not until we have given a universe, and one containing beings capable of a moral relation and a free obedience, can any such conception as *Justice* be formed. It is an inference drawn by placing together in thought two or three

facts : one, the observed fact of free obedience or disobedience to law, or of naïve and spontaneous conformity or non-conformity to it ; another, the observation that disobedience or non-conformity is followed by suffering or ill-being near or remote, and obedience or conformity by well-being near by or far off. Justice accrues in thought then from the attempt to square the providential treatment of conscious subjects with their moral condition, and the discovery of some, possibly necessary, connection between them. And, on reflection, it is seen at length to be the form which the Divine Love of necessity takes when sin has entered the universe, exhibiting one attitude towards responsive love, or its own likeness, and another attitude towards unlovingness, or its own contradiction. The universe is seen to be so framed that none of its laws and methods, which are intended to subserve the well-being, harmonious development, and ultimate perfection of the rational and responsible subjects for whom it exists, can be violated with impunity, but by some retributive result show their own expediency and wisdom, and, on deeper reflection, their necessity. This method of bestowal of physical or metaphysical good or ill is what we call the Divine Justice ; sometimes difficult to trace, but not impossible to trace and demonstrate. Belief in it or doubts about it indicate the fluctuations and degrees of faith, and come from the balancing between sensuous conceptions and moral intuitions, from the contest between the imagination caught by the ephemeral, and the reason resting upon the permanent. Justice as imparting blessing is for the most part taken to be its normal attitude, and the universe

thus to be ideally optimistic. As such it is quite clearly seen as the true form of God's Love towards all his creatures who are capable of delight or pain. Pure animal enjoyment predominates vastly over animal pain. Even though it be noticed that the quality, if not the quantity, of such delight proceeds according to the development of the creature and its elevation in the scale of being, leaving thus often an hiatus which is something other than enjoyment, this still shows itself as a form of the Divine Love. Even though the simple, rudimental animal complacency and the ordinary sensuous gratification, diffused in the lower stages of development over the entire structure and the ordinary experience, is at times contracted and concentrated into points and shorter periods of more exquisite delight, interspersed with periods of want and longing, this still appears as a form of the Divine Love. Want and longing are not pain nor suffering; rather they contain in themselves the power and the promise of finer delights still, and indicate heights and depths of being yet to be expanded into.

So intent, we may say, is God on the diffusion of happiness, and the gradual refinement of its quality, so determined to elevate his human creature to the capacity to share his own blessedness and to partake of his Glory, that He frowns upon any contradiction that may arise, pours his wrath upon it as something not to be borne with. Thus the sufferings actual in the providential scheme are so many signs of warning away from perilous paths. How such sufferings are graded according to the degrees of advance downward in such paths, taking new forms as the transgressors

become either more sensual or more spiritually evil, more brutal or more devilish, is part of the enquiry into the method and the mystery of Providence. To what degree of intensity such suffering may go, when the dissolution of the physical organism occurs, what form it must take from this change in the environment, and what must be the result of such persistence in the contradictory attitude, these are the questions of Eschatology, to solve which the Christian Scriptures give some help, but to obtain definite notions of which we must use our speculative powers. These questions will be later considered.

But, avoiding these for the present, we discover that within the sphere of our knowledge the Divine Justice is nothing other than the Divine Love. It is the form which this takes when alternatives of treatment of creatures capable of joy or pain are presented. Being thus an inference or discovery made *a posteriori*, it can have no vindication for our rational and moral mind but as such form of the Divine Love. It must never be allowed, in our notion of it, to contradict its origin. If thought ever as something that contradicts the Divine Love it must, *ipso facto*, be false and unreal, and in such disguise God is misrepresented. We cannot make our thought self-consistent if we lodge an eternal contradiction in our idea of the Godhead,—which is done if the Divine Love is isolated from the Divine Justice, and supposed to be limited by the latter, according to an absolute necessity. The Divine freedom is lost from our scheme of thought if Justice be thought not as a form of Love, but as conditioning Love and higher than it. Such a Divinity could elicit from his creatures only a

slavish, and never a loving obedience. Thus, should any theologic scheme separate the Divine Love from the Divine Justice, it commits suicide. It is a dualism, and supposes a Divinity within a Divinity with contradictory attributes, and the one to be feared is above the one to be loved. So too it is equally a contradiction to think the Deity as ruled by mathematical and physical laws, rather than as acting by moral laws, as though the former and not the latter were the *prius* in thought and necessity. This is the case where violations of law, or sins, are thought as having objective being, and to have unworth as such, or as though they were not mastered in their objective content and used in the providential scheme; and not as indications of a false relation of a conscious subject to God and the universe; and when it is supposed that sins, as such, must be punished by some mathematical adjustment and necessity, even though the source from which they came has ceased to be sinful. Of what objective unworth is the sinful act, when its consequences have been caught up into the current which God only guides? The objective unworth is in the sinning soul, and if it ceases to be sinful, the suffering which still inheres as consequence of foregone sin takes a new form, becomes remedial and purifying, is no longer punishment but chastisement, exists not as warning of the danger of forbidden paths, but as reminding of weakness and dependence, and as producing some of the finer virtues of the Christian character. God's treatment of such a soul belongs to the positive side of the Divine Justice and not to the negative side.

But still the deepest and truest view of the Divine

Justice is not reached without taking into account the organic unity of the human race, and that all suffering whatever is not only individual, and either punishing or purifying, but is also vicarious. That suffering falls upon the innocent as well as upon the guilty, and from the sin of the guilty, is unquestioned, and this can only be reconciled with our *a priori* notion of the Divine Love, and our *a posteriori* inference of the Divine Justice, by considering the organic unity and the needs of the organism—thus *why* suffering is vicarious, and what is the rule, if discernible, by which it is bestowed.

In this case it is pre-supposed that individual isolated perfection, as such, is by man unattainable. Indeed it can be demonstrated so to be, for that is not perfection which leaves unrealized the entirety of possible moral relations. The perfect thing is the regenerated human race, which is also a commonwealth of regenerated members. It can only be perfected as a whole (which is the teaching of the New Testament). Any imperfection adhering to any part affects remotely or immediately, in space, time, or thought, every other part. The very instinct of sympathy shows the physical unity of the race, and also that it is linked to the grades of being below. The possession of the common reason shows the spiritual unity of the race, and that it is linked to all forms of spiritual being whatever, on the same level or above. Hence flows intercession, which comes from a spiritual instinct, and is the nervous system of the spiritual organism, which struggles to throw off any disease in any part, and is content with no imperfection in any member. Something in every individual of this or-

ganism is undeveloped and unknown, as long as any member of the same is unknown and not normally developing, or as God is only imperfectly known. Thus there is for the entirety and for the individual an endless progress, which does not consist in the removal of contradictions, but in an endless expansion into the ambient, whereby every soul becomes richer and larger. But while the contradictions remain, the sin of any part affects the whole; the suffering, whose originating cause was in one member, shows itself in another; and improvement in any part is not without relation to the whole. So it comes to pass that suffering is diffused, since the organism is physical and mental as well as moral; and hence is more or less vicarious, and the innocent have to suffer for the sin of the guilty. Yet the law of Justice is not infringed. The suffering which the relatively innocent one may endure is part of the universal penalty diffused throughout the race, reaching special expression and intensity according to conditions not entirely undiscoverable. The one only innocent One cannot be perfected then but in connection with the race with which He is identified and for which He suffers; or, if not with that race entire, by rising up within it as a regenerating seed, assimilating the whole that does not freely stand aloof to a likeness with itself,—gathering it all into the new organism. That the innocent suffer for the guilty is then no violation of the Divine Justice, considered as a form of Love, but rather reveals the full meaning of the Divine intent, and the depth, compass, and richness of that Love.

Satisfaction then is not rightly thought, when considered as a tribute to an abstract principle (called

Justice) higher than the Divine Love. That only can satisfy the Divine Justice which satisfies the Divine Love. This is the new and perfected human race ; or the seed and principle of its regeneration, in which such perfection is potential. It is to be shown that nothing less and nothing other than the work of Christ, submitting to kenosis and triumphing upon the cross, did or could satisfy the Divine Love. That his suffering was vicarious shows then the intrinsic and profound rationality of the actual redemptive scheme.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE DIVINE FORGIVENESS,—THE MORAL AND THE RELIGIOUS DISTINGUISHED AND UNIFIED.

CLOSELY connected with the Divine Justice, and still needful for its full explication, is the consideration of the Divine Forgiveness. This too is a conception formed *a posteriori*.

It is observed that violations of the laws of the universe, whether physical, mental, or moral, bring retribution, sooner or later. To violate the laws of health brings physical pain. To violate social laws brings mental sorrow. To violate mental or moral laws brings about various forms of suffering. While the evidence for this is not forthcoming in every case, it is yet abundant and common enough to warrant the general statement. Men, for the most part, act as if it were so, and often knowingly violate the law, hoping to put further off the punishment, yet having no strong hope of escaping it by natural prudential means. Hence the contrivances of natural religion, and the frequent immoral *cultus*, the object of which is to bribe the unseen powers to allow the exception, and to ward off the otherwise inevitable retribution. It is observed, too, that the slighter violations of known laws, or any violations of laws superficial, meet with more speedy and obvious punishment, while profounder violations of known laws, or

violations of higher laws (to which the superficial ones are subordinate), have their retribution further off, and in a form not to be anticipated. "Be sure your sin will find you out," and the greater the sin, the more refined, selfish, calculating, devilish that sin, the further off usually its return in suffering. The only apparent exception to the general rule is when by a refined prudence the penalty is escaped through the whole of life. But this apparent exception (unless it be inferred that evil is stronger than good when it is intense enough) furnishes a new argument for the likelihood of retribution after death.

The temptation is very great here to illustrate this principle from history and experience ; but indeed all observation and all literature of personal interest are full of illustrations of it.

Then, too, as we have noticed before, the consequences of such sin are also borne by others, not only by the objects of the sinner's malevolence, but by his family and friends, when the retribution is seen to fall upon him ; this again indicating that the bestowal of suffering can only be reconciled with the Justice of Providence by taking into account its vicarious quality.

But if we suppose that the sinner ceases from his sin in any particular respect, repents and sins in this way no more, then new facts appear. If he has been guilty of any practice detrimental to his bodily health, when he ceases from this the recuperative powers of his constitution assert themselves, and engage in a struggle to throw off the derangement. Sometimes they are unsuccessful, but often they are victorious, and the mischiefs wrought by the previous transgression gradually disappear. Some undiscoverable con-

sequence, however, may be thought as still lingering, impairing some function, rendering some organ a little weaker to react against shock or disturbance, or shortening a little the period of life, or laying the conditions for some pain remotely to be experienced, and adding somewhat to the hostile forces which, sooner or later, are sure to triumph. Nevertheless, we see that the providential law in such case is recuperative. Death would have come had there been no violation of any law of health, because the environment is hostile, and the vital energy is limited. The providential law whose aim is to render the existence of the creature complete and its enjoyment full, even though its term be limited, is a higher one than the chemical and mechanical laws which accomplish its dissolution. Its power to triumph for a time reveals the possibility of a permanent triumph.

Thus it is observed that the law of Providence over sentient creatures is restorative rather than vindictive. Suffering comes through the lower laws. The cure of suffering is the restoration of the normal ideal relations.

When a wound is made in the flesh, the cure seems often to be perfect. It is doubtful whether the vital energy expended in such healing is any more *wasted* than it is by ordinary exercise or resistance to inclemency of the elements. Physiology, were it microscopic enough, might detect some slight difference, showing that man was made for exertion, but not to be wounded; but the recuperative power, if not too deeply wronged, shows itself as still a form of energy strong to subjugate the lower forms of energy. The cure seems perfect, and nothing remains but the *scar*,

which is the handwriting of this body's history ; and again, were our vision microscopic enough, we might trace upon the complexion the influence of every breeze, or of the degrees and alternations of sunshine, or upon the countenance the effect of every emotion. Nature will continue more or less to scarify us, until man is in perfect correspondence with his environment.

So, too, by analogy we may conclude concerning all violations of mental and moral laws. All wilful violations of physical laws are, in a sense, violations of moral laws, and, as such, of social laws. As moral they are all in the same category.

When any violation of moral law ceases, as, for instance, the habit of evil-speaking, which has brought upon its author retribution in the shape of hostility, giving annoyance or imparting pain, this hostility and any revengeful actions consequent, bringing pain, slowly diminish and disappear. The body social shows its tendency to return to health.

When a life sinful, selfish, unscrupulous, cruel, neglectful of God, or despising God (which last means only that one has but a weak faith in him), ceases to be such (and the cases have been frequent), when the obligation of universal ends is recognized, and the man comes to honor God, and to love and serve his kind, and to seek to purify himself, then, too, the possibilities of suffering that lay within his selfishness, the slumbering agony that was preparing to burst forth, and the secret goads of conscience already pricking him,—all these begin to undergo diminution or extinction. The recuperative law asserts itself even here. Though his very repentance brings him new suffering, bitter detestation over the picture of

his unworthy past, hostility of a new kind against his newly awakened zeal, sensitiveness acutely painful at his still remaining weakness, still he feels and knows that such suffering is but transitory, and will grow by degrees weaker or more infrequent in his experience, or will be met with a stronger spirit. Still he thinks, and all rightly judging minds think of him, that he is laying the foundations of future well-being, and that the consequences of all past transgressions are being gradually annulled.

Even in human intercourse it happens, for the most part, that the feeling of forgiveness survives the feeling of indignation,—of sympathy that of alienation; showing that the law of recuperation is more central and the stronger. Were it not for the complementary truth, the *primum* of human moral freedom, it would be strictly philosophical, and even according to the testimony of a large science, to contend that the contradiction is but interjectional, had a beginning and must have an end, and the intent of all recuperation be attained, as it was before the incoming of the contradiction. But by no analysis can it be shown that human freedom *must* become the necessity of perfect good, and may not also become the necessity of pure evil.

There is absolutely no evidence *a posteriori*, that there is any profounder providential law than this of recuperation, that there is any other to which this is subordinate, any Moloch of Justice that must still be appeased, or else all the retributive consequences of the former transgression will still of necessity pour upon this man once guilty but now repentant. The law (if it can be called such) by which this recupera-

tion may be held off, or resisted, is not a law of Providence, but a self-made law of evil, and the consequences of the same are indeed according to law, but an inferior one, and which waits to be overcome by the law of recuperation. Otherwise the Divine Love cannot be maintained, and the Divine character is something other than the creature can trust.

This annulment of the consequences of sin, this re-assertion and triumph of the law of recuperation, this possibility of such repentance as brings it into exercise, are, however, due only to the work of Christ, and his sacrifice upon the cross. And this by no arbitrary arrangement, but by a necessity as strict and by a method as rational as the law of retribution itself. It, and nothing else, is absolutely required by the Divine Justice. Indeed, the necessity is involved in the very idea of created existence, and evolved from the essential relations of the Godhead itself, which is what we are endeavoring to demonstrate.

This re-assertion and triumph of the law of recuperation over the law of retribution is what is meant by the Divine Forgiveness. When we endeavor to discover the method of its bestowal, however, we meet with the same difficulty that we did in tracing the method of retribution. Both are forms of the Divine Love. Retribution and Forgiveness are the modes of the Divine Justice. The one negatively and the other positively seek to carry the object to such perfection as that the Divine Love, imparting blessing, can flow forth upon him in its purity, without breaking (as now) into two streams, separable in thought but in reality forever intermingling. But as in the case of the bestowal of retribution we saw

that the rule was not always obvious, nor ever simple (since the deepest violations of law seem to have evaded such retribution, and since the consequences of retribution fall upon the innocent as well as the guilty, and often upon the innocent rather than the guilty), so, in seeking the method of the Divine Forgiveness, we find that it is neither simple nor obvious, and that it is beyond our power from actual knowledge to adjust its bestowal accurately to moral needs and deservings.

We see that the deeper the sin the more slowly do the consequences disappear. We argue the Divine Forgiveness immediately upon repentance (which repentance has its foregone conditions), and rightly; but this forgiveness is realized in the process we have described. The suffering from foregone sin, so far as it is objective, remains, in a degree, in the repenting one, but is weakened in intensity and goes on to its extinction: and, so far as it is subjective, it takes a new form. The speed of the recovery, as well as the degree of the complex suffering, does not seem accurately adjusted to the degree of moral desert. Yet, though the exceptions seem manifold we have glimpses enough of the working of this providential law to induce the belief that it *is* accurately proportioned to moral desert, provided that a future existence is taken into the account, without which no method can be made out, or it seem other than an arbitrary or merely economical procedure.

So much of human sin comes from mere weakness of will (which is not independent of physical conditions, and is something ruled by the law of heredity, and therefore involved in the physical *nexus*, and

which may be increased or measurably cured by the environment, and that too physical and mental rather than moral), that the degree of guilt in transgression must vary from such a fact, and be for our minds quite undiscoverable ; yet, perhaps, this fact may help to justify, if not to explain, the bestowals of suffering and blessing that seem to us so strange, so arbitrary, and often so unjust.

Thus, likewise, we see that, in the case of repentance, the suffering that as punishment only hardened, or, at most, deterred from the hazardous violation, even though it continue in a slowly diminishing degree, acquires a new aspect. It becomes chastisement, or a means of purification, teaches and strengthens, imparts virtue, and cultivates holy and beautiful traits, helps to symmetrize the character, and thus, by its very continuance, shows itself a mode of treatment by the Divine Love. Where God forgives, He not only annuls the consequences of past sin, or, while they remain in diminishing degree, transmutes them into extirpating powers attacking the original proclivities from which the sin came, but carries on the positive work of strengthening the soul in its new attitude, freeing thus the primary instincts of its spiritual being, and rendering the likelihood of lapse less and less.

Thus (to anticipate, and in current theological language) the Remission of Sins and Sanctification (which means the strengthening of the will in all Christian graces as they become more ingrained in the character) are the two aspects, negative and positive, and each involving and implying a process, of the abstract and timeless relation, which is called Justification.

The Divine Justice, implying retribution and forgiveness, works, then, according to fixed laws. There is no pure arbitrariness in the Divine character. Whatever God does must be thought as the perfection of freedom, *i. e.*, as a moral necessity.

There is no contradiction among the laws of the universe issuing from such freedom. As chemical laws conquer the mechanical methods, as vital energy subordinates both, so ideally spiritual perfection subordinates all three and makes them subservient. When the contradiction arises (and its origin beyond human freedom we have found to be shut off from human thinking power), the law of spiritual perfection takes the form of retribution ; when the contradiction is reversed, it asserts itself again in its pure and eternal character, begins again to repair the ravages of the lower powers and to build up again the entire structure of humanity. As in the complex of relations which constitute humanity, the entire structure has undergone deterioration, physically and mentally because morally, so the recuperative process, to be efficient, must reach every element of that synthesis, must heal it physically and restore it mentally while it restores and purifies it morally. We cannot understand the recuperative process, nor indeed find vindication for its assertion, except by showing that it brings about human recovery in all three of these aspects.

That new physical forces, or modes of motion, began to stir in humanity, that new mental relations were revealed and displayed, that new moral motive-springs were brought to bear upon the human will, —all three of these it is necessary to show were involved in and brought about by the atoning work of

Christ. These three processes, which constitute human recovery, cannot be torn apart, in fact, inhere by a necessary *nexus*, and any attempt so to abstract them as not to show their necessary connection, must be misleading and result in an incoherent scheme. Man's resurrection or bodily glorification is not rightly thought, then, as an arbitrary reward for and super-added, by special Divine power exerted for the occasion, to his moral recovery, but is involved in that recovery as part of his ideal constitution. And his mental illumination follows by a necessity as strict,—all which is evidenced and illustrated in the story and the atoning work of Jesus Christ.

In this connection it may be needful for the full understanding of our meaning to restate and explain our use of the word "*moral*."

The *moral*, in a large definition, is used as including the *religious*. The moral relation is that to the law, whether regarded as abstract and intuitive, or revealed as positive. In either case it is a revelation of God. It is contended in our work that an analysis of the abstract moral law shows it to imply a personal lawgiver, inasmuch as its essential and unifying idea is love, which is a personal relation. Nothing but Love could make love a law. Therefore obedience to it is obedience to God, and therefore really, if not intelligently, a religious obedience. Whenever the moral law is figured in the mind as that of a personal lawgiver, obedience to it is religious, and obedience to any prescription assumed to come from such Divine lawgiver is equally religious. With the Jewish people both strictly moral and strictly ceremonial obedience were equally religious. The one as the other was

means to an end. All *cultus* whatever is assumed to be religious, though it may respect the First Principle thought in a false or imperfect conception. There may be religion without morality (which is the true definition of idolatry), as that of the ancient Romans. There may be morality seemingly without religion, but only seemingly so, and because it has not looked deeply enough into itself. It is the peculiarity of Christianity to make morality and religion very nearly identical (the want of absolute identity being shown by the prescription of a limited ceremonial, of which hereafter), and in it the moral and religious motives coalesce. The end or final cause is the same although, from the institution of the Christian Church, the means are different, and the whole plan of life must be differently ordered. Thus Christians think that practical morality can only be rightly taught as Christian. But the Christian motive-spring is unique, as springing from a personal relation. Thus, in this latter form only can morality issue from a true fount, bear all shocks, and show itself eternal. Thus, when we use the word *moral*, without qualification, it must be understood as including the *religious*. There is really no occasion for any difference of opinion, or confusion of thought in the matter.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE SUFFERING OF JESUS,—THE SACRIFICIAL MIND AS AFFECTING HIS CONCRETE PERSONALITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS.

BEFORE considering the consequences of the sacrificial work of Christ upon his own disciples, and through them upon mankind at large, we must first consider its effect upon himself, *i. e.*, how what takes place in his ethical or religious consciousness affects his composite and entire humanity. That there were such consequences is shown in his unique mental development, in his miraculous powers, in the increasing depth of his religious utterances, and in his resurrection.

Moreover, if He is indeed a new creation, and the progenitor of a new humanity, either co-extensive with the old, or an election from it, and comprising all of it that does not refuse the attraction, and if this humanity is to be restored as a synthesis, ethically, mentally, and physically, then all the forces (so to call them) resulting in this threefold recovery, must be started in his person, and be due to his sacrificial work. Thus in an unbroken chain the redemption of humanity and the regeneration of the *κτίσις* are traced back to the love of the Father in *sending* the Son.

And again, since humanity is such a synthesis, and any movement or change in one aspect affects or im-

plies a correspondent movement or change in each other (a fact which not only philosophy but science is all the while affirming and illustrating with increasing emphasis), then if the change in either aspect or element is gradual,—a process in one direction or the other,—or a series of processes advancing or retrograding, neutralizing each other temporarily, yet seen in the end to be reduced to one by the failure of the other, then such change in each other element or aspect must be similarly progressive. In other and illustrative words, sinful propensities tend to weaken the will and darken the mind, weakness of will or confusion of mind to strengthen sinful propensities, and so on. Any remedy applied directly to either of these elements or aspects of humanity must mediate affect each other; and a remedy is possible which may affect all three immediately, whereupon the correspondent changes would go on normally and in proper and harmonious equipoise. (This, we shall see hereafter, has been the naïve procedure and implicit consciousness of the Christian Church, in her practice of infant-baptism, to be followed by proper nurture, however consistently or otherwise adhered to.)

We find all this exactly illustrated in the history of Jesus Christ (and from this history we infer the absoluteness of the law, whose true vindication, however, is that it unlocks, as no other philosophy can, the riddle of Providence, and dissipates whatever clouds hang over the Divine revelation). In him the sacrificial mind, or the highest ethical quality, is secured by the primal act of self-limitation, by the *kenosis* itself. The Divine element gradually modifies the human consciousness, and converts moral innocence

into moral strength or perfection, and thus the love of the Creator and the creature meet in mutual response. The Divine filial Love at length takes the form of human and responsive love. This persistence of the sacrificial spirit brought about correspondent mental expansion, and an insight growing perpetually more piercing. It brought about also physical change, illustrated by his glory on the holy mount, the increasing multiplicity of his miracles, his assertion of power unlimited over nature, if the will of the Father were sure, as in his assertion of ability to secure angelic aid. And yet, with the process of "redemption of the body" going on, He could still pass through the article of death,—which looks, at first, like an absolute reversal of the redemptive process theretofore maintained.

Evidently in the mind of the New Testament writers that death was indispensable. Whatever virtue, then, there may have been in what went before, they still thought that *it* was needed to render efficacious, to fix and fasten the whole process, and therefore might be itself called the redemption, or reconciliation, or the complete payment of the debt to God, as well as the perfection of sacrifice, and all these other illustrations of its efficacy indeed because it was the perfect sacrifice. So emphatic is this assertion in the New Testament writings, so evidently was that death singled out and pre-figured in the Old Testament rites, that many thinkers have sought to find in it unique and special virtue, explained in forensic, ethical, or physical terms; have thought it as something superadded to the sacrificial mind pervading his life, having only an arbitrary connection with it and with

all the results, instead of regarding it as having necessary connection with the sacrificial mind shown theretofore, and as the continuation and culmination of it. Other thinkers have so dwelt upon this sacrificial mind, thus initiated and showing itself in the life of obedience and in its partially redemptive results, as to fail to bring about in thought any particular significance or necessity for that death. And besides, the very figures and illustrations of Scripture have been often misleading; abstractions have been taken for realities, and consequences have been mistaken for or confounded with the means.

Redemption, reconciliation, satisfaction of debt, are figurative expressions of consequences, and not definitions of means. We should not know the significance of the analogies implied in them, but by tracing and finding something in the result of the means used to bring them about that might be described in such terms. The sacrifice of Christ was the means, the link between the Divine Love and these results. Redemption, reconciliation, satisfaction, must then be discovered first in the concrete person of Christ, thence to be extended to the new human race.

What then is meant by the sacrifice of Christ? And here again we repeat the caution before given. We cannot judge of this by the analogy of the sacrifices of the Old Dispensation. Rather they must be understood by it. There is no abstract law of sacrifice to which it as well as they were obliged to conform. Indeed the word *sacrifice* is not rightly used but as respective to the disorder of humanity wrought by sin, and the need of recovery. The self-limitation of the Godhead required for all creation, and becom-

ing profounder and more evident according to the progress of concretion in the hierarchy of the Divine ideas, is not rightly called *sacrifice*; or if such use be insisted upon, then we need some other word or some qualification of the same to express the modification of the self-limitation and the peculiar form it took in consequence of the lapse of humanity and its failure to realize the Divine idea. There need be no dispute here, but as to the use of the word. The Divine self-limitation, in order to heal the contradiction, becomes as complete as possible, becomes a kenosis. In the actual form which it took for our knowledge, it involved contest, struggle, giving up, suffering, victory under difficulties, death. This we call sacrifice, and with this meaning the word has passed into common use. The dearest thing that man can give up is life, therefore to yield it is the perfection of any sacrifice he can make. As such it was the perfect sacrifice of Christ. What is needed is to show that it alone was or could be redemptive or liberating, and we rightly infer that it could be as an absolute law, because it *was* in the concrete illustration. To be sacrificial, however, the spiritual virtue which yielded itself to death was something more than the submission to an inevitable physical change, or a mere ritual observance of some positive and other than ethical law. To be sacrificial it must be loving. To be redemptive it must be love triumphing. To be acknowledged as sacrificial, and to be thus influential upon the human will, it must be seen by the mind to be such quintessence of love, it must be seized by the imagination in order to be felt by the heart. Thus it can supply a new motive force to the human will, bringing home to the creature

the depth and intensity of the Divine Love, which alone can elicit an adequate response, sufficient to secure the other and transcendent results rendered possible by that death. What these are, and how absolutely dependent upon Christ's death, we shall in due time see.

To rightly understand the virtue of that yielding to death, we must do the best we can to transport ourselves into the mind of the august sufferer. It is surely providential for this that the closing scenes and last words of Jesus' life were so minutely, accurately, and repeatedly recorded. It has been a good gift of God to his creatures, the story of that death, moving them as nothing else ever did, will, or can ; moving them at length more profoundly when that death is seen to be the central fact in the history of the universe, to which every thing tended and from which every thing flows. It cannot be written about adequately without prayer, without shame and humiliation, without wonder and praise, without love and exultation. We have sought heretofore to penetrate a little way Jesus' inner mind during his life, in order to find the beginning of redemptive results, and now seek to do the same as we find him in Gethsemane and on the Cross.

From each of the four narratives it is apparent that Jesus had foresight of his own death, not merely as all men know that to be an inevitable event, but as one to occur before the natural time, by violence and as the result of hostility. Even the manner of his death was foreseen. It does not appear whether this prevision arose from any unique insight into the future, attained at some stage of his development,

either from grounds of probability, or from supernatural disclosure of the future, being thus a step in the recovery of the Divine omniscience ; or whether it arose from his deep study and acquaintance with the Old Testament predictions (evidently his education had been mediated by them, and they, rightly interpreted, were looked upon by him as revelations of the Father's mind, and therefore as agreeing with, if not forestalling, any special insight He may have attained) ; or whether each of these reacted upon and confirmed the other. Thus that his death was to be brought about before the time, and that by the hostility of his brethren in the flesh, his own immediate countrymen, became a familiar knowledge, and was often alluded to in his conversations with his companions. There is a pervading sadness that is felt by all readers about his utterances during the latter period of his ministry, deepening towards the end, and from which He does not seem ever entirely to recover. Even the foresight of his own exaltation and glorification, to which He sometimes alludes in the same breath in which He speaks of his approaching death, does not give birth to any exultant expressions. The serene majesty which marks his utterances after his resurrection contrasts markedly with this profound and sympathetic sadness, which preceded and became so intense before his death. Such persistent and unrelenting sadness indicates unusual suffering, and we have, as best we can, to analyze and determine the conditions for this unique consciousness, this increasing mental agony, which terminates at length in powerful physical reaction in Gethsemane, and in the premature or hastened disorganization upon the Cross.

The hostility of his own countrymen whom He loved as such, the bitter hatred of the chosen people, the colder cruelty or indifference of the Gentile power behind it, and beyond that again the sin and wretchedness of the human race which He had undertaken to cure,—of all these, human sympathetic feeling and human imagination would make as much in his case as in the case of any other man, and more indeed, for the more one loves, the more does the failure of responsive love distress. And this distress is rendered yet more acute by the perception of the weakness of his own friends. Betrayed by one disciple, deserted by others, and followed only afar off and fearfully by a few, the strength which goes on cheerfully and exultingly to martyrdom does not show itself under this load of grief. And if his mother or any who loved him would have consoled with him in his hour of need and in the intense craving for human sympathy, they are not allowed to do so now. Around him is bitter hatred on the part of the Jews, proud indifference on the part of the Roman authority, the brutality and mockery of the soldiery,—around him when he is utterly unsupported by any human aid or visible sympathy. Surely here we have solitude such as was never experienced by man before or since. He whose sense of fellowship is weak, whose love for his kind is imperfect, cannot have the feeling of isolation as He can whose Love is so pure, strong, and pervasive, whose sympathy is so acute. No hermit in the wilderness, no friendless wanderer in the streets of a city was ever so solitary as Jesus was during these last hours of his life. And for man created for love expansive as light, and able to fill the universe, growing

stronger and acuter as it flows, this crushing lack of love is the most poignant of agonies.

But even in a forlorn state like this, the failing, shrinking soul of man might be sustained by faith in the unseen, by the consciousness of fellowship with Him and sustentation by Him whom it has met so often in voluntary seclusion. Even in any compelled solitude He has been able to resort to this. But with Jesus now, even this too fails him, and some inexplicable oblivion of that sustaining influence causes the outcry, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"

Here now is absolute loneliness. The Divine-human consciousness undergoes such a modification as to make it seem to itself purely human. The depth of the Divine limitation in the Incarnation appears again, to our imagination apparently deeper than before. These are the *magna opera*, indeed! But as in the first case we concluded the utmost of Love to be the very concentration and utmost of potence, so now it may be so too, and under this apparent obscuration is veiled the completion of the highest creative act. God may be closest by when He seems farthest off, or utterly alien, or the faith in him trembling,—but in this case He is not recognized as close by. Humanity, as to its consciousness, is left alone to pass through the darkness. This surely is the condition for the greatest possible suffering that the creature can feel. And it is also the condition for the greatest possible virtue that can be conceived for the creature. Any other passage of agony conceivable, any triumph of love, any strength of will, falls to a lower plane beside this. This accomplishes the Divine satisfaction, and

nothing else could. All the beneficent and blessing forces of the universe, in right order and irresistible might, flow forth only upon such love as this,—for it is the Divine Love reflected in perfect human love,—sacrifice meeting sacrifice, whence the discord ceases, and the universe potentially returns to health.

Also, the abstract nature of sin was more clearly understood than it possibly could be by any other man. The clarity and depth of mental insight are ruled and graded by the degree of moral purity. The full force of the contradiction between holiness and sin, however accurately and forcibly stated, is not fully seen by the mind which has secret leanings towards sin. Unconscious sophistries weave themselves into clouds before the vision. Even doubts of the eternal reality of the distinction will bubble up, until holiness has become perfect and indefectible. All Christians know of the progressive sense of the turpitude of sin as they grow in the Divine life. The conditions are only progressively supplied for comparison of the actual with the ideal, of the ultimate commonwealth of love with the immediate arena for the battles of selfishness, and as the result of this meditative experience all actions having the one quality become brighter and all having the other quality become darker; or, more correctly said, all *souls* become for such contemplation more beautiful and satisfying, or more ugly and repelling.

In the case of Jesus alone are the conditions supplied for an unerring comparison. To innocence untried sin is an astonishment, a startling wonder, an inexplicable disturbance. When, with the knowledge of sin in others, or as possible for one's self, innocence

through resistance to temptation has acquired spiritual fibre, sin comes to be looked upon not so much as æsthetic violation of the pure beauty, but more and more as a moral enormity, bringing consequences so deplorable as to awaken sympathy, pity, and dread for creatures who can suffer. Jesus saw that for the sinning one there was no escape from these consequences, as the faithless children of men still hope there may be, and as even the faithful ones sometimes think it possible there might be. Thus, while in one sense not knowing sin, in another sense He alone knew it; and if there is such a thing as vicarious repentance, He who needed not to repent could alone repent. He only saw the disaster of the human race in the clear light, and how only through this agonizing pathway of sacrifice, broken first by him, and followed unsteadily by his brethren, it could be repaired. This knowledge of the abstract nature of sin, made concrete for his imagination in the devilish hostility of those now persecuting him—the knowledge also that the force which could successfully stem this current of evil was not yet in the world,—this too intensified his suffering during these closing scenes of his life, when He seems to us so entirely human.

There is no need to go out of our way to find suffering in his case, no need to conclude that something other than this which we have described, and which we can understand, was actual or was required. If we could not understand it, it could have no ethical force for us. There is no need to argue, nor any evidence to support the assertion of any vindictive infliction arbitrarily bestowed, or such as could fall upon the unrighteous only; no *need*, because even hereby

we cannot reach and present to our imagination any suffering so great as that which we have seen *can* befall the righteous one, and therefore can gain nothing thereby but to satisfy some logical requirement. And in affirming such suffering we are using words that have no meaning. The affirmation adds nothing to our thought, no stimulus to our feeling. It is a mere logical formula, and helps no whit to enable us to connect in thought the suffering and death of Christ with the transcendent results of the same. How suffering vindictively inflicted and unimaginable should be required to be superadded to the holy agony of Jesus, which we can measurably understand, we not only fail to see, but the very suggestion throws a doubt into our foregone conception of the Godhead, that sooner or later will be found destructive; thus the sole meaning of such a proposition is negative, and that we have not hitherto thought God truly. All of Jesus' suffering then is such that we can understand it, being human suffering still; can even in faint degree imagine it, even its acme in the Father's seeming desertion of him on the Cross. But into this, and his whole consciousness when meeting death, we have still to look more fully.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE DEATH OF CHRIST, AND HIS EXPERIENCE AFTER DEATH, AS AFFECTING HIS CONCRETE PERSONALITY.

IT has been the almost universal *consensus* of theologians, of those who have meditated much upon the events and truths enacted and uttered by Jesus and his immediate disciples, and which must constitute essential Christianity, that whatever virtue there be in the death of Christ is to be ascribed to the sacrificial mind, the ethical quality which brought it about and which it symbolized.

We cannot think, therefore, that the results of that sacrifice resulting in death are merely arbitrary and superinduced, and that the loving sacrifice as such has no absolute worth nor efficacy, but rather that it stands towards these results in the causative relation,—that this sacrifice has supreme and absolute worth, and that these results ensue as a revelation of the immutable constitution of the universe, and are involved in its very idea. This thought, however, will be elaborated hereafter ; now it is used as the key to unlock whatever can be opened in that system of truths and relations, which is Theology.

Nor are we satisfied merely to think that the virtue of Jesus' death arose from his yielding to it as coming prematurely and through violence, from anticipating it in time, in short from its being merely an heroic

act, which has many parallels. As such it does not rise above a level fully populated.

The easy pitfall into which some have stepped, but out of which the Christian mind has always quickly struggled, that Jesus' death was an act of will, and that He could have kept himself from it, that He was only mortal by miracle, and that his virtue consisted in undertaking to die, need not detain us. It is clearly Monophysitic, virtually denies his humanity, makes his bodily pain absolutely inexplicable as physical disorganization, reduces the whole manifestation to mere Docketism. Besides, it still shows no particular virtue in the death, and no necessity for it, so far as any transcendent results are maintained. It becomes then a mere dramatic show to influence human imagination. The bitter agony touches no more, the whole sublimity of the experience on the Cross disappears.

We are then under the need to think that while the sacrificial mind pervading his life is essentially redemptive, it is not so absolutely and irretrievably, except by its going on to and culminating in his death; that such death was uniquely redemptive as death, and that, as before said, not by any arbitrary appointment, but by an absolute necessity. We must, therefore, profoundly meditate upon what death is.

It was a possibility for the innocent progenitors of the human race, as for all animals. In lifting the animal nature to a higher plane, in illumining the animal mind so that the moral ideal is imprinted upon it, and moral advance made possible, in carrying on the career of moral development till moral strength should be secured, and moral perfection attained—in this was to be the security against death. In this

was the triumph of *life* over the lesser forces. This was *eternal life*. This alone was to make the creature a perfect reflection of the Creator, and a sharer of the Divine nature, as holding the same relation to the determined universe, as having now a trust which he will not abuse. To stop and recede in this moral development is to fail in attaining this victory over the lower forces. The vital force is weakened at its root, not having the proper moral *substratum*, the filaments which reach into the Divine depths. Death, which was a possibility for man before, threatened and made obvious in animal death, becomes now a certainty. The moral harmony of the universe has been violated. Any power of recuperation within it is not sufficient to heal this wound. A new creative act, originating in a new moral or loving act, and issuing in a new set of forces, must enter the universe, interfere with its abnormal condition, and can alone restore it.

Death for man is then the penalty of sin. All bodily pain is not only the premonition of it, but is the beginning of it, and indicates the struggle between the contending forces, in which the lower ones are sure to overcome. As dwelt upon in imagination it looks like the cessation of all connection with the physical universe. To superficial thinking it appears extinction. The organs which make connection with the outlying world disappear. There is no *residuum* left after death upon which imagination can lay hold, except by restoring in some way the very organs and the very universe which have been parted with. However by pure thinking we conclude the soul-consciousness to continue still, and its extinguishment

as escaping thought, and therefore impossible, it still eludes the imagination ; we can only *think* it as a concrete, and to be in some new and unimaginable relation to its environment. Thus death appears to us as the passing out of the sensuous world, the world of imagination, into the realm of pure thought. All history and progress depending upon external relations seem no longer possible. To think such history possible, we must covertly bring back these relations again. We may, however, think, though we cannot reproduce in our own consciousness, the inner condition of the soul after death, as having its time-consciousness contracted into a timeless present, as thus living upon its past, as attaining self-knowledge, as undergoing psychical symmetrization ; but all this falls short of actual *knowledge* on our part. Death remains still something unknown, and the shrinking from it is the shrinking from the unknown, the longing to abide in the known, to hold on to the relations with this universe in which are such possibilities of enjoyment and progress. It is the recoil from the solitude which suggests itself when our earthly eyes begin to grow dim, unless that solitude be peopled by faith. One only dies in faith and not with knowledge of what is beyond. It is not the dread of physical pain which constitutes the dread of death. That is usually very slight. It is the shrinking from the new experience and the clinging to that which, as God's gift, we feel to be needful for any perfect life. We do not mean to say that Christian knowledge and experience do not greatly modify all this regard ; but of that we are not speaking now ; only of what death is to the natural heart and understanding of man, and what in the con-

flicts of faith and doubt, it still often appears to the Christian, even though it also seem something far other.

Moreover, by those who think deeply, death is clearly seen, and by those who do not thus think, obscurely felt to be the summing up of the contradiction which has entered the universe. It is what the rational soul of man thinks and feels *ought not to be*, that to which it can never reconcile itself as part of the normal constitution of the universe. It is the victory of brute force over the intelligent and aspiring soul, the reversal of the right relation between matter and spirit. It sums up in itself all failure and calamity. To bear it is the very acme and ultimate reach of sacrifice. To go into this darkness, when all sight and certainty are vanishing, if done cheerfully, is a triumph of faith, in which is implicit the thought that by death the contradiction of death may be removed.

Jesus as human could not *imagine* his own experience to be after death, whatever pure and clear thought upon it He may have had. He could not have made that outcry upon the cross had there been any internal vision of the eternal "mansions," or of his own immunity from all imperfection when He should walk the earth again. To insist on preserving the purely Divine consciousness in him while on the cross, is inconsistent with his own utterances thereon, is taking away the sublime virtue and redemptive worth of his human experience, is lowering our conception of the Love of the Eternal Son itself. In thinking thus to emphasize the Divine in him we have not made him more, but less Divine, for the inmost character of the Divine is obscured.

Human logic here has only darkened Christian truth. This experience on the cross was in the mind of St. Paul the evidence of his Divinity, because it, as the extreme of humiliation and the lowest depth of the kenosis, showed the Divine Love. It was such, not because it was ignominious in the eyes of men, but because the Divine in obscuring itself shows itself most really Divine.

That then which shows the utmost of the Divine Love, and issues in the perfection of sacrifice, must be redemptive, if any thing can be. Nothing higher can be thought. That any thing lower would have been sufficient, is to make this display needless. To attach the virtue of the cross to any thing lower, is to render this highest of all conceptions of God and man inefficacious and without meaning.

For the Christ on the cross life as experience is finished. All is over that He came to do, that He can do, except to die. He is conscious still of God his Father. Human consciousness, as such, cannot be robbed of that. It is involved in its very structure. He is conscious of God in faith, in faith the more required because He is not conscious of present sustaining support. The Father is still known as the Lord of the universe, as He who will do his will with the spiritual soul now deserting the known world and commending itself to him. To this simple form the consciousness of Jesus seems to be reduced. It seems very simple, this clinging to God in the darkness, this unwillingness to let Him go who seems to be letting go his creature. Hence this implicit belief that it is otherwise, that He is not forsaken, that the loving Father will take this spirit to himself.

Such, then, is the death of Christ, regarded not as a mere physical change, but as an experience involving and conditioning the highest and purest spiritual act. Nothing less and nothing else could have given birth to the forces which are to accomplish human redemption, sanctification, and regeneration ; all which imply the Divine reconciliation and satisfaction.

These results show themselves first in his concrete person, and thence the restorative power radiates through his own to the universe. This leaven either leaveneth the whole lump, or casts out whatever is alien or unleavenable. We have the facts of his history to establish this point, viz., that the redemptive results are visible in his person, as validly testified as any thing else in the whole narrative. These facts are so far out of the natural order that they can only be admitted by regarding them as an abrupt interference with that order ; or else as displaying the existence and the evidence for another and higher order to which the natural order is subordinate and subservient. The latter thesis is certainly a profounder thought, and has the highest evidence of truth, if it serves to harmonize all other truth. We learn hereby more of God, the method of his working, have clearer conceptions of his wisdom and keener appreciation of his Love, than if his ways are thought to the full extent inexplicable. But even if this were not so, and physical perfection, or glorification, were not in the Divine idea of man, but an after-thought, a subsequent reward, it is still evident that what Jesus Christ underwent after his death, is what all his followers are to undergo, and we have a rule which God has declared He will follow ; and these are the superinduced

results, if not the straightforward and necessary consequences of the atoning work.

We are informed as to these results in what little is told of the story of Jesus immediately after his death, and what after his resurrection. If the spiritual soul of man have distinct and individual existence after the crisis of death, it must be self-conscious. Rest and sleep are no longer predicable of it. These are for the organism only. The pure mind is never weary. Our own experience may possibly give evidence of this. The mind may be most active in deepest sleep, more active than usual in the twilight region between sleep and wakefulness, and least active when all the relations through the brain with the outer world are reëstablished. Only occasionally and briefly in our full wakeful life do we have any thing even remotely resembling the mind's amazing, time-annihilating, and creating power in sleep. But, indeed, in regard of the thinking mind as purely such, rest and sleep are meaningless words (or the former term may be used only in the sense of freedom from perturbation). As self-conscious, then, the soul after death must be thought either as withdrawn utterly from the whole environment, or else as standing in some new relation to it, which we cannot imagine. What this last may be and how possible we shall hereafter consider. But either with it or without it we may figure, in our reproductive thought, this soul consciousness no longer as a time-flow, but as a present whole, which may render possible the knowledge of its whole past experience, or rather the determining result of the same upon itself, whence the whole may symmetrically arrange itself, and a true self-knowledge be attained,

such as now in our brain-consciousness escapes us. Thus, figuratively, it is retiring from the clouds and perturbations of the phenomenal world into a clearer and quieter air, where things are seen in right relation and proportion, and where the mid-point which unifies the whole may be discovered and occupied. We who think under time-conditions can only reflect upon such a condition as a process implying and requiring *time*. But allowing this, there seems in the case of Jesus no such necessary requirement. There is nothing within him needing to be rectified and harmonized. The cloudiness of the phenomenal world is dissipated suddenly in the very article of death. The whole interior consciousness crystallizes itself at once into symmetry. These are the conditions for immediate illumination and perfect self-knowledge, the expansion of the human consciousness into the Divine. And yet as human, actually and ideally, we may still think the consciousness of Jesus Christ as under time-conditions. The timeless life, the pure eternity-form may be a possible thought, but is never an imagination. We now can only think him near us or conscious of us, by thinking him under time-conditions. Our knowledge is bounded by these. Thus God knows and is with his creatures in their time-experience. To know any thing of Christ from his death till He appears again to knowledge after his resurrection, we must know it as occurring in time. Any changed relations occurring in this interval may and must, therefore, if referred to, be spoken of as *events*. We are not satisfied to think this interval an utter blank, about which nothing can in this way be known or hinted at. To us it is a real time-interval : and its

significance is either economical and relative to the various needs of men ; or it is itself a prolongation of human experience, and a still needed part of the redemptive work ; or it is both. We may recall here the Scripture word which connects our Justification with his Resurrection, and therefore as not attainable before.

If indeed it be according to the required career of man, as modified by the incoming of the contradiction, that he should pass through this psychical experience, then, of course, to fulfil the lot of man, Jesus must have passed through it. We have before contended that it is not according to the normal idea of the human career, that man should pass through death and have this psychical experience, but rather that his experience would at length have become thus psychical by natural development. But since this abrupt transition has become an actuality for the human race, Jesus, to redeem that race at every point of its development, must needs pass through it. If, then, his psychical experience thence ensuing be not required for self-knowledge and symmetrization, it must be itself a part of the redemptive process ; or rather the first form of the application of that process beyond himself, and as to be accomplished in his concrete person. It must thus have meaning, and a necessity relative to and determined by the needs of those upon whom the redemptive process is to be applied. Christ's experience after death is not, then, a meaningless blank, but has relation to the needs of mankind. And it also has meaning as a needful part of his own experience.

To know what death is it must be looked at not

only from this side but from the other, not only by these dim earthly eyes and through this perplexing atmosphere, but by the purified vision and through the clear air beyond. Such regard will fix the meaning of it only obscurely descried before. Jesus could hardly be said to have experience of human death but by such retrospective regard.

In the narratives bearing upon his career very little is told us of his story in this interval. There is no allusion to it by himself except that He anticipates it as a *rest* in his words to his companion in crucifixion. There is no event marking it, unless that be such which is referred to by St. Peter, his making himself known to departed souls. Could this be established as the meaning of this passage, we may draw large and consolatory inferences therefrom. The present author, after much study of this text, is convinced that it must be thus interpreted, and an exegesis of the same, vindicating this meaning, and explaining the peculiar way in which the event is alluded to, and which has made this passage such a puzzle to commentators, will be found in an appendix.¹

Assuming for the occasion this interpretation as valid, we find, on exegetical as well as upon *a priori* grounds, a significance other than superficial and merely economic in this psychical experience of Jesus, and why, as we might otherwise have expected, He did not after dying instantly revive, why there should be this delay for the completed bodily glorification.

As a conclusion from the thesis that the redemptive work was for humanity as such, or in Scripture words that He died for all men, it follows that the motive

¹ See Appendix E, vol. II.

force of the Divine love shown in that death must be applied to, known, and felt by all men. We may think it then as brought to bear upon the whole host of departed souls at once, and through his personal mediation. It is thus applied in its intensest form, not left to intermediates, but presented in full force ; so that these furnish no exception to the universality of his own words, " And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men to me."

We have said heretofore, and we shall fully explicate later on, that this is by no means asserting any probation after death, as actual for these departed souls, or possible for any of the human race.

If Jesus be thought as self-conscious after death, we must also think the possibility of relation, of communication, of spiritual activity. This, in the narrative of his history is indicated not only by the passages above alluded to, but by his own parable of the rich man and the beggar (from which, however, we here draw no other inference than this). Indeed, it is impossible not to think such spiritual activity and some conscious relation beyond one's self ; not only because sleep is no longer possible, and the brain movements no longer interrupt and retard the pure psychical flow, but because otherwise we must figure the consciousness as in utter solitude, which would be its crushing back upon itself, the reversal of the primary and ineradicable instincts of its being. Such solitude would be either consummate wretchedness, or else could maintain itself in peace only by meeting a heavier demand upon faith than is made while man is in the flesh. If, rather, the creature is drawn towards perfection by meeting and gratifying the purest and high-

est instincts of his being, there must be companionship and sympathy, enough for the ethical needs of this being, created for love as well as by love, and possible some kind or degree of loving activity.

(We shall see, later on, that this pathway towards utter solitude, is the one which the wilfully and persistently evil soul, if such can be thought, must begin to tread.)

Thus on grounds *a priori* we conclude the possibility of communication between the soul of Jesus Christ and the departed souls of men,—which cannot be without results.

And besides, if this be so, we cannot think an utter absence of relation to the physical universe. Now we not only communicate with each other through organs which that universe supplies, and God has supplied that universe that we may communicate with each other, but this is his own means of communicating with us. It is as legitimate an inference to infer a mind and heart beneath and reaching us through the sights and sounds and motions of the universe, as it is to infer a rational soul beneath and reaching us through the words and motions of our fellow man. As a mode of communication the one is as trustworthy as the other, nay the former is more so, for it never wilfully deceives us.

If God can never sever himself from his own Glory, if the physical universe has true existence, a basis in the Divine being, and is not a series of magic pictures to serve a turn, then for man as such, as a determination of the Divine Glory, his relation to the physical universe cannot be utterly severed, and he sink back into mere abstract spirit. Here, indeed, imagination

cannot soar in this vacancy as it can in the earthly life, and in the glorified life, but in thought we cannot dispense with this relation, but may rather find some hints and analogies to make it comprehensible.

It is not needful here, to confirm this possibility, to advance such things as are often asserted to be facts, of communication of soul with soul here on earth, direct and without the intermediate organs. If these be indeed facts, they are in themselves as inexplicable as the attraction of gravitation is, *i. e.*, it is impossible to think relation in either case, without some third conception, some bond, to tie in mutual influence either the heavenly orbs or the pure minds.

If it is essential to the idea of humanity to bear this relation to pure spirit, to God, on the one hand, and to matter, to the Divine Glory determined, on the other, then we cannot take apart, except in mental abstraction (which itself is incomplete), the elements of this synthesis; and we must still think a relation to the universe, which the soul of man bears after death, not identical with the present relation, nor with that which will be after the resurrection and glorification.

We have a fact narrated which may illustrate this, in the appearance of Moses and Elias on the Mount of Transfiguration. This was not identical with their final glorification (if we suppose the Christian Scriptures to be consistent with themselves, and that there is no confusion of thought here), for this cannot be except as included in the glorification of the totality. "They without us cannot be made perfect." This relation, too, may have entered into St. Paul's mind in his wish to be with Christ after his departure. We conclude then that, abstracting all notions of locality

and spatial limitations, at present, there is an intermediate relation to the universe between the existing and the final one ; and that the departed soul is not without an environment, even though this be indescribable.

These considerations are adduced to exhibit the possibility of Jesus' conscious existence after death, his companionship and activity, his bringing the force of his own loving sacrifice to bear upon the whole world of the departed. This must be done at some time, or else it could not be said that He died for all men,—if the motive-spring elicited by his death is not supplied, if the Divine Love is not made known that the responsive love may spring forth. Otherwise we are reduced to the shallower and indeed contradictory view that there are two kinds of human beatified souls : the one morally developed through faith and love ; the other miraculously made innocent ; in which latter case man appears no longer as a self-creating being, and is degraded in our conception to a level with the animal. But of this more hereafter.

This then is the meaning of the interval between Christ's death and his resurrection ; which is nothing arbitrary, but a necessary part of his own experience, and an essential element in the redemptive process. As human, while on earth He knew by present memory and the ordinary means of knowledge the human race, their sin and their needs, so far as their earthly history is concerned. His love could and did flow forth for them and upon them in the purest and most striking form. But as human also, the world of the departed He did not know ; or only in kind, if further in degree, as we do. While indeed recog-

nizing the organic unity of the human race, yet concretely this portion of it escaped his imagination and made his sympathy more abstract, and less real and immediate. His Love, we may say, had to round itself out into completeness for the human race as such, by the knowledge of this part of the destiny and career of human kind. If his sympathy, as human, was to be fully intelligent and perfect for them, and shown as such, He must know them and exhibit his sympathy for them in their intermediate state. Even though no inner symmetrization of the elements of character, no harmonization of experience were needful for him as individual, yet such modification of self-knowledge as was to be accomplished by the full recognition of the entire organism of humanity, was still possible for him. That such modification of himself in the absolute relations, some transition in his relation as human to the Almighty Father, is to occur at the completion of the regenerative process, and when the new human organism shall have terminated its militancy, is indicated in St. Paul's words, "Then shall the Son himself also be subject to Him who put all things under him," in which the Son Incarnate is regarded as having fulfilled his complete idea and destiny only as the head, heart, and centre of the perfected organism.

If then the intermediate relation to the physical universe between the present and the final one be essential to the career of man, as modified by the incoming of the contradiction, Jesus too must have acquiesced in this relation, and it is a necessary step to his complete glorification. Let us then endeavor to think in what consists this glorification and, if it be

a process, what are its degrees. Absolute glorification is a reversal of the relation which the spiritual soul now bears to the physical universe, which is one of subordination. Not only, now, does our vitality succumb to the disintegrating powers, but the dull matter obstructs us at every turn. Our power over it, though it has grown wondrously in the career of humanity, is still very limited, and it surely conquers us in the end. This is what man feels to be the reversal of the right relation, and precisely *what ought not to be*. He feels it to be a contradiction, and that the spiritual soul should not be thus fettered, but should rather control matter and use it at its will, that it should be pliant and subservient and penetrable by the soul, present no impediment, and conceal no mysteries. If this relation is reversed, then the material universe becomes for the human soul a mere medium or organ, as it is for God himself. For him it is his own Glory determined to secure certain ends. Thus it must be for the human soul, for whom, now, nature is reduced to its primal and simple elements, with which he may deal at will, which he may combine and mould and modify to serve his purposes. Glorification is not bondage to an illumined body, even though in it the soul be able to cleave through all existence;—it is rather being brought in contact with matter in its pure form, with the Eternal Light. But as each soul is itself, and has its own history and its own idiosyncrasy, it may and must, by an ethical necessity, so use primarily the pure Glory as to express itself. Thus in this way each soul will have its own body, not as now in any vanishing identity of material particles, but as having the vital processes no longer carried on apart

from the spiritual ones, but as ruled by them, if not identical with them,—so that life will not be as now something superadded to spirit and will, but a form of spirit and will. It will be true that love is life, and that perfect love is perfect life.

Such glorified life was that of Christ after his resurrection. There was his own body still, recognizable for those only whose own glorification had begun, and bearing upon it the marks of his history; yet it was subject to no spatial limitations. No physical *laws* existed for it. It made its own laws, and these, coming from a will absolutely one with the Divine will, could never issue in contradiction. We cannot, without bringing back the very difficulties that the whole redemptive work was intended to remove, think any imperfection in or restraint for this body of Christ. It is capable of no further change, glorification, or advance. But, contrasted with this, there may be an incomplete glorification. Such was his on the mount of Transfiguration (not identical, however, with that of Moses and Elias), and a still further advance may be thought possible at any time thereafter, though none such was ever exhibited.

These, then, are the results of Christ's sacrificial work, so far as they terminate and are discoverable in his concrete person: the progressive glorification, the mental illumination and expansion, to terminate in the instalment of the spiritual soul in the eternal and true relation to the Father and to the universe. Without this work of Christ, thus accomplished, no recovery were possible to humanity; and thus it is not by any arbitrary, exceptional, and changeable appointment, but literally, necessarily, and absolutely

true that human salvation is only possible for God through the sacrifice of Christ, and for man by the knowledge of Christ; which is the thesis we are endeavoring to establish.

This declaration depends upon a philosophy, which, it is maintained, is the only rational and consistent one, which can harmonize the facts and declarations upon which the system of Christian doctrine is erected. It is contended that this philosophy is implicit in the Christian Scriptures. Any interpretation of them whatever presupposes a philosophy, *i. e.*, certain conceptions of God, man, and the universe, and their relations to each other. If these be wrongly, imperfectly, or confusedly held and adjusted to each other, such interpretation must be so far inconsistent, or incoherent, and painful hiatus must be left needlessly. That the career of Jesus Christ is an illustration of this philosophy, furnishes an argument for it, and a vindication of it, is here contended, so that, if it can be correctly stated, it will be the key to read that history aright in all its details and consequences.

This philosophy we propose now to explicate, so far as is required for the purposes of the present work, before returning again to consider the death of Christ and its atoning results.

CHAPTER XXX.

THE PHILOSOPHY.

A PHILOSOPHY, to be absolutely true and seen to be self-evident, must be exhaustive, and leave nothing unaccounted for ; or if no such is to be had, the region that cannot be included and unified must be sharply defined. The degree of its self-evidence will largely depend upon its method, and while there is no absolute method, and the identical result may possibly be reached by several pathways, yet one may be much easier to follow than the others, and the evidence for the result be more readily seen to be as far as possible conclusive.

Methods are, predominantly or nominally, either analytic or synthetic ; but a pure analytic method is impossible, since synthetic procedures have preceded the discovery of the totality to be analyzed. Nor is a pure synthetic method possible. The nearest approach to it is Hegel's, where the most abstract expression is seized, to which the mind finds itself forced to add determinations, to give it meaning ; but this method pre-supposes the mind's own activity in making first the needed abstraction ; and the synthetic process which it carries on may itself be analyzed. From all which it would seem to follow that any method must be a mingling of the two ; and whichever one be chosen and predominantly availed of, the

mind's own activity, the content of its consciousness, must be the point of departure. But this, neither, admits of a perfect abstraction, since we only know our mind as concrete, *i. e.*, as determined. It is what it is by virtue of its relations; and the admission of these relations assumes the existence of that to which it is related. It only exists in its synthesis with these, and there is nothing simpler, therefore, than this synthesis. It is determined by the material and physical universe, and has no existence apart from it; and the evidence for the existence of this is as valid as that for its own. And yet this existence either is not independent; for we only know it as synthesized by mind. The mind is determined, also, by relations which are extra-physical, which never can be brought within the terms of physical movement or explanation, with what we call *spirit*, the existence of which too must be assumed as completing the synthesis.

Thus there is nothing simple, and, since the law of causality rules all our mental movements, the problem of philosophy is having this complex before it, —the material and the spiritual synthesized in and by self-consciousness,—to discover the First Principle which can account for this in its existence, change, and development.

The insufficiency of many philosophies has been owing to the attempt to make this impossible abstraction, and to consider any one element of this complex by itself exhaustively, hoping by that to arrive at the others. It is an illegitimate procedure to posit *matter* as a starting-point, seeing that it is known to us only as determined, *i. e.*, under the forms of mind. It is illegitimate to posit pure and abstract *spirit*, since we

know nothing of this, but only of spirit, as determined, and these determinations become known to the mind, through its organism ; *i. e.*, through the physical universe. It is illegitimate to posit *will*, or pure activity, for we know nothing of such, know activity only in relation to end or final cause, which is a category of spirit ; and never without a sphere of possible change or progress ; and such sphere includes the material universe in some stage of its movement or progressive determination.

The true point of departure for philosophic thought must therefore necessarily be the mind itself, and that not in its abstract essence, were that discernible, but in its concrete existence ; and this, as we have seen, includes the two sources of its determinations. If analysis attempt to exclude these, it has simply reduced the mind to naught. It can only discover that these two sources have each its own laws, and yet not independent of each other, but the one subordinate to the other ; otherwise the attempt after unity must be abandoned.

But this complex, this totality which is to be accounted for, is in perpetual movement or change, and is never a perfect totality for our thought. New relations of the world of matter to mind constantly disclose themselves. To furnish such disclosures is the task of physical science proper. New relations and changes in the mind ensue. To trace and describe them is the task of psychology. And likewise fluctuations in the spirit relation ensue. To lose none of these is the task of ethical philosophy. To unify all, to find the immutable Source, the First Principle, which can account for existence as concrete (for ab-

stract existence cannot be accounted for), and for all movement, change, and development, to discover its law and meaning, *i. e.*, what is the end to which it moves, or what is the *Idea*,—this is the task of philosophy proper, or constructive.

Thus Theology, in its larger definition, is identical with it. In its narrower definitions (which may be many), it may be reduced to Theology proper, *i. e.*, the First Principle itself, in its immanent relations, antecedent to or aloof from any activity or relation beyond itself.

While indeed the totality to be accounted for is never perfect, but in constant flux (and because this is so we can never think its Fountain as exhausted, and therefore must include an infinite reserve of possibility), yet the law of its movement is discoverable, and the end or final cause may be forecasted more or less confidently. Having discovered the parent Sun of which this synthetic universe is the revelation and partial reflection, we may turn the light of this upon that which reflects it; *i. e.*, a doctrine of the Godhead is always tentative, it derives from the contemplation of the totality, yet enables to comprehend this approximate totality, and thus each illumines the other. A perfect Theologic Science will therefore busy itself with these two undertakings: *first*, to show how the idea of the First Principle has been reached; and *second*, to show its sufficiency to account for the totality. The degrees of this sufficiency are the proofs of its truth, and there is no other proof than this. Had the aim of this work been purely philosophic, this would have been its method, but as it has been, rather, to follow the development of Christian Doctrine, or

Dogmatics, with philosophic scrutiny, its method has been unavoidably a mixed one. The object of this chapter is to express briefly the philosophy received on the above rational grounds, which is believed also to be the philosophy implicit in the Christian Scriptures, and the key to read their meaning. The story of Jesus Christ, rightly read, is the prime vindication of its truth.

If it were thought or said, just here, that in drawing these conclusions we are governed by the laws of thought, and that the certitude is only subjective, it may be replied that no other certitude is possible; but really this is a misapplication of the term: for the subjective only comes to be known by thought as such, by virtue of the objective, *i. e.*, of the mind as determined; and if determined, then the objective includes also that which determines. Any determined progress must depend upon absolute determination. The very notion of the dependent implies the independent. There must be that, therefore, in the Eternal First Principle, which can account for man, as this subject-object, as summing up in himself all the thinkable elements of existence.

The dilemma of Materialism is so evident, that thinking men are generally abandoning a position so insecure. It is only by endowing matter with the properties of mind that it can be used as a First Principle, thus covertly bringing in the synthesis it seems or aims to reject.

The dilemma of pure Idealism is equally great, seeing that it finds itself obliged to use the abstraction or law called *force*, which has no meaning except upon the postulate of an object to exert itself upon, susceptible of change. We may add also that pure

Idealism has no room for Imagination in its representative or creative power, which faculty mediates all our thinking.

We suppose then that, availing ourselves of the *a posteriori* hints,—the study of ourselves, and of the universe, we have reached an idea of the First Principle, which must show its adequacy by its sufficiency. From it we have eliminated all that is transient and progressive, yet hope to show from it the possibility of the progressive. We find in it the absolute, necessary, and unchangeable, yet must find in it the conditions for the relative, the voluntary, and the changeable. We endeavor to discover the law of the movement of the universe, *i. e.*, how its changes ensue to bring about the end. In our First Principle must be found the basis and the possibility of all spiritual and physical existence and development. In thus abstracting all the determinations and relations of the universe, whether physical, intellectual, or moral, we are not reduced to a simple, but to a set of relations still, but these immanent. Here only is a realm for pure thought, in which imagination cannot play, or if it attempt it, can give us no solid results, and hence no aid. There are no images here for it to combine. Its figurative tentatives are more likely to mislead than to enlighten. It can deal no more successfully with the pure Divine Glory than it can with the spirit-relations of the Godhead. Imagination only starts to life when the determinations come, and the universe appears in movement. And it deals with these according to the subjective condition of the soul, of which it is a mode of activity. Hence it ever weaves a cloud before the vision of pure thought, whose activity it accompanies; and what is regarded is always

mixed more or less with obscurations. Only through ethical rectification is its disturbing influence modified. These obscurations come not so much from defect of culture and intellectual advancement, as from moral conditions, which dislocate it from the centre. Though indeed infringed and partially swept away by culture and purely mental triumphs, they are more successfully banished by the holy soul, which can become indifferent to the nature it is not permitted to subdue. Thus the universe has its phases of darkness or brightness, according to the subjective regard, even in our common experience. And it is truly analogous with this to think that in the relations of will and force, as well as in the relations of knowledge, it may or must change according to the subjective regard. To the confused and morally disordered mind of the human subject it is one thing or another, according to the degrees of this mental or moral disorder, or the rectification of the same. It must be then quite another thing, as to the relations of knowledge, physical force, and spirit-activity, to the morally innocent, if such exist or ever existed. And it must be still another thing to the restored and perfected subject-soul, if such restoration and perfection be possible.

It is claimed here that all this points to the discovery of the absolute law of the universe, which having seized, we can return upon our pathway, and find illumined what was before dark. Whether, without the concrete illustration of this law in the history of Jesus Christ, we should ever have discovered it, may be questioned. But when once discovered, it is found to have absolute rationality, and philosophic, yea, scientific vindication.

This law is, that the universe is so constituted that intellectual and physical perfection are bound up with and depend upon moral perfection. That if love is deficient, defect in the former two must necessarily ensue ; if love is restored, these two also necessarily follow. Love is omnipotent and omniscient from its essential idea.

We have already at length shown how the human responsive and sacrificing love, meeting the Divine self-limiting Love in the death of Christ, the ethical union of God and man, was the regenerating principle of the universe ; and that this was by no arbitrary decree, but involved in the eternal constitution of the universe, and in the Divine idea of man.

This fundamental idea of Christianity, this scheme of thought implicit in the mind of the Scripture writers, is shown thus to be able to bear the closest philosophical scrutiny. It is the governing and unifying element in all Ethic and Æsthetic. It meets the requirement of the materialist, and saves for him what he is so anxious to conserve. And all true Science, instead of furnishing any thing to weaken it, supplies food to strengthen and confirm it. No doubt can ever successfully assault it, except as it comes from the fact of moral evil. This it can never escape, and this keeps it still within the region of faith. But aside from this, having once mastered this thought, the pathway through theologic science becomes lighter and easier ; and every step furnishes new vindications. The whole healthy Christian body has always known and felt it, and acted upon it, though constantly failing in its endeavor clearly to express it ; and success, far greater than ours, is yet to come.

CHAPTER XXXI.

REDEMPTION,—RECONCILIATION,—SATISFACTION.

THERE are certain words used in the New Testament Scriptures and by theologians to illustrate various aspects of the doctrine of Atonement—*ransom*, *redemption*, *reconciliation*, *satisfaction*,—each one of which exhibits the complex truth, either in its cause or its consequences, in a certain manner. Each one is a true illustration of this, but no one of them exhausts its meaning; and each when isolated gives but an incomplete exhibition of the entire truth. The word *Atonement* itself is used in either or both the senses of reconciliation and satisfaction. The word, *Redemption*, while nearly synonymous with *Ransom*, has been stretched in its meaning, and made to cover the whole act, process, and results. The present author separates the initial act from the process and results, and confines the word, *Redemption*, to the two latter, or uses as equivalent the phrase, the redemptive process. For all these words regard the consequences of the sacrificial act rather than the act itself, *i. e.*, mean either a changed relation of God towards man, or the consequences flowing out therefrom upon the human race, and upon the whole *κτίσις*. It is a possibly misleading abstraction, however, to make any analytic subdivision of the one Divine act of sacrifice. The same

mind in God initiates and pervades the whole process, and is susceptible of no change or subdivision, except as we note the moments of the process beyond himself, in which the Divine act is made concrete. It can be variously regarded as variously resulting. The one word applicable to God is *sacrifice*, in the sense of *self-limitation*, which is an act of Love. Pure sacrifice, or such limitation as is required to create an image of himself and elevate this to the highest of its possible attainment, issuing in apotheosis through a new act of self-limitation, becomes sacrifice in the narrower, concrete, and actual sense, and this because of its negating virtue, and because difficulties are to be overcome. This, its sublimity and pathos rather than its beauty (the utmost of spiritual strength possible for the creature being shown in it, and which is successful because it is the work of the Creator as well as of the creature), reaches its culmination and sure efficiency only in the article of the death of Jesus Christ. This sublime passage breaks away all bondage or impediment, and sets free the forces which are to bring about and issue in the regeneration of the *κτίσις*; and nothing but this, the conditions being given, could have accomplished such result. As various phases and descriptions of the process which is to issue in such result, we have the illustrative words above named, each one of which we propose to subject to examination, never losing sight, however, of the key-word, sacrifice.

The word, sacrifice, has sometimes been taken in a still more restricted meaning, but only by superficial thinkers, who have confined its use to its objective, physical, or mechanical aspect, rather than to its sub-

jective spring and meaning. As though there were some absolute law to which all sacrifice whatever must objectively conform, to which the Old Testament rites conformed, and to which also the sacrifice of Christ must conform, they have taken the phrase "without the shedding of blood is no remission," as an absolute principle, instead of the statement of a fact, and as flowing from a Divine prescription. In such regard the physical is elevated above the ethical : an unknown Divinity presupposed within or above the known Divinity, whose requirements must be met ere the other could act : a scheme virtually Dualistic, or rather doubly Tritheistic. Rather the profound thinkers of Christendom have, with much unanimity, acknowledged the virtue of the redemptive act to be ethical, and to reside in the sacrificial Love reached and manifested in the death of Christ.

That the offering of himself in death of Jesus Christ had its objective meaning and necessity, as well as its subjective significance and virtue, we have before endeavored to show, and this because required by the conditions of the concrete human nature, the thing to be first recovered, and whence the virtue of the sacrifice was to radiate throughout the *κτίσις*. Thus the mere willingness to die was not sufficient ; but there must be actual death. Hence the figurative language of *blood-shedding*, or outpouring. This or any other human experience cannot be spared, or the whole transaction might have taken place in the realm of pure spirit, and had no visible reality. Human trials and human agonies must be felt to make the triumph human. Besides, the concrete human nature in its entirety has to be restored. Through

the sacrificial act there must be elicited a new moral motive-spring ; human feeling or emotion must be awakened to the uttermost ; human imagination must be stimulated to its extremest tension ; every element of human consciousness must have its satisfaction. Even the thinking mind must be beckoned and let down towards the unifying centre of all thought. For Christian thinkers the philosophy of the Incarnation becomes the philosophy of the universe,—nay, if the words are allowable, the philosophy of God himself.

And as man is related to the material realm as well as to the spiritual, and shows forth the Glory of God, but as obscured and needing to be irradiated afresh, the sacrificial work of Christ must issue in physical forces likewise, regenerating man's physical being, the changes in which may be seen now and then to flash through the obscurity. So the mystical energy whereby is carried on the development of *life* must have received new increments,—the Holy Spirit have new possibilities of activity,—in order that the supreme end be reached in the entirety of its relations,—a commonwealth of holy souls, with environment correspondent, and which are forever enriching themselves, and expanding to fill the unbounded sphere of the Divine thought. Thus, if human nature is to be restored, the restorative efficacy must act upon imagination, thought, will, body, and environment, and we should be able to trace this in actual Christian experience, in the life of the individual and of the whole Church. As helpful and conducting towards a full and accurate view of this complex result we have the words above named, which now we will take up severally for examination.

And here, as we have said, it would enlarge this work beyond the present intent of the author, to take up and criticise by name the systems which have isolated and emphasized each one of these thoughts or aspects of the entire truth and made it the key to the understanding of the whole. This work is intended to be constructive, and not critical, except so far as is needed to make its meaning plain.

Nor will the author enter upon philological and exegetical enquiries to fix the meaning by finding the history of these terms which the Scripture writers have used. This belongs to another order of work. The endeavor will be to penetrate to the root idea of the word used, affirming that it was availed of to illustrate and make more intelligible the results of the sacrificial act of the Eternal Son of God.

Ransom, or Redemption, is a term derived from human conventional relations, and means the taking out of bondage, ordinarily by giving an equivalent for the services of the enslaved, which henceforth are to be missed or transferred. The superficial understanding of this term was seized by the early theologians, and by degrees, and with a seeming logic, converted into the doctrine of a ransom paid to Satan as an equivalent for the service of which he was to be deprived. This scheme has been subjected in the history of Theology to such fiery and destructive criticism as to make the present author loth to repeat it. This work has been done once for all. The scheme was found to issue in contradictions and absurdities which have caused its rejection long since by Christendom ; yet it died out not without much controversy, for

it had an element of truth in it, though greatly distorted, which gave it vitality, and this is what it is our present intention to elicit.

Assuredly as result of his moral defection man is in bondage, and in bondage from which he cannot lift himself. Nature herself is his master, and mocks at his struggles to subjugate her, and overcomes him at last. His own body, which links him to nature, is in bondage to a host of inherited tendencies which cause him to deflect from the supreme end which he clearly sees, or of which he has a dim instinct. His mind is full of visions,—transient or permanent ideals, which confuse, or obliterate for a time, the vision of the ideal end stamped upon his essential structure. To be released from all this influence *in potentia*,—to have the process started which is to rescue him from it in actuality, is surely lifting him out of slavery. The one act which accomplished this was the sacrifice of Christ, which thus becomes, in human illustrative language, the price paid for it. Released from this bondage in the new principle of development which is or may become his, man is God's possession in a higher sense than he was before,—morally as well as physically and intellectually his subject. This ethical possession is not by a compelled, but by a voluntary obedience. It is not so much possession, which here is a possibly imperfect word, as a timeless coalescence, which is only figured by material ownership, and not identical or even entirely analogous to it. But, acknowledging this obligation to the work of Christ, in proportion as the man appreciates it does his heart overflow with such gratitude that he has been thus purchased, that this becomes a motive spring for such

spontaneous obedience as was not possible before,—obedience warmed by emotion, and well likened to an inextinguishable fire.

But this illustration must not be carried too far, does not exhaust the meaning of the transaction, and if isolated, will issue in a partial or erroneous view. Paying a price belongs to human transactions, occurs between equals, presupposes a system of rights conventional, provisional, not necessarily absolute,—belongs to the mixed and imperfect state, and therefore is not profoundly descriptive of an act on God's part resulting in a certain change in the mutual relation between his human creation and himself. To call what He does a "price paid" is, however, a useful illustration to bring home to the ordinary human mind and heart the depth and extent of the Divine Love; but the absolute meaning of this must pass beyond the scope and expressive power of the figure or seeming analogy. Therefore any such notion as a price paid to Satan is surplusage and unmeaning. It does not even come within the terms of the human transaction of paying a price, for it is not pretended that there is any voluntary relinquishment on Satan's part of his power, in consequence of any price paid, or that there is any testimony that he accepts the death of Christ as such equivalent. And that God was bound to pay him a price presupposes a law, with an interior God to sanction it, higher than the loving God himself. All the history of this view is an interesting illustration of how the naïve and well meant expressions of the Scripture writers have been tortured into caricatures and untruths. Indeed, since theological controversy has arisen, the very phrase "a price paid to God" must be

used with caution and explanation ; for it is not said that the Eternal Father was loving because of the price paid ; but that his Love provided the price in order that men might be loving. But, nevertheless, his Love is only seen and acknowledged because of the price paid, which He himself provided should be paid.

But the thought that by virtue of the humiliation and sacrifice of Christ the moral, mental, and physical influences or forces within the sphere of knowledge, and the mystical energy and efficacy beneath them and supplementing them, were enabled to start into activity, and thus rescue and elevate the human being in every element of his definition, was, in the mind of Irenæus, the origin of the expression that the bondage to Satan was thereby annulled, seeing that Satan, or the principle of spiritual evil, may be thought as identified with the deranged universe, and able to use it, under limitations, for the purposes of the spiritual contradiction. Had Irenæus foreseen how his followers would have used this hint, it is likely that so clear a thinker as he would have receded from this following. The thought, however, may be so safely followed out as not to impair the truth of the doctrine, which remains the same whether Satan be or be not thought as adding force to the temptations which come to man from and through his disordered nature.

Indeed, if our philosophic vindication of the doctrine of grace be truly grounded, and it be true that the human being is inexplicable, except as thought subject to mystical influences from the unknown universe, and that, being thus related to the entirety, he

is a true universal,—by parity of reasoning we may also conclude, and include in the general thesis, that he is subject to mystical influences which are purely evil, and that spiritual powers may lurk in physical disguises. Such facts as sudden conversions or downfalls, or unlooked-for and inexplicable outbursts of good or evil, add probability to the truth of the general proposition, since on known or scientific grounds they are inexplicable. We cannot follow, however, with the same profitable result the endeavor to explicate the possibility and the method of evil spiritual influence, that we can of its contrary, for the endeavor will soon conduct us to the insoluble problem of the possibility, origin, nature, and destiny of moral evil. Therefore the terms of this doctrine can never be accurately formulated. But there is nothing lost that man needs to know, and possibly something gained by the superadded doctrine that man in being released from his bondage to nature is thereby released also from all bondage to any alien and spiritual principle, and freed from purely spiritual temptation, or any temptation but such as may come from his physical being, from which spiritual evil is not entirely severed, and cannot be until the regeneration is completed. Surely spiritual contact with any evil principle is not, except in the extreme case of utter lapse, possible for the believer in Christ, and thus pure spiritual contact with the good principle becomes possible. Not till the coalescence of God and man in the personal relation of Christian faith can it be said that the believer is “the temple of the Holy Spirit.”

The nature of this possible interference with man, through and by means of his physical organism, will

be treated of at greater length hereafter in an examination of the doctrine of the Divine Providence ; also in another connection the method of the activity and influence of the Holy Spirit.

Another word illustrative of the cause and the result of the redemptive work is—Reconciliation. And here let me say that it has always seemed to me a vain and needless dispute whether the proper phraseology indicated by the word be that “God is reconciled to man,” or “man is reconciled to God,” and that they are correlative phrases, each one being required to bring out the fulness and correctness of meaning of the other. The primal act of God which provides the sacrificial atonement includes only in an abstract and timeless sense the moment of reconciliation. God is not, nor can be, reconciled to actual sin. To say that He contemplates man ideally, and the result as accomplished, is true in a certain sense, as we shall presently see, but the thought thus presented is too abstract, and needs to be made concrete to be brought home to human feeling, to make God’s Love apparent to our composite nature, and to make appreciable the Divine joy. God becomes reconciled to man in this latter sense when the idea is realized. To regard God’s reconciliation as a mere persistent state of the Divine consciousness is barren of results for our responsive consciousness. To have these it must be presented as in act and process, and seen to be the starting of the influences and forces which have hitherto slumbered, or have only been preparing to burst forth, and which are to bring about the entire result of human regeneration. He cannot then be

said to be reconciled in such full sense that the human mind and heart can lay hold of it until the act is accomplished, the sacrifice made, human nature, not in idea, or *in potentia* merely, but in the concrete, liberated and regenerated, and this we have seen was done by the sacrifice of Christ, and in the person of Christ. Now we have the new man, the perfect man, the progenitor of the new human race, and the Divine reconciliation can be thought as complete as to Him, and *in potentia* with regard to all who shall be grafted into Him; yet still only in the fulness of its meaning when every thing alien has been cast out of the new organism, and it too is perfect. The Scripture words "be ye reconciled to God" are an affectionate urging to the individual men to freely take part in the regenerative process, to subject themselves to its energies.

Yet, indeed, in pure and abstract thinking, the reconciliation accomplished by the ethical triumph on the Cross may be regarded as belonging to the eternal or timeless sphere of the Divine mind, and so far as complete in itself, and involving the surety of the time process and the visible and knowable results; but for human imagination, moving under time-conditions, and dealing with its mixed material, it only becomes real and influential as contemplated in the knowable act, process, and result. This result is, primarily, the risen and glorified Christ, and therefrom the regenerated organism. Thus man, as such, can only be said to be reconciled to God when he accepts the Divine reconciliation, thereby making the latter perfect *in potentia*; yet each lacks concrete completeness, and waits till human perfection is reached, when only the Divine reconciliation can show itself in the

fulness of its beneficence ; and thus the two streams meet and in their mutual relation each becomes perfect, and exhibits its full significance.

The Christian Scriptures contemplate the entire human race as a unit, an organism. Science and history add their imperfect testimony to the same ; and even though it can never be made out historically and scientifically that humanity is one in its physical origin, yet inasmuch as its idea is unique, and every moment of this idea discoverable in every individual of the race, and all development possible for every such individual ;—the essential relations to the material and spiritual realms being thus identical, humanity must even thus be thought as a unit. Hence the phrase, “In Adam all die,” which is not so much a dogma as an indisputable fact. Thus the human race may be regarded as summed up in its primal specimens ; and the existence of the sexes shows that St. Paul’s word is not to be taken in its literal and limited sense, but must mean the ideal humanity in whatever numbers concreted. So, too, the new and regenerated humanity may be regarded as summed up in its solitary and unique specimen, Jesus Christ, from whose side issues the Church, the bride, the extension of himself, and the propagation from himself. Even science and philosophy may show us that, could the innocence, sacrificial strength and ethical perfection of this One be made out, it must virtually be a new beginning, and comprise a new relation to the universe, and issue in some new process, be the source and spring of a new activity. This new relation between God and the new humanity may be spoken of as reconciliation between those hitherto estranged, since it is to extend

to the individuals of the race as they enter into, or are caught into the currents of the new process,—the latter according to some providential rule more or less discoverable.

And also, when we fall back upon the thought of the ideal reconciliation as a timeless relation and as involved in the primal act of the Eternal Father in sending the Son, whose Incarnation under the existing condition of humanity must involve sacrifice, and whence “the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world,” we perceive that the act of self-limitation in the kenosis of the Eternal Son is no afterthought, but an occurrence having its needful providential preparation, its prefiguration on a lower plane; and thus that in some sense its results may be thought as anticipated in time, and a slow movement of a comprehensive plan become visible; thus that some of the consequences of the timeless relation existing “before the foundation of the world” may visibly appear, even though the perfection and the triumph of such sacrifice upon the Cross be thought necessary to make such consequences secure and permanent.

Thus it may be made out that Christ died not only for ideal humanity, not only for his own perfection, not only for all who should be grafted into the new stock,—for his elect, the Church,—but for all mankind as such. What benefits accrue to every individual of the human race from the sacrifice of Christ, so that the phrase “He died for all” means something more than a thinkable possibility provided the providential means are provided, is a topic that will be treated of at length hereafter. If there be foundation for this doctrine of a universal benefit, we thus see that, in

varying senses, the Divine reconciliation reaches not merely abstract human nature, but man in the concrete, and humanity as a unit. Whether the restored and new organism will be identical with the organism to be ideally restored is an eschatological problem that will be treated of fully in its proper place.

We approach now the more difficult term to explicate—Satisfaction.

This word may be used to express some condition of thought, or of feeling, or of both combined; and of course gets its meaning from human psychological analogies. Reason is satisfied only when all contradiction is removed, when development no longer involves sacrifice, but is spontaneous, natural, essential. In its perfect satisfaction there is, we may say, no longer a process of thought, but thought has subsided into its rudiments of feeling, or love in pure activity. Thus the satisfaction of reason is identical with the complacency of the pure æsthetic contemplation. This feeling of untroubled complacency exists only when thought has triumphed over all difficulty, and has intuition of the eternal harmony. It exists before in degrees correspondent to the harmonizing successes of thought. The Divine Love may be felt and returned in proportion as the Divine thought is appropriated, not necessarily in its amplitude, its minute ramifications, but in its central and unifying idea, whence the ambient grows in an ever enlarging harmony. This is, or becomes, "the peace which passeth understanding," because it has subsided into that from which all understanding has issued, and to which it returns.

The Divine Satisfaction can at all times be thought

as ideally complete, but as actually progressive. We do not elevate our idea of God, but only lower it, if we insist in abstracting from it every thing anthropomorphic,—if we think him as in cold majesty indifferent to human sin and suffering, as content with his own Glory, as incapable of further glorification as the infinite riches of the Divine mind are objectified ; and thus as having already reached the ultimate of complacency. To regard the Divine consciousness as ever progressive, the Divine joy as possible to be varied, if not intensified, is a higher thought of him than the other, which bears too close resemblance to the conception of the exploded Deism. Thus to think him is needful to bring him within the sphere of human feeling and to make him an object of love. Anthropomorphism in some degree is a necessity for all thought of the First Principle, and the mistake of defect is as great as that of excess in applying it. If God's highest manifestation of himself be Jesus Christ, we are therein taught to regard him as our true congener, as through this mediation making known his own Love and rejoicing in its return.

Thus far the Divine Satisfaction is simply the Divine reconciling Love contemplated as thought involving feeling, or feeling implying thought.

As has been said before, to separate the Divine Justice from the Divine Love, and to regard it in an absolute sense, as having its own stern and mysterious requirements, is the extreme of mystical assumption, since our only conception of Justice is *a posteriori* in origin, and is seen to be the attitude which Love takes towards its object according as it is its own congener or the reverse, according as it is loving or unloving.

The Divine Justice may be seen and understood to be satisfied when the Divine Love abates of its severity by degrees, as the objects of it no longer, or in diminishing degree, offer contradiction to the providential scheme ; or as the inflictions of such severity work their purpose as chastisement or individual purification. The sacrifice of Christ alone accomplishes this satisfaction, since it, in showing forth the Creator's Love, alone elicits the creature's love, since it exhibits the utmost of human strength, and liberates the regenerative forces ; and this, not by any arbitrary arrangement, or as tribute to an unknowable principle ; but because it is the law of the universe that to ethical perfection all other perfection becomes correspondent ; because Love in its purity and perfection is almighty, the origin and the end of all things, the circle which forever returns upon itself,—rather the wheel within the wheel which eternally and reciprocally meet and coalesce ; whose interpenetration is the highest harmony, and the very sparkles of whose contact are new creations.

The death of Christ has then objective worth not as a physical change exceptional and different from all other physical death, but because in and by means of this death does humanity in him become perfect, and thereby becomes loosened the might of spiritual gravitation, so that humanity in him springs up to its source and cleaves its way through the eternities into the infinite recesses of the Divine mind. The hostile forces withdraw from him, and begin to withdraw from his own. The Divine complacency or satisfaction is ideally perfect, and even for human imagination and thought apprehensible and comprehensible. Thus

Christ's death, as a spiritual act, was not merely the means of satisfaction and restoration : but itself the restoration, as all power was concentrated in it.

Some theologic schemes have severed the death of Christ from all organic, or ethical connection with the sacrificial life, giving it an alien, artificial, and obscure significance, such as removes it from human thought and makes it no longer attractive even to human feeling. Others have made it an arbitrary provision, and for which we can see no necessity, thus likewise robbing it of all ethical significance ; while others, again, have so emphasized the sacrificial obedience of his life as to leave for thought no special need of his death.¹ Yet upon this last the Scripture writers lay the whole weight of their emphasis.

The want here has been,—a philosophy,—such as shows that, under the postulates of the Divine Love, and of human sin, the death of Christ had an absolute necessity,—that nothing else, and nothing less could have restored ethical perfection, and set in play the recuperative forces. This is the key not only to harmonize all theologic science, but to push step by step all mystery adhering to human knowledge up to the unilluminated verge. It is so fruitful that we return to it once again, and approach it from another direction.

¹ This is notably the case with the Roman Catholic theologian, Fabst, whose thought up to this point coalesces largely with our own.

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE DEATH OF CHRIST THE ATONING SACRIFICE.

AT the risk of some repetition, which may be not unwelcome upon such a topic, we return to consider once again the death of Christ, as profoundly fascinating, approaching it in another way, and endeavor to penetrate a step farther into its meaning.

And here, referring to the kenosis again, we must postulate that the mind of the Father, objectified in the self-limitation of the Son, and carried into effect by the Holy Spirit, must still persist in the Incarnate One as the spring and the purpose of the whole Divine act. It need not be thought, however, that the whole process of its realization, in all its ramifications, was present in the mind of Christ. That the entire process was not perfectly seen by him is indicated in his own words : " Of that hour knoweth no man, not the Son, but only the Father," *i. e.*, the full evolution of the idea is not present. Its end only is seen, the culminating result, and with increasing clarity during his human development ; but there is felt at the start, and with unwaning degree, the Father's Love, in which all wisdom and might are implicit. This Divine Love, converting itself by degrees into the human, in which ethical union alone is the perfect coalescence of God and man, is therefore in him a continuous thread, forever unifying the increments of knowledge. The

unravelling of the Divine plan, so far as displaying wisdom and might, enters into his consciousness by degrees, by steps and stages in his mental and moral development, and the purpose becomes clearer as the veil is gradually lifted from the process. Thus, in this sense, we presuppose the mind of the Father to be known, viz., that the annulment of the hostility, or the remission of sin, the restoration of human nature, not in the abstract, but as concrete in his person, and the impartation of the restored nature to those subjectively responding to the Divine Love shown in him, and objectively grafted into it, and, from this nucleus spreading, the possible recovery of the entire human race, and actually and at least the perfection of the new organism, was to be accomplished by his own sacrificial Love triumphing in death.

The restorative forces, as to their results upon the human race, are both negative and positive,—each, within the terms of the problem, implying the other. The remission of sin, or annulment of its consequences, cannot be without positive growth into the loving principle, or sanctification. Each conditions the other. To keep them separate, or not rightly to apprehend their essential union, gives birth necessarily to a partial or incoherent theology.

Christ's death cannot, then, be rightly understood but as marking a crucial point in the whole process, both Divine and human. The perfection (for human thought) of the Divine Love, and the perfection of the responsive human love are both reached in it; and without it neither would have been revealed in the utmost of its possible manifestation to human faculties. But to comprehend the ethical worth of that death,

we must be able to comprehend it in the entirety of its relations. We must know the trials over which it triumphed in order to be enraptured by the knowledge of that triumph ; and therefore we must understand, and not relegate to the region of mystery, his sufferings as his death approached.

We have said before that there is no need to think any special Divine vindictive infliction upon Jesus Christ, unintelligible to human understanding, and escaping altogether the capacity of human imagination. Such a view arises from the supposed requirements of an abstract Justice. Moreover, it does not enhance our conception of Jesus' suffering, but rather dims and diminishes it, since withdrawing thought from what we can comprehend, to plunge into a meaningless darkness. We not only can, but must, understand his suffering sufficiently, in its uniqueness and its intensity, in order to measure the strength of the sacrificial Love displayed therein, and to understand his death, and be drawn by it as He intended we should.

All suffering, indeed, is in view of death, and acquires its meaning and reality from it. Death is the summing up of the consequences of sin, the consummation of the contradiction, includes in its significance all suffering that can go before. It is the absolute reversal of the relation which only can satisfy reason and feeling, and have absolute worth and eternity. That the sublime spirit of man, the soul enriched by thought, whose penetrating power is limitless, should be at the mercy of the brute forces, and no longer maintain its position in the universe, and be checked when his attempt to master it seems most promising,

is the seeming failure of the end for which it exists, the vanishing of the prize it felt confident it could reach. Could man not die no mental suffering would arise from physical pain. He would have in himself such a make-weight, such elastic force as would triumph over it, and he would find the means of evading it. That which makes pain acute now is that it is the premonition of death. The animal who fears not death, does not shrink from pain, but goes into it willingly. And man himself, under a strong passion, which absorbs his mind and concentrates his energies, cares not for it. The intense mental and emotional pre-occupation banishes the sense of pain from the consciousness. But when no such passion (and every passion is love or a disguise of love, or perversion of love) occupies the soul, pain is felt in terror as indicating the insecure hold upon the world, and upon life as the connecting relation. Mercifully, indeed, when the time for death comes, the nervous system has become measurably insensible to physical pain; the mental relations are left comparatively pure, yet death is still shrunk from. Suicide is an act having negative and not positive intent,—that to escape from the unbearable, rather than that to enter into the preferable. The philosopher goes to his death resignedly, his pure thought conquering the shrinkings of his instinctive being. The Christian takes his death resignedly, submitting to the Divine will, or gladly, under the impulse of a strong spiritual passion.

Had then Jesus' death been under the ordinary human conditions, we can readily think such a make-weight as would rather diminish his suffering to a degree less than ordinary. To escape this physical

pain and to enter into the rest of Paradise would be seemingly a welcome relief. The religious mind, in this case most intense, would absorb the sense of suffering, both physical and mental. We must find, therefore, something unique in his mental state, in order to account for and understand the indubitably unusual suffering,—the agony in Gethsemane, the dread that produced the cry upon the cross, against which his clear mind and strong spirit could not make way,—to show how his pure and loving heart could be so greatly wrung.

There are certain forms of human suffering which He, as sinless, must necessarily have missed,—the punishment which comes from violation of the Divine laws ; and such chastisement as presupposes even for the loving and obedient subject contrary appetencies, which torment him, require to be struggled against, and for which he needs the aid of Divine grace, whether providential or mystical. Jesus' suffering, *ex hypothese*, cannot be regarded in either of these lights, and therefore to say that He experienced the suffering that is due to the elect, and which they would have experienced, is to say what is impossible.

But there is suffering which is neither of these, viz. : such possible pain as comes from the limitations of the imperfect life, and the process of death already begun. To avoid it, to be rid of it, to diminish it, to triumph in any way over it, to prolong life and postpone death is the great stimulus to all human activity, and the secret of the stirring energies of mankind. Human culture brings multifarious disappointments and hence acuter pains, and accomplishes new contrivances to mollify the passage to death, and

to rid it measurably of suffering. But pain is not only avoided or mollified by these deliberate efforts, but it can be made to diminish or to disappear from the mental consciousness, even when it continues to do its physical damage, when the subject is under the domination of a strong spiritual passion.

Were the *mother's* tendance of her child unsanctified by her love she would find it irksome, and her attention would be absorbed in the many disagreeable sensations which it would involve. As it is, she finds delight in toil and sacrifice for her child's sake. Her own life is identified with its life, as the prolongation of herself, and the love in its absorbing nature dulls the sense of pain. The sacrifice of self has thus a tendency to diminish pain, and to transmute it into joy, and joy the greater that the pain is felt. It is the joy of conflict and victory, the delight of the sublime activity rather than of the beautiful rest. That one can find delight in sacrifice for another's sake can only have its justification in the implicit recognition that it is vicarious. It liberates another at our own cost; and so far liberates the organism by liberating one of its members; thus unconsciously preparing even for itself a still finer gratification, and a larger felicity.

All pain is thus an indication of a deranged physical relation, which can be cured and righted only by the virtue and the might of spiritual sacrifice or love. It is our share of the remedial process which is liberating the universe, and our sacrifice is not immediately liberating only from its imperfection.¹ Only love per-

¹The author acknowledges that the thought that pain is an indication of imperfect life was suggested to him by James Hinton in his "Mystery of Pain," but it will be seen that he has made quite a distinct use of it.

fect in purity and strength can be immediately liberating. Such was the Love of Christ. *We* continue to share the consequences of the deranged relation, but it may be for us transmuted into chastisement or a purifying process. This is when it is borne in the sacrificial spirit, and then for an end which is vicarious.

Moreover, if the disorder of the universe had its origin or has its explanation in a deranged ethical relation, or in an ethical shortcoming, thus as the result of deficient love,—in love renewed and sufficient must be the condition for its recovery. For this, as we have seen, sacrifice in its highest tension is needed, as the highest conceivable form of love,—sacrifice having implicit in such perfection the power to transmute itself into joy, and thus to disappear as sacrifice. But it must still be known and felt as suffering in order that love may reach and show its utmost in annihilating it. Thus we see, on *a priori* grounds, that the perfection of sacrifice destroys the need of itself. That we are so much tortured by our self-denials, or rather, that our torture is so prolonged, proves something wanting in ourselves, proves a deficient love. If, when discovering that our pain is vicarious and for the good of the whole, we are not reconciled to it, it proves a love still lacking in permanent fibre. That Jesus' sufferings, though intense as ours cannot be, were not prolonged, shows that his Love was greater and sufficient. Thus it is incumbent upon us to endeavor to understand the nature and the poignancy of his suffering, as well as the necessity that it could not be prolonged.

Had his human love been perfect at the start there

would have been no need of his development. His physical perfection would have been reached, and He could not have suffered. The insistence that his physical perfection was perennial, is the explanation of the many Dokeric schemes that have been strewn along the course of Christian speculation. In such the ethical development disappears except in semblance, and He mounts beyond all human sympathy. The word "He was made perfect by suffering" is ignored. Indeed his love, not as Divine Love, but as the human love made possible by the Divine Love, reaches its perfection only in the utmost increment of its strength, in the triumph upon the Cross. While such love was capable of increment, suffering was possible, and this sense of suffering inhering, of course, in the one Divine-human consciousness. The suffering which came from any trial possible and actual in his human experience was, by the victory in such trial annihilated and no longer possible, and the conflict need not and could not be repeated. But there were, and must have been in his experience, the conditions for a conflict severer and more and more painful as He approached the end.

Even in this respect do his disciples feebly follow his footsteps. As rapidly as we become capable of one kind of sacrifice, and reach resignation to it, and find joy in it, it may be, and if the victory is secure it will be no longer required of us again, and trial of another kind opens before us, and thus step by step do we go onwards towards our moral perfection. But our sufferings are graduated upon a lower scale than Christ's. Our love being less, our sympathy is less. We cannot reproduce in our thought the contradic-

tion so clearly as He did, and therefore our sympathy is less intelligent and keen, and so we cannot experience an agony so profound and bitter as his.

There has always been a propensity among Christian people to dwell upon in imagination and make much of Jesus' bodily sufferings, the agony of the crucifixion, etc. It is a harmless exhibition of human pity, but may be misleading, for, by the very terms of the problem, He felt these less keenly than other men. He could suffer in body, because He was not yet emancipated from nature's laws ; but his very Love and spiritual strength would enable him to make less of these. He never alludes to his bodily suffering, or only to the mental aspect of it, and the ethical reversal implied in it. His sufferings, to be understood, must be regarded as mental and emotional, *i. e.*, as spiritual. These He makes known, and the causes of these He does make much of. He saw, as we cannot, the exceeding sinfulness of sin, the absoluteness of the contradiction, the depth and extent of the calamity ; and, having human imagination and sympathy, felt more closely the contradiction as concentered in his fellow-men. Hence "the contradiction of sinners against himself." The malignity or the indifference of his human brethren made more intense this appreciation of the contradiction, more vivid his knowledge of the misery wrapped up in it. Thus his sorrow over human sin was profound as ours cannot be, and thus the phrase becomes legitimate, that He alone could repent of human sin. As identified now with our race, and irrevocably, He must feel the disturbance of the organism in the very depths of the possibility of feeling. Our repentance, falling thus short of his, needs

to be repented of. Even though for the Christian mind and heart the discovery of utter selfishness in one to whom we are bound by natural or friendly ties is one of the acutest agonies that we can endure, and to which any physical pain that can befall us is as nothing, yet our intelligent sympathy does not reach, or only abstractly, the human race. Imagination has too limited a field for this, and is ever seduced hither and thither. We are too much bound up with the phenomena immediately about us to be able to reside long in this region of truth where alone feeling can be most intense.

The suffering of Jesus over the contemplation of human sin cannot be thought as relieved by the full vision of the accomplished purpose of the Father. This sin still abides immediate for his imagination. His own words, that He knew not the day of his own second coming,—and the prayer, “Let this cup pass from me,”—show that the region prior to the accomplishment of the Father’s purpose was still dark to him. He could not have prayed thus had his vision been clear.

And now if to all this suffering coming from the contemplation of erring humanity we superadd what is involved in the foretaste of his death in Gethsemane, and in his nearer approach to it as He hung upon his cross, we shall have reached the limit of human thought in this regard.

The yielding up of life is the greatest possible sacrifice that can come within the capacities of our thought and feeling,—the greatest conceivable and therefore the greatest possible. To refuse it, when the Divine will or the requirements of the absolute ideal call for it, is the utter reverse of sacrifice.

It is yielding to the flood of the contradictory tendencies of our being, the turning of the vision away from the supreme end and eternal purpose of our creation. It is plunging into the mists again, to form out of them some transitory individualistic ideal purpose. Yet to yield one's self to death for love's sake is to part in imagination, in thought and feeling, with all that we *know* of truth and delight. It is a precipitation into the unknown, supported by no explicit knowledge, but only by faith. It is the uttermost, sublimest, and strongest act of faith or spiritual love. It is such faith as, when analyzed, proves to be the knowledge that thus and thereby it is lapsing beyond its own necessity. It is the moral recovery of the creature, and the estimation of true martyrdom has herein its vindication.

When such sacrifice in faith is perfect, it is the sole condition for the ultimate participation of the Divine nature. It opens the door and sets free all the recuperative and regenerative forces. God and man cannot meet physically,—in the Divine Glory;—God and man cannot meet mentally and the creature see as God sees, from the true centre, and hence every thing is right relation,—except as they meet thus ethically and in love. In the known and felt sacrificial Love of God in Christ, and the responsive love of man, God and man do meet, and all other moments of perfect being take their normal place, and subside into harmony. Even in Jesus Christ the perfect ethical union of God and man takes place only in his death, and we see that the liberative results at once ensue. This shrinking from death, this closing up of the relations which constitute life in the known universe, this pros-

pect of the desertion of friends, and the utter loneliness resultant, this exhibition of human perversity and malignity,—constitute a mental image for Jesus so terrifying that He prays that the terror of the process may be lightened, and the agony mitigated. The extreme of mental suffering begins to accomplish physical disorganization, and hence the “bloody sweat,”—suffering so great that the physical structure would have yielded before the time, before the last trial, the escape from which could still dwell in his imagination, and which is the explanation of his prayer;—and it was needful that supernatural aid and the sustentation of the Divine messenger should carry him through the conflict. The holy will never wavers, however much the instinctive nature, and the meditative mind may shrink; the human will, the representative of this nature and this mind for any action or change, yields to the Divine will which manifests no change, its innocence is preserved, and it receives a great increment of strength to sustain it for the trial upon the cross. Here, as the victim hangs from the pierced hands and feet, there is no complaint over the physical pain. There is no need to suppose that as physical pain it was felt more keenly than by other men,—rather less keenly since sustained by the sublimer spirit. But death is no longer a little way off, and within the sphere of imagination only. It is inevitable and in a degree actual. There is no doubt the obscure consciousness, that the vital force is yielding to the external infliction. Jesus is in the midst of the actual trial. The holy will resigned to the Father’s will remains, but unsustained by such influence as came to uphold

his physical being in Gethsemane. He remembers the words of his own prophet and progenitor, feels their force for his ancestor, and their greater force in his own case, gives them new and their profoundest meaning. God is never away from his own. In the depths of essential being the Father still holds irrevocably the Divine-human Son ; but the consciousness of this is in abeyance. We have again something like that which took place in the Conception itself,—Love abandoning the sphere of determined and explicit knowledge, and retiring into that in which all knowledge is formative, becoming intensest in purity, and having implicit in it the irresistible might. Into this consciousness we cannot penetrate, from the defect of our love, but we can think it as the greatest human trial, strength, and victory. The perfected human will has to bear it seemingly alone, unsustained by the consciousness of the paternal fellowship that was felt by him so vividly throughout his whole previous career, and as we cannot feel it. The whole consciousness is so left in darkness that the ray of Love can alone pierce it. Human nature passes through the tempest as to its consciousness alone, thus in the uttermost of its strength, not explicitly knowing that in this its perfection and the closest union are accomplished, that God and man are concretely and to be visibly one, as well as ideally and essentially. The oblivion is but transitory. The sense of the Father's sustentation retires but for a vanishing moment, and its restored presence is indicated in the words "It is finished" and "Into thy hands I commend my spirit." Love in its purity and perfection has become omnipotent. The eternal reciprocity of the Godhead is

imaged and shown forth in the reciprocity between God and his highest creature. They meet in the region of pure Love. The self-limitation of God is met by the sacrifice of man. The ideal end of the mission is potentially reached. It begins now as from a new centre the process of regeneration. The seed itself, the product of benevolent forces reaching from the eternal heavens, and gathering increments from the developing universe even amid its contradictions and obscurations, now becomes fructifying. And this, the trial and triumph in death are the "price" paid, the "ransom," the "reconciliation," the "satisfaction." The Divine Justice is met. The Divine Mercy can flow forth. The recuperative forces, hitherto clogged by the disorganized products of human sin, now can fill the channels, natural and mystical, and issue in human redemption, regeneration, and glorification.

There is no *new* mystery in Christ's Atonement, only the mystery of the primal act of self-limitation in Jesus' human conception, repeated in the unimaginable consciousness of him in the article of death. And this mystery does not inhere in its innermost idea, as an act of Divine Love met ultimately by the perfect human love. The Christian's knowledge of God seen in the death of Christ and its results is the highest attainment of human knowledge, for in it the philosophy of all created existence, and the essential relations which constitute the Godhead itself, become concrete and visible,—the knowledge that perfect love alone makes possible true knowledge, forever reaching into the infinite abysses, and needing never to reverse its career. Thus the human creature is the image of

God, and comes to share his nature—*i. e.*, his relation to the universe.

We have yet to see how this new seed is to bring forth fruit, how the influences thence derived are to reach the individuals of the human race and create the new organism ; premising that since human disorder is complex and affects all the elements of man's being, so the process of recovery must be complex. Man is to be restored ethically, mentally, and physically, and there must be that in the plan of his salvation which can reach him in all three of these relations. But as the perfection of Jesus in body and mind was attained in and by his ethical perfection, and through the triumph of his Love, so the restoration of the human individual must be reached by a similar process

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION, AS ELEVATING
THE IDEA OF MAN, AND NEEDFUL FOR HIS
COMPLETE DEFINITION.

THE doctrine of the Incarnation not only reveals the highest idea of God, letting us, as it were, into the inmost secret of his being, furnishing thus satisfaction for thought, and meeting the intensest longings of feeling, but it gives us also the only complete, and which is seen to be also the most exalted and gratifying, idea of man. But for it we would not know the extent of human capabilities, nor what was in the Divine mind in man's creation. Now we see to what a height he can be elevated, and that at first he did not know and hardly yet realizes in thought the grandeur of his own destiny. That, rising out of the abyss of the unconscious, he should pass through consciousness in all its forms,—through the rudimental one of simple sensation transmuted into feeling, through the phases of purely animal consciousness into self-consciousness; should apprehend the personal relation between himself and his kindred, and thus become capable of love and reciprocal self-limitation; that he should come to apprehend the personal relation with God, and learn to worship and love his Creator; that his spiritual fibre should harden and strengthen under the discipline of existence, till it should reach at length

absolute security, and reflect perfectly and permanently the loving principle, and be thus assimilated to it; that as the result of this he should come to share in their fulness the Divine relations to the universe, find it pliant and subservient, and patent for his knowledge; that he should become able, because a perfect son, to share the mind of his Father, and see the mystery of all development, hitherto unravelled,—the meaning of the Divine thoughts,—and be able to watch and comprehend all future development, and in degree forecast it; that thus his consciousness should melt into the Divine consciousness, absorbed by it, yet not absorbing it,—become one with God without exhausting God,—preserving and not losing the personal tie (for thus the highest of all would be lost, and all this riches would drop into poverty); that thus man was intended as an individual to be a perfect son, and as a commonwealth to image the Unity of the Trinity, in its essential characteristic of being, thought, and love, whereby and wherein is existence;—all this is shown to have been the Divine idea and intent for man, because it has all been run through and accomplished in the person of Jesus Christ.

And the manner in which this process was and must have been passed through, rendered necessary by the incoming of the moral disaster upon humanity, with its accompaniment of mental and physical disaster, is such as to bring before our minds new capacities of God and man, new secrets of existence. In consequence of this disaster the self-limitation of the Divine one becomes sacrifice, man may be touched to the quick, and the needed Atonement becomes possible. Suffering was the penalty paid for the derelict.

tion, and suffering implies death ; but the penalty cures itself when it reaches its *ultimatum*. The sacrificial death abolishes death. All human suffering is in its intent remedial and vicarious, and atoning in its tendency, yet it does not reach Atonement, because the sacrificial spirit is wanting, or is weak, or is blind. Thus the beauty of man's intended normal development has been changed into sublimity ; and the ultimate beauty of the restored universe will bear the marks of its sublime career. The purely dynamical sublime will have disappeared, since power, being limitless, will admit of no restraint or degrees,—the moral sublime will exist only in memory,—but the eternal unravelling of the Divine thought, rolling into new phases, and crystallizing in new concretions, will still create that expanding emotion which we call sublime, and thus retain what the idea of sublimity signifies. And for this, the highest form of sublimity, the disaster and the remedial sacrifice were not needful, though from our mental view-point these latter do, by contrast, enhance our idea of the former.

That the Son of God became the perfect Son of man, is the surety that his brethren too may and will become such,—otherwise they would not be brethren indeed. The absolute security of the result in his case, accomplished in and by the hypostatic union, must have been, that a new starting-point should come into being, and a new race be spiritually propagated, yet such was the wonder of the process, that it was accomplished by the Eternal Son through human obedience and sacrifice, and through human development mediated by the Holy Spirit. Its failure may be metaphysically thinkable, but is ethically unthinkable,

because the starting-point is an act of sacrifice on the part of God. The creation of the primal humanity was an act of self-limitation, but the creation of Jesus Christ as human, through the assumption by the Divine Son, was more,—was sacrifice. As the highest conceivable and possible act of Love, the result was secure from failure. The secure result of the process as repeated in and by his brethren is only attained when love is perfect, which it is not *ab initio*, either in purity or in strength. But this beginning love, usually spoken of as faith, goes on through a career, more or less rapid, yet ever seeming tardy beside that of Jesus Christ, and, as a rule, is secure of the result. “God, who has begun a good work upon you, will continue it till the day of Christ.” Exception to the rule is thinkable, therefore possible. But the good work is, aside from such exception, continued in the individual and in the totality, whether we can follow it with our comprehension or not. Each member of the ultimate commonwealth is completed only by the completion of the whole ; and not till the whole body has assumed its rightful, faultless, and unchangeable relation to the head and heart, will the Son, who can no longer be severed in thought from his brethren, “be subject to him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all.”

Christianity thus meets with actual promise man's utmost aspiration. That which he feels he can never be content without, it declares that he shall obtain.

It is much to think that beneath the shows of things that are seen,—this alternation of physical, mental, and moral storm and sunshine,—there goes on this unseen process, which alone explains all the rid-

dles of the other. No wonder that to think it, is a task, and that faith is difficult, and sometimes trembles in terror, doubting whether it is within the compass of the Divine power to raise from the abyss of selfishness, brutality, and devilishness so many of our race who seem to be sunk in it. But to abandon such faith is to lose one's hold upon the good, and to sink one's self towards the same abyss. And we are warned to judge nothing before the time.

APPENDIX A.

THE SEMI-PANTHEISTIC OR SEMI-SABELLIAN THEORY.

THERE is one scheme of thinking upon speculative grounds, with various modifications, which adjusts itself very readily to the theologic scheme called Sabellianism, and which, at first glance, has great plausibility—so much so that those recoiling from the Deistic position inevitably fall into it, and rest there, if they do not proceed further to the Catholic doctrine of the Godhead. This scheme, not taken from any of its avowed advocates, whether philosophical or theological, but as it shapes itself in the mind of the present author as measurably coherent, may be stated as follows:

Here personality is, at the start also, assumed as the highest idea, whose origin must be found and acknowledged in the First Principle. The conditions for personality are also, in a certain form, acknowledged, viz., the relation of subject and object, of the Ego and the non-Ego. But the eternal object is not purely a personal one, but only by development reaches personality. Therefore it is not thought primarily as an object, which is also a subject, but as that which is to become such. It is no other than the universe itself, the projection into reality of the Divine thought, and that from eternity, so that that which exists of necessity is the Divine subject *plus* the object universe. This being, as is apparent, a changing one, furnishes occasion for the display of the Divine activity, of the Divine thought, and of the Divine benevolence, which thus come to be perceived, recognized, and felt by the intelligences to be produced (who are themselves Divine thoughts), so that

collective intelligence may be figured as a Son, holding a personal relation. The stages of the evolution may be called creations; the annulment, if accomplished, of the moral contradiction in this collective intelligence may be called Redemption; the moral elevation of the same, Sanctification; and the adjustment of the physical environment, thus showing forth the Divine thought, to the progressive advancement of these intelligent creatures, Regeneration. Thus God as creating or objectifying his thought may be called *the Father*, the thought thus objectified and developed into personality may be called *the Son*; as the Divine Energy mystically adapting the environment to the progressive changes of the personal object may be called the *Spirit*. Redemption, however, or the annulment of the moral contradiction, can only be predicated specially of the Son, if thought as the self-rectification of these intelligences, or aggregate humanity, under conditions supplied.

To escape the dilemma of Deism, or an idle God, this creation is figured as eternal: and, if by virtue of the same only can God be thought as self-conscious, and if personality in its full definition requires the relation of subject-object to subject-object, then in this universe there must ever have been intelligences capable of and constituting this relation.

In this scheme the difficulty which meets the intellect when first engaging itself with the doctrine of the Unity in Trinity of the First Principle, seems to be avoided; and a readier rest for the mind provided. It certainly must have philosophic strength, for it has captivated some of the finest minds of modern times, who have thought also that, in spite of the Catholic tradition, it is quite reconcilable with the New Testament writings. Men of philosophic education, and the consequent modes of statement, but knowing little of purely theological discussions, are very apt to rest in this scheme: as also are some having theological rearing, yet unacquainted with the past history of theologic science. In the history of Christian doctrine the old Arianism has almost entirely disappeared and is not likely to be again revived.

Unitarianism, in the Deistic form, is never rested in, exists only as a rejection of a suggested Tritheism, and always tends towards the scheme above described. Pure materialistic Pantheism, if it ever took shape, has already fallen to pieces of its own weakness, and its name is repudiated. Agnosticism, in its very endeavor to state and support itself, contradicts its own name. And any idealistic Pantheism may be stated in the terms of the scheme above described. In seeking after a satisfying conception of the First Principle, this and the Catholic doctrine, in the regard of the present author, are the only ones which have a future before them, alternatives for thought having sufficient strength to reward profound scrutiny. If it shall be found that the doctrine of the Unity in Trinity will bear the scrutiny of prolonged thinking as the other cannot, the fact that this conclusion will have been anticipated in the Christian Scriptures, which have guided to it, and whose strange and puzzling declarations are thus found to have implied a scheme which has the highest rationality, which is alone intelligible, or one having any meaning whatever; this fact will constitute additional evidence that we owe these same Scriptures to a providential interposition, and that they are an authoritative test of truth.

Of two rival schemes of thought, that is likely to be true which is most self-consistent, and this its inner coherence is the best refutation of the other. Our text exhibits the one scheme, and now let us recall for examination the other.

And first let us notice that the conception of the First Principle contained in this scheme does not come up to the dimension of a conception possible for us; and that in our thought we can transcend it; and if so, that the principle of causality is violated. This Being does not reach our idea of perfection. As a synthesis of subject and object, the object is imperfect, and therefore unsusceptible of the highest thinkable relation. This ever developing object either never reaches its *ultimatum*, in which case, as object it is ever deficient, and the full personal relation cannot appear; or if

it does, it would have done so in the past time, and we should have an unchanging *plenum*; or it must have been resolved again into its primal elements, and begin a new cycle, in the midst of which we now are. Thus the First Principle never reaches satisfaction, or reaches it only periodically. The Divine complacency is thus spasmodic and not perennial, and we must figure the First Principle as in perpetual unrest, and as never reaching such blessedness as we can think. One has to supplement this scheme with an imaginative endeavor, and supply another world with environment more favorable to moral development, and the production of perfect sons, than this, which has borne only its one unique fruit. Eastern thought has been very fertile here, and gives us transmigration after transmigration, in ample perplexity, and all conducting to a possible Nirvana. It is quite possible that this Semi-Pantheistic scheme, to impress or sustain itself may hereafter avail itself of the resources of Eastern thought. This Esoteric Buddhism, however, requires a separate critique, in which it can be shown that it is deficient in any true ethic, and therefore is built upon only a partial foundation. But this is beyond our present purpose.

Now, however, if moral facts and implications require the postulate of a loving First Principle, this must be in itself loving, and perfect reciprocity must exist within itself, and there is no need of a perpetual struggle to obtain it. The notion of freedom, or love having already its perfect object, yet ever from its very nature enriching itself by multiplication of objects, is, in the scheme under consideration, degenerated into the notion of a necessary struggle to attain that which is never perfectly attained. The idea of self-determination is victoriously assaulted, since limited by the possibilities of the objective development, seen to be thus imperfect.

With the endeavor to make the exegesis of the Christian Scriptures support this scheme, as a form of Sabellianism, we have nothing here to do; but we may remark that the form of holding the doctrine of the Holy Spirit must here be

greatly changed ; for the energy which eternally generates and changes the universe, resolving it into its primeval elements, and organizing it afresh, must be thought prior to any universe as determined, whereby the latter may bring forth a personal object. Thus the Christian formula would require to be precisely reversed, and we should have Spirit, Son, and Father, *i. e.*, the mystical generating movement must first be thought, whereby at length comes to pass, the Son, and thus is thought, the Father. The First Principle is thus made dependent upon humanity for its completeness ; and in such necessary evolution, moral distinctions, as absolute and eternal ones, have no legitimation, evil is only imperfection, and immortality itself disappears from the scheme of thought, except for such perfect sons as may be thrown up in this whirl.

This Semi-Pantheistic view starts with an optimistic feeling, giving us what looks like an æsthetically grand view of the world and humanity as elements of absolute being, but leaves us in a pessimistic frame of mind, since, being borne along in the changeless current of necessity, there is no sufficient ground for hope that the present contradiction and misery may not be ever-during. The Catholic doctrine, starting from a pessimistic feeling, arising from the contradiction, the sense of the sinfulness and the wretchedness of sin, conducts us through the pathway of Redemption and Regeneration to optimistic views.

The subtle conditions in the structure of the individual soul which lead it to prefer one scheme to the other is a secret, perhaps undiscoverable, known only to the Divine scrutiny and judgment ; and is what has been called the mystery of our eternal election.

APPENDIX B.

EXPLICATION OF THE IDEA OF CREATION.

WE have thought it wise to add a supplementary discussion to elucidate the doctrine of creation, issuing in the appearance of man as "the image of God."

The motive in the search after a First Principle is to account for the universe in every element of its definition, or characteristic displayed by it. It must account therefore not only for all existence, but for our own thought and feeling, and must legitimate our profound and ineradicable instincts. We have found in the Godhead, as in the text explicated, that which accounts for the thought in the universe, and for the activity which is forever manifesting the ideas so superabundant; and we have found in it the conditions for and the explanation of love or the social bond of intelligences. What remains to be accounted for is the means, or the material, by virtue of which the Divine Energy makes the Divine ideas *real*, *i. e.*, such that they can be recognized and enjoyed by created intelligences. This is something which we cannot successfully abstract or think away. We have to account for the existence of *matter*.

To say that matter is an equilibrium of *forces* is to us an unmeaning proposition, for we only know forces as modes of motion, guided by intelligence, and having an end or final cause. Force is an abstraction, and means simply the possibility of motion, and motion must therefore first be thought. It is, then, only a name for a conception derived from actual motion, and this requires the pre-supposition of something to move or be moved. This something must either be self-moved, in which case it is itself energy, and,

since always having an end, is intelligent ; or it is moved *ab extra* by such energy, which again is resolvable into intelligence and will, viz.: being, thought, and activity, mediated by a motive-spring, which is precisely what we have concluded the Godhead, thought as purely spiritual, to be. If thought thus as purely spiritual, there is nothing in the First Principle which can account for the birth of force, or even generate the notion. Pure thought cannot translate itself into imagination except by covertly assuming other conditions. This law of the human mind is that which must ever give validity and basis to schemes which assert the necessity of matter ; and we can only avoid this result by showing that it is not necessary to think matter in any determined form but only in its pure form ; which last, though refusing to come within the sphere of imagination and consequent description, may yet be a necessary element in all our thinking, held in the region of faith, and not yet come into knowledge.

The old expression that creation is something issuing out of nothing is unintelligible and contradictory. It is a synthetic proposition. We have simply added to our more or less carefully thought First Principle a universe, without showing any causal relation between the two. Such a universe could not manifest the First Principle, or contain any of its elements. It is the most incoherent form of Dualism. If the universe displays the First Principle it must come out of it. The principle of causality is as imperious here as elsewhere. We must find that in the First Principle, therefore, which can account for the material of the universe, as well as for the intelligence and activity displayed in it.

We can only know matter through our senses. We can think possible other senses by means of which we might know more of it. We find that some animals have such senses, or at least the existing ones sharpened to such degree as to suggest that more might by such means be known of it. But we cannot think that our senses deceive us, otherwise we cannot trust the faculties, by which all our knowl-

edge is reached. Though we know not the whole truth about matter, we know some elements of that truth. We may err in conclusions inferred from the imperfect *data* furnished by our senses, but their testimony we are obliged to trust. What are called the properties of matter are indeed relative to our intelligence, and it is impossible to think of matter but as relative to some intelligence. But we cannot think it away. Indeed, as I have said, we owe to it our very ability to think. We have without it, could the abstraction be made, only empty forms, *i. e.*, laws, not existences, and laws made possible for discovery only by existences. Whatever is beyond matter is only approachable through the medium of matter; and when by abstraction we seem to reach it, we find in it no function for imagination, no medium through which love could show itself to possible spiritual subjects capable of love. All warmth of feeling and all Beauty are lost. But we carry all these into our seeming abstraction, thus evincing that the abstraction has been only seeming.

History and science show us matter as having undergone and as undergoing incessant change. Its very laws determining these changes, and which now we trust as uniform, have been a progressive incoming. A new law came in with the new idea, and the new force or mode of motion, when vegetable life made its appearance in the inorganic world: and again at the incoming of animal life (if the two were not simultaneous and correlated); and again at the appearance of humanity. Each new idea displayed a mode of motion, having its particular spring and end, which overcame temporarily the forces which went before. Science and history do not yet show us the incoming of chemical upon mechanical laws in the remote past, or whether in primal matter they existed simultaneously, or whether they are reducible to unity. And strict science has nothing to say about the origin of mechanical laws, but assumes their existence as the starting-point of enquiry; but *a priori* speculation, which has been sustained thus far by the *a posteriori* process, has not been content to abandon the task of enquiry; and hence we have

the nebular hypothesis, and the slow accumulation of facts to support it. The evidence grows continually stronger that the material universe has been a development, and the display of ideas in an hierarchy, mounting nearer and nearer towards some dimly descried idea of perfection. But in any projected advance the material still remains. Its changes are the changes which enrich and beautify the universe, and give rise to human activity, knowledge, and joy. We can think no possibility of its disappearance in the future, or of its non-existence at any point of the past. (And both conclusions have support in the Christian Scriptures.) Could we think a time when it was not, we could never in thought bring it back. And, besides, we cannot imagine it as pure chaos, or without determination. Our *knowledge* thus falters when we attempt to think matter in its primitive simplicity, and before the existing system of determinations. Any atomic theory does not carry us beyond the region of these determinations, for these atoms, even if we abstract attraction and repulsion, still have shape and relative location in space. Science has not yet said her last word here, and the philosopher, and the theologian too, gratefully wait to see what results for their use are yet to be attained.

But as once before we found helpful, in constructing our idea of the Godhead as spiritual, the intimations of the Christian Scriptures, which enabled human thought to take so great a leap,—so perhaps we may find in them also a hint to help us to form a notion of the purely material. These Scriptures speak of something appertaining to the Godhead which cannot be resolved into the purely spiritual,—no other than the Divine Glory. All their utterances concerning this betoken it to be something other than spiritual. It is no mere complacency or subjective opinion (the later and degraded significance of the word as commonly used). It is not identical with the Divine blessedness, for it is that which may be obscured. It is what Father and Son shared before the world was, yet not identical with the Holy Spirit. It is

what the disciples caught a glimpse of on the mount of Transfiguration. The universe is spoken of as showing forth this Glory. It does not mean one thing in one place and another thing in another place, but its essential signification is everywhere implied. If it is ever resolved into a simpler and more comprehensible form of expression, it is identified with intense, pure, and perfect *Light*.

If light be, as some science concludes, a mode of motion in the hypothecated ether, or in attenuated atmosphere (as some few contend), and the perception by appropriate organs of such motion, it has then to be thought a result of spiritual energy operating upon matter that may be regarded as in itself inert. Thus this matter would be still the *prius* in thought. So too electrical phenomena are no longer regarded as the result of the motion of a particular and unique fluid, but as a special mode of motion in known matter, which presupposes likewise the energy and the material. The light thereby produced seems to be the result of velocity in extremely attenuated particles, disturbing the cohesion in a manner as yet eluding scientific observation. The displacement is temporary and immediately recovered from. The motion which produces ordinary light, produces also *heat*. Yet our science alleges all motion to be the result of heat, manifest or latent, *i. e.*, of light either pure or obscured. Here, then, the light has to be thought as the *prius*; and we have a seeming antinomy.

If the Divine Glory is eternal, and light existed as a mode of motion involving heat, and starting the motions of the developing universe, before perceived as light by created intelligences with adapted organs, then the first determination of the Divine Glory must be thought as its separation into the clear and obscure, whereby it could be perceived and known by such intelligences, through this contrast. Thus the first creative act is an act of limitation. The negation appears, action and reaction between the clear and the obscure become possible, and we have the beginning of development. Within the pure light there is the possibility of

the obscure, as within the infinite is the possibility of the finite. The Divine thoughts follow this primal determination of the Divine Glory, in constant succession, the universe becomes, and still proceeds in its process. This everywhere exhibits energy, thought, particular ends, and motive-spring, from all which we infer the ultimate end, or the realized idea.

These progressive determinations indicate that the universe, which we know, exists under time conditions, as well as under space conditions, and therefore had a beginning, and has a limit, both geometrical and arithmetical (*i. e.*, space is not a *plenum*, or there would be no motion, though it may be thought as nowhere unoccupied. It is the condition for the constant change in position of what it contains).

But are we necessitated to think that this our known universe will have an end? Such termination could only be something fixed and frozen,—universal death (which the conservation of energy shows to be impossible), or it is a resolution into its primal element, a cyclical movement, a running back into its pure and undetermined form, to begin afresh a new cycle of development. But against this we renew the objection formerly made. If the Godhead is infinite, it is exhaustless, and if the human being reflects the Divine, he reflects it in its infinity, and is capable, therefore, of an infinite expansion into a circumference which must forever recede. The universe cannot then collapse, and its determinations vanish, or human consciousness would be reduced to a blank, and be forced to begin its own new cycle. This is the thought reached by Eastern philosophy. The continuity in soul-existence is here broken. It lapses into forgetfulness periodically, or else carries into a new cycle the phantom of its former knowledge, to be contrasted with its new knowledge to be acquired, and so on endlessly. We have then a series of cycles between which there is no dialectic connection, and which cannot come within the powers of the human mind. Some sort of cyclical development may be indeed required to be thought, and *what*, we

shall see hereafter, but not one like this, which reduces all the determinations of the universe to nonentity, and among them the determined soul, whose very after recollection, if admitted, shows that these determinations have not been banished; and thus we are landed in a contradiction. We conclude then that it is not necessary to think that the universe as determined shall have an end (in which conclusion we are fortified by the Christian Scriptures).

The difficulty lies the other way. If the universe as we know it had a beginning, does this beginning of determination constitute *time*, and can we think existence as *timeless*? The very notion of a beginning requires the assumption of antecedent time. We cannot emancipate our mental movement from time conditions, and any result reached by abstraction of these is untrustworthy. This attempted abstraction lands us in pure being, with its ideas, its love and its possible energy. We have pure and abstract presence, science, and potence. That this abstraction has its use we shall see in another part of our enquiry. But the dilemma perpetually recurs, whether, thinking under time-conditions as we do, we are obliged to think the Godhead as inactive antecedent to the beginning of the development of the universe. Indeed, we *must* think the First Principle as in itself perfect, as requiring nothing beyond itself and its hypostases, as sharing its own pure Glory. We must think Love as having all its conditions of reciprocity fully supplied, and that any creation is therefore a free act. But Love, while metaphysically free, must, as Love, be self-necessitated to go beyond itself, to enrich itself. This we allege as the motive-spring in the creation of our universe. Can we think the Godhead, then, ever as inactive, and does not creation seem to spring from it from the very necessity which is the perfection of freedom? The naïve notion of an idle God is terrible to thought and feeling, and contradicts our profound instincts, and carries us beyond all analogy. Absolute *rest* is unthinkable. It is never found as actual. In the concrete, rest is only the cessation of one mode of motion that another may proceed

unmolested. There is no historic evidence that there was ever stillness or rest. Retrogressive movement there may be, but this never terminates in rest, but is rather preparation for new activity. The Biblical *void* is not rest, for the Spirit moved upon it, *i. e.*, it was in mystical motion, motion unknown to created intelligences, or at least unknowable for human intelligence.

The only escape from this dilemma, is to conclude that our known universe is not the true universe, but the adaptation of the same to our present limited faculties, and that the sphere of our knowledge does not measure the sphere of existence, that in it and beyond it are possibilities of knowledge, and an eternal activity. Into this region imagination cannot penetrate. Our predications are untrustworthy, yet faith here comprises this in its holding.¹

We have noted, in late years, the alleged discovery or claim that matter, when greatly attenuated, becomes radiant and self-luminous. Were this established, it would go to confirm the suggestion made above, that the primal cosmic motion was the obscuration of the primal pure light, whereby it could be manifested as light. The conjecture, too, arises that our sun may owe its light to the inherent property of its material in extreme attenuation. But again, this attenuation is due to heat, which is a known form of energy. Heat then derives again from the pure light breaking into

¹ Hegel calls matter a "negative unity," reached through annulling all special determinations. Since these determinations are all relative to mind, this is only one way of saying that matter can only *exist* as relative to mind. But if any synthesis of *thoughts* merely constitutes matter, it is reduced to spirit solely, and as such it must elude imagination, and can never become *real*. To be this, it must still be determinations of a *somewhat*. But as spirit itself, though a system of relations, has still in it a permanent, an eternal ground,—that which objectifies itself,—so matter must be thought as a system of relations having likewise a permanent ground. If it be asked whether in abstracting all determinations we have not reduced the Divine Glory to such a "negative unity," we reply that this is posited as a necessity for thought only. Thought can no more penetrate the abstract Divine Glory than it can the eternal ground of the spiritual Godhead. It can only move by virtue of the determinations in either case.

the clear and obscure, by which a system of relations and movement become possible. That the light in the universe is to grow purer, and not subside into darkness, seems thus a corollary from the incessant movement. As it becomes heat, it does not annihilate, but becomes destructive, which means reconstructive. The alloy is burned up, and the pure gold remains. The Scriptures speak of final and purifying fires, and also tell us "There shall be no night there."

But now, confining our attention to the universe as we know it, and regarding it thus as the outcome of the Divine Glory synthesized by the Divine Spirit, we must look to find everywhere in it, and in every grade of being, a manifestation of the spiritual Godhead, of the Trinity in Unity. Even in the first creative activity we see it, in the separation of the pure light into the clear and the obscure as the result of motion, whereby it is to be known as light to the intelligent senses that are to come. Here we have thought and energy issuing out of the primal being, the name of whose inter-relations is Love. The order is the same in the creative as in the described regenerative process. In this we are told that God the Father sent his Son, whose work is mediated by the Holy Spirit. In the creative work the Father further objectified himself in making real the thought which is the Logos, through the activity of the Holy Spirit, that there might be created sons to respond to his Love. Thus the time process reflects the eternal system of relations, and in their order. Everywhere the universe shows this triplicity,—principle, end, medium. In the inorganic world we find being made concrete as the Divine Glory determined by the Divine activity realizing the Divine thought. In the vegetable world we have another and higher thought made real through such activity; and in animal life another great leap,—the suggestion of independent life in the power of locomotion; and, above all, the Divine blessedness reflected in enjoyment. At length in man we reach that sum of Divine thoughts, than whose idea we can think no higher for created existence, and which therefore we call "the

image of God." The full significance of this phrase should be sought.

Here we do not regard it simply as a declaration of the Christian Scriptures, but as they confirm our thinking, and as a conclusion to be reached *a priori*. Man can only think God according to the requirements he finds within himself, and as that of which he himself is the highest known, if not the highest possible outcome; and within himself he finds the same triplicity as in other orders of existence, only transfigured by new elements. This triplicity has been variously stated, and under some forms not exhaustively. If the relative and dependent existence reflects the absolute and independent subsistence, it must contain within itself the implications of the absolute,—the essential relations and the proper order of the same. The mere notion of a created intelligence as the outcome of an eternal intelligence is not sufficient. Intelligence admits of degrees, and itself displays a hierarchy of ideas. It is the highest known created intelligence alone, in all its inner relations and essential conditions which can, with entire correctness, be said to be "the image of God." Therefore we must find the Trinity in Unity, in proper order and relation, reflected there. The various attempted definitions of this all have an element of truth, and do not exclude, but only supplement each other, and the historical sequence of these several attempts follows exactly the dialectic order.

Some have been satisfied to find this triplicity in "*body, soul, and spirit*," a phrase used by St. Paul. It is doubtful whether he was intending thereby to explicate the full notion of "the image of God," or was doing any thing more than stating the various forms under which the human being might be popularly regarded. But even if he was intending more, it by no means follows that he was thinking of these as three independent entities creatively united,—as a little analysis will suffice to show; for if such, neither one is necessary to the thought of the other, and thus there is no image of the Unity in Trinity; for this must reflect, and

in the proper order, the essential relations of the Godhead. Besides, as distinct entities, they do not come within our knowledge, and therefore the terms have no meaning. We know nothing of *body* without *soul*. Otherwise it is mere matter under control of the mechanical and chemical forces. To have a body the *animal* must have *soul*, or the life principle with its individual *schema*, which makes it an entity, and even here *spirit* is in relation, for the Divine enjoyment is reflected in this synthesis. Nor do we know any thing of soul without body, for if we think the human soul to exist independent of the combination of materials which constitute the present physical structure, we still cannot think it as utterly out of relation to an environment, which alone is the medium of any relation to other souls, though such relation escape our present knowledge.

And *spirit*, as distinguished from soul, is impersonal, and when used in the singular number as describing a concrete, means a spiritual soul. If we say "God is spirit," we mean to define spirit as a Trinity in Unity, whereby it is concrete. If we say that "God is *a* Spirit" we mean the same, but it would be inconsistent with this to say that God the Father was *a* spirit, also God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit. This would look like Tritheism, and could only be otherwise by thinking in reserve the essential relations which constitute Father, or Son, or the Holy Spirit. If we admit the phrase, "God (meaning the Godhead) is a spirit," or concrete entity incapable of separation except in mental abstraction, then, in the higher nature of man, thought apart from his animal soul and relation to his physical environment, we should look likewise to see the triplicity,—the purely spiritual reflected in the purely spiritual. This is legitimate, even though we find the Godhead likewise reflected in the entire synthesis, which constitutes humanity. But in the latter regard we must find in man that which gives unity to the whole, which is the soul, *i. e.*, the life-principle and its idea or *schema* made real or concrete through its relation to pure spirit and to matter, whereby it becomes spirit and

body. Thus to say "man is a spiritual soul," is equivalent to saying he is body, soul, and spirit, and is what the latter form of expression means, if it means any thing intelligible. As soul, body is implied, *i. e.*, some relation to the material or inorganic universe whereby it supplies itself with organs for feeling and for thought. The unconscious processes of our physical being go on even although our spiritual consciousness is suspended. Whether the spirit-soul consciousness may not yet remain, unmolested by disturbance through the senses, is a legitimate matter for enquiry, of which hereafter, —yet connection with the environment cannot be thought as utterly severed, even after death. But the *human* soul is never without its spirit-relations. These are rudimental even in the unborn child, for we learn afterward that it has carried spirit-traits along with its physical development. In this case the animal soul has been lifted up. Into it have been infused, inbreathed, radiated, (all figures insufficient to express it,) the inmost nature of God himself, love, persistence of being, the possibility of endless knowledge, the instinct of its origin and its destiny, and the dim outline of the end or final cause, the commonwealth of love, to be uncovered and made clear by its own self-development ;—all which makes it a spiritual soul. Though it die in the body, *i. e.*, though its existing relation to its environment give place to another, it does not thereby lose its individuality, as does the mere animal soul, but subsists still with some relation to the universe, through some supra-sensible organs, so that it is not utterly isolated. Thus as spiritual soul it is an image of the Unity in Trinity, and man, as an individual concrete, reflects God, as well as in his abstract spiritual being. The latter gives us (1) being, (2) being objectified, whereby it becomes thought, and the conditions for self-consciousness are supplied, and (3) will or activity, only thinkable by virtue of the other two, and (4) love or enjoyment, which is their unity, and that conception coming to birth only when these inter-relations have been thought.

All this, with regard to the individual human subject. But

there is still another, and richer and fuller sense in which man is "the image of God."

The individual man is not complete in himself, and no such thought as the merely individual man entered into the Divine idea of human creation. As individual he does not rise to true personality, which is something more than the relation between the Ego and the abstract non-Ego. As individual he cannot reproduce himself, or elicit his own finer potentialities. He must, through the Divine activity of which he is the medium, other himself, to become a spiritual unit. Thus from the man issues the woman, and the two are amplified to a higher unity. Love emerges, and love as such is active, and propagates itself and its objects, and thus we have for the man and the woman their offspring; a higher unity still emerges, and human society is imaged. And in this triplicity only is the human idea realized.

Thus the complete image of God is entire humanity, or rather, in our thought, redeemed and regenerated humanity, the contradiction having been annulled, and the whole organism harmonized; every member of which pre-supposes every other, and requires every other to elicit all its potentialities.

A homely mode of saying that man is thus an image of God is—that "if God were not in himself a social being, he could not have created human society." Solitary man would be no image of a God whose very being is Love. Therefore the family, the tribe, the nation, and human society, which, in the infinite division of energy and effort expended upon the inorganic world, and upon the lower orders of life, brings out new thoughts, and conditions the growing intelligence of the race, and the greater expansion of its select individuals. Yet the possibilities of love are not exhausted while there are any individuals not grasped within its brotherhood, while imperfection exists in the shape of sin and suffering, or of shortcoming in normal development, therefore the Church, the alone universal society, whose idea and aim is the completed and perfected organism.

Had man been normally developed from his primal innocence, and had he subdued the world, which afforded him the conditions for trial and the acquisition of spiritual strength, and made nature thus correspondent to himself, human society, upon which death would not have fallen, would have been commensurate with the Church; and the propagation of the race, existing in time and space, must have overflowed the bounds of this planet, and filled the orbs and stellar systems, and found in distance no bar to its required communications. But it may be thought that the race must at length have completed itself, and found a termination to its propagation, when its idea as an organism had been fulfilled; and this its completeness may be thought as synchronous with the Incarnation of the Eternal Son. Of this hereafter in the proper place; but if so, we have the "image of God" coalescing with that of which it is the image, in a higher unity still. Language is inadequate here, and the poverty of our means of expression is humbling. The apostle expressed his sense of its inadequacy when he said "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man the things which God hath prepared for them that love him," yet the dim vision of this triumphant issue had stirred the inmost depths of his being, and was the secret of his enthusiasm.

APPENDIX C.

RECONCILIATION OF THE INNOCENCE OF JESUS WITH HIS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT.

THE endeavor to bring within our comprehension the innocence of Jesus Christ, and to reconcile it with the fact of his human birth and development, may receive somewhat ampler explication,—which we give in an appendix.

In all *life*, animal or vegetable, it is still a mooted point in physiology whether any part of the *material* is derived from the male element or parent. Contact only may be needful to develop the germ. As the identity of the plant or the animal does not consist in the material particles, but rather in the growing and changing form or mould through which they run, there is no need to think that any one changeless particle, or unchangeable combination of such, is necessary to constitute or preserve identity. The germ afforded by the female is perfect, so far as its material is concerned. It needs only to be put in motion to begin to realize the idea wrapped up in it. That which puts it in motion is an energy bringing into coalescence another idea which avails itself, as the other, of a material element. Thus life is accomplished and becomes concrete by a *reciprocity* of ideas, meeting each other through physical *media*, and variant determinations come from either side, and the entire synthesis is thus accomplished which constitutes the new individual. There is nothing gained for thought, then, by supposing that any part of the material from the male is carried into the *ovum* of the female. It has no worth for life purposes as simply material, but only as this conveys the idea whose coalescence with the idea from the female con-

veyed through its material constitutes life. Life is thus reciprocity accomplished through a third element or energy, mystical, and not reducible to mechanical and chemical laws. Many organisms, indeed, show that the female alone is sufficient for life, and that it is transmitted otherwise than through the sexual relation ; yet even here it is reciprocity, since one seeks to other itself in its own likeness. This is the primary and simplest form of life.

The Divine Energy, which accomplishes any conception, works through these supplied conditions to realize the Divine thought in the particular *schema* of the individual. But in the case of humanity, with which we are immediately concerned, this *schema* is still the generic idea of the race in all its essential elements, though having these combined into a new and unique synthesis, so that no human being is like any other. (This is the true notion of individual Creation, which thus is not inconsistent with a true notion of Traduction.) This synthesis has, however, through the principle of heredity been modified into an idiosyncrasy in the particular individual, so that we have in every human being implicit *character*, to be itself again modified by the physical and social environment, and also by spiritual influences knowable and mystical.

Since, however, contradiction, or the sinful tendency, has entered humanity, we have in every individual a character whose implicit traits are contradictory, and the particular *schema* thus realized is abnormal, and not the pure idea of the race normally developed to the pure idiosyncrasy of its *schema*. Through heredity this idea has been historically determined, and the parent transmits to the offspring the entirety of the inherited tendencies, the agreeing and also the conflicting modifications of the entire ancestry, again to be modified by the particular historic development of the offspring ; but in every case these tendencies are discordant, and the whole synthesis stands in need of rectification. This is the *fact* called (perhaps not wisely) *Original Sin*, to which all observation and science attest.

In the conception of Jesus Christ, if we exclude the function of the earthly father, the current of tendencies ordinarily thus derived, is cut off. The idea to be realized is then no longer one determined to any idiosyncrasy from the earthly father's side. But as He is to be an individual man, there must be a particular *schema*, but this is now the normal idea of humanity. He is to be the perfect pattern man, for nothing less can be the aim of a new creation. Of this idea the Divine Logos furnishes the type or the anti-type, and so far as the Logos is the Son, He is the pattern of perfect Sonship. In this paternal-filial relation we can think that He may be followed by the new human race. As the Divine Logos he is exhaustless. Man's *love* may become perfect, but his *knowledge* is a growth which has no termination. The Divine infinity transcends the reach of any possible creature; or we should have pantheistic absorption, in which the reciprocal love also would disappear.

Thus in the Incarnation the Eternal Son restricts himself to the idea of humanity, and we are obliged to think a true *κένωσις*. He *becomes* human, as his form of being for redemptive, regenerative, and beatific purposes. He does not unite himself to a concrete humanity, but creates it, and in creating assumes it as the form of his own existence. This humanity, to be true, is to be developed, and we may say that in him it grows till it fills the mould furnished by the Divine Logos, and realizes the informing idea, which idea as the Son he does not transcend, though as the Logos he must of necessity transcend it. (We have discussed elsewhere, and in the text, the difficulties created by this seeming separation of his relation to the universe as the Divine Logos, from his relations to it through humanity as the Son.)

But, in this creation, development, and subsequent birth, what has been the function of his mother? To suppose that she supplies merely the characterless material would be to give her an insufficient function. For this only any woman would have answered as well. Indeed, thus only, she would not be a true mother, and we might decline to admit the hu-

manity of her offspring. She must be a mother in the fullest sense, and therefore must, as every mother, transmit soul-determinations, or the elements of *character*. It is no more a contradiction to think this,—that Jesus should have inherited from his mother elements of character, than it is to think that his education and culture should have been modified and limited by his physical, national, social, family, and friendly surroundings, for all these, as well as the other, constitute his environment, and come within the same modes of physical and spiritual determination. These soul-determinations, inherited from his mother, must constitute or comprise such propensities of actual human nature as make temptation possible in his case, *i. e.*, solicitation of his nature to gratify its innate instincts altogether irrespective of the ethical requirement, *i. e.*, as He calls it, to do the will of his Father, or his own purpose,—to gratify hunger, to shrink from physical pain, to love life and dread death; and also to feel the want of knowledge, and have the solicitation to reach it before the time, to run ahead of his own development. We do not think these limitations, thus required for the sacrificial purpose, as existing after his resurrection, and therefore do not think him then as liable to temptation. Knowledge and power and the glorified body have come to him then.

But, *ex hypothese*, amid all this temptation the will, which represents the entire soul in its spiritual as well as in its physical relations, must never swerve. To think that this is miraculously accomplished, and that no human strength is needed to preserve his innocence, is again to deny his moral development, and virtually his humanity, degrading it into a mere passive organ. He disappears as our human brother, and is only God needlessly disguised.

But we have seen that the abnormal tendencies derived from the earthly father, which have in ordinary humanity intensified temptation, have weakened spiritual strength, and lie back of the will, are wanting in his case. In their stead we have a new creation, and the pure idea of innocent humanity. The contribution of his earthly mother must be such, then, as not to carry captive the concrete nature, and as to

make the preservation of innocence possible. Here the propensity has been very strong to suppose a like innocence, if not an absolute moral perfection, in his mother. But this was a too easy, and a premature solution, which raises more difficulties than it allays. For this innocence or perfection could only have been wrought by severing her from organic connection with the race, or by a miracle wrought upon her as naturally generated, in which case there would have been no need of a new creation in her son, for the natural generation would have served as well, and the like process might have been repeated in every human individual. Moreover, it supposes humanity to be recoverable through a merely physical change or process, and severs this recovery entirely from any ethical pre-conditions. The suffering, strength, and triumph of Jesus Christ, the whole redemptive work, is a surplusage. His beauty, sublimity, pathos, and supreme attraction disappear.

It is not forbidden to think, however, that by a guiding providence, and through a carefully chosen ancestry, we have in Jesus' mother the abnormality of human development and character reduced to a *minimum*, and the utmost moral and religious attainment reached that was possible through the ordinary providential and mystical influences, such as could be before the new forces were started by the sacrificial Atonement of her Son. This may render it a little easier to think that even from the mother's side the inherited tendencies might be only so strong as to make temptation possible, and leave the will still impartial. This supposition is rendered more probably true by the discovery and the conviction, on other grounds, that a Divine purpose leading up to the Incarnation itself runs through all the dealings of God with humanity, giving them meaning. According to the Old-Testament intimations, the whole story of the Hebrew people was preliminary, not only foreshadowing the Divine entrance into humanity under the form of sacrifice, but providentially leading up to it by changes wrought in national and social conditions.

That there is such a classification, and a difference of ten-

dencies inherited from the male and female parents, much within observation confirms or renders probable. Ambition is mostly confined to men. Both it and pride take a different form in women. The ends kept in view in either form of selfishness are different. The character of pure spiritual evil, self-assertion, independency, is more discoverable in the male. The love of fellowship and recognition by others, as determined by external and physical relations, is more apparent in the female. The very sense of dependence in the female, is the negation of pure evil. The elements of character inherited from the idiosyncrasy of the mother are, beyond all question, different from those derived from the father. And, in the case before us, the former must be such in their combination as, without the latter, to make innocence possible and break the thread of human moral continuity, if the immaculate conception of Jesus and his actual sinlessness are admitted, even though, with our present knowledge, we cannot disentangle from each other the elements of character derived from human father and mother. Here is room for enquiry and thought in the future, by which light may be thrown upon this theological problem. For, could we find sufficient reason to think that the abnormal tendencies derived from the father are those of the soul as spiritual, and from the mother those of the soul in its physical and emotional continuity, we might see how Jesus, though born of a woman, was innocent, and able to preserve his innocence; and that his sinlessness was secured, not by a miraculous act overpowering his humanity, but through the fact that his humanity was a new creation, ideally perfect, and to be made really perfect through an ethical, *i. e.*, sacrificial process. Since He bore the consequences of the contradiction, the suffering and dying body and the limited mind, the result of the moral declension of the race,—his rescue from these, and hence the recovery of the race, both come from a moral return and through an ethical force,—from strength made possible, not by his birth from an innocent mother, but directly derived in his creation by the joint act of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, yet made actual through a true human experience.

APPENDIX D.

THE KENOTIC THEORY OF GESS.

WITH Gess¹ the kenosis is something real. The outgoing of the Logos from the Father is a suspension of the influx of the Eternal Life of the Father, who hath "life in himself," into the Son, in virtue of which the Son *pro tempore* ceases to have life in himself. The Son in becoming man lost the capacity to receive into himself the Father's life, and to cause that to flow forth from himself again. He lost, therefore, the self-sufficient life, of which omniscience and omnipotence are attributes. Losing this capacity and this life, He lost all consciousness of the same. What is left becomes or assumes the unconscious human germ, which is to recover itself as a developing human consciousness, till it becomes again identical with its former being. This flesh which He assumed, and his entire physical environment, become then a determining power. He was subject to the law of human development and grew up under the usual human limitations. The potency or abstract capacity was there from the first, for the Logos essence remained unchangeable; but the attributes were in a state of rest, out of which they could not return into a state of activity as long as the

¹A Translation of Gess' "Die Lehre von der Person Christi," has been published at Andover, Mass. "Martensen's Dogmatics" is well known. A very lucid reproduction of the distinctive features of these Christologies, as well as of those of Thomasius and Ebrard, is to be found in the work, "The Humiliation of Christ," by Alex. B. Bruce, D.D., Edinburgh, of which the present author has availed himself. But his criticisms are independent and different. He has not thought it needful to criticise the views of Liebner, Beyschlag, and others, nor the older Christologies, as the purpose of this work is constructive, and critical only so far as is needful to bound more strictly the construction.

eternal self-consciousness was not there. This was re-attained, not by recollection, but by his human intellectual and moral development. But as in all men there is a certain instinct of their origin and destiny, so there was in him. This might cause a recollection of his preëxistence occasionally to flash through his human consciousness, and may explain his utterances in the temple and elsewhere, which exhibit an increasing distinctness.

There is much beside in Gess' exposition, which is coincident with other expositions, but the above gives what is distinctive. While there are elements of truth to be extracted from this, yet as a totality it is unsatisfactory. Indeed it requires much explanation and elasticity of meaning to make this theory self-consistent ; for, first : If what the Son received from the Father, the eternal life, be lost, what is there left ? To have life in one's self is a predication of the Divine, and that which hath not life in itself is not Divine. Is there some abstract being distinct from the Father ?

If this can be thought, He is no longer his perfect image, and we have a Tritheistic or a Dualistic scheme. Again, as to this *residuum*, after the cessation of the influx of life, has it any determinations ? What is the nucleus which has parted with its relations and its attributes, and is to recover the same, and how to be described ? This "potence and abstract capacity" needs definition, and to define it in any way is to bring back in measure the very relations and attributes in some form it is said to have lost. The conditions of primary theologic thought are thus violated. This theory supposes it to be thinkable that the eternal relations which constitute the Godhead can be other than they are ; that instead of the persons of the Trinity being conditioned and conditioning, the eternal begetting of the Son by the Father is of free Love, and not an eternal necessity, and therefore may cease by another act of free Love (a notion perilously near to the Arian view). The fatal objection to this is that we are called upon to think God as loving and *willing* before the essential conditions of self-consciousness,


ergo, of love and of will, are, in thought, supplied. Will cannot be thought, if the eternal generation is not previously thought, and as absolutely necessary,—for otherwise we have to think an interior Godhead back of the other, about whom the same difficulty inheres.


Besides, if the depotentialization of the Logos, arising from the obscuration of his consciousness as the Eternal Son, be thought so complete, He either ceases to be a determining power in the human development, *or*, this abstract *residuum* must be regarded as the determining power, which, being without consciousness, and therefore without loving will, is reduced to a physical mechanism, and issues in a purely physical result; and no properly ethical results can issue from the same. No Divine-human consciousness could thence arise. Moreover, the development being thus carried on without modification by the Divine consciousness of the Logos, and so not thought as loving, cannot be redemptive. Love expired in its own self-oblivion, and the development of the created humanity could only issue in possible human love, and that not produced by the Divine Love in continuity. Thus any gradual change in the complex human nature during the ethical development can no longer be thought. Jesus' miracles are wrought *through* him passively, and not *by* him. Omnipotence is gained not by steps and degrees, but only *per saltum* and at the end of his human experience. The exegetical difficulties here are immense. Again, if the Logos is not a determining power in the human development, there can no longer be maintained the *non posse peccare*, but only the *posse non peccare*, and as dependent upon the foreknowledge of the Father that the issue of the Incarnation would not fail of the intended result; which failure, then, is not only metaphysically possible, (*i. e.*, as a corollary of human freedom), but morally possible, and there is no absolute security against defection. This is, indeed, Gess' view, and, according to it any uniqueness in the humanity of Jesus Christ disappears as essential. Besides, this view of his cannot even be reconciled with his

own idea of creationism. This depotentiated Logos either assumes a human soul, without him and otherwise created (which is Nestorianism), or it *is* the human soul, and the abstract *residuum* after the life of the Father is withdrawn is the abstract ground of human nature itself. If purely abstract, it cannot be a something. If concrete, we have a fateful background out of which the Godhead itself arises, and which must be previously thought; or else the Logos is the essentially human, into which the Divine life had been in-breathed, yet from which it was withdrawn, as the prime condition of the Incarnation. According to this we would have to think the abstract human ground before thinking the Divine Logos, who is thus not essentially and necessarily Divine, but only temporarily, freely, and purposely so, a view which, again, might be made to coalesce with the Arian.

Thus, in the laudable endeavor of Gess to make the human side of Jesus thinkable, too much of the Divine is sacrificed, and the difficulties for thought are not abridged but multiplied.

END OF VOL. I.





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